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This dissertation examines the history of multiracial alliances among 
internationalist radical activists in the San Francisco Bay Area from the late 1960s 
through the 1970s. Using the approaches of social movement history and intellectual 
history, I critically assess the ideological motivations radicals held for building alliances 
and the difficulties they encountered with their subsequent coalitional work in four areas 
of coalescence—the antiwar movement, political prisoner solidarity, higher education, 
and electoral politics. Radical activists sought to dismantle the systemic racism (as well 
as economic exploitation, patriarchy, and the intersections of these oppressions) that 
structured U.S. society, through the creation of broad-based movements with likeminded 
organizations. The activists in this study also held an orientation toward internationalist 
solidarity, linking the structural oppressions against which they struggled in the United 
States to the Vietnam War and other U.S. militaristic interventions overseas and viewing 
these entanglements as interconnected forces that exploited the masses around the world.  
Scholarly and popular interpretations of Sixties radical movements have 
traditionally characterized them as narrowly-focused and divisive. In contrast, my 
research highlights the persistent desire among Bay Area radicals to form alliances across 
these decades, which I argue demonstrates the importance of collaborative organizing 
within these activist networks. Scholarship on coalitional politics also tends to emphasize 
“unlikely alliances” between “strange bedfellows.” In contrast, this project illuminates 
how sharing similar ideological principles predisposed these radical organizations to 
creating alliances with others. Coalitions remain integral to contemporary social and 
political movements, and excavating the possibilities but also problems within previous 
ii 
broad-based organizing efforts provides a usable history for understanding and 
confronting societal issues in the present day. At the same time, the multifarious 
manifestations of racism and other systems of inequality demonstrate the need to first 
understand how these oppressions affect minority groups uniquely, before we can 
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The 1960s and 70s marked the apex of visible radical activism in the history of 
the United States, an era that carried reverberations into the present day. Perhaps the most 
prominent rallying cry to arise during this time was, “All Power to the People.” This 
phrase embodied one of the distinguishing characteristics of radical activism from more 
mainstream contemporary forms: the shift from primarily focusing on securing 
minorities’ civil rights and protections under the law to a more immediate attainment of 
control over the social, economic, and political institutions and systems that structured 
their lives. 
Former Black Panther Party (BPP) spokesperson Kathleen Cleaver expounded on 
this idea at a 1998 Howard University symposium on the edited volume The Black 
Panther Party Reconsidered, an early contribution within the emergent scholarship of the 
Panthers over the past twenty years. Reflecting on her activist history in her “Women, 
Power, and Revolution” speech, Cleaver discussed the mid-1960s shift within her first 
activist organization, the Student Nonviolent Committee (SNCC). SNCC transitioned 
from fighting for “Freedom Now” to advocating “Black Power” in the struggle to 
eradicate the “legal, social, psychological, economic, and political limitations” Black 
Americans experienced.1 By the time she joined the Oakland chapter of the Black Panther 
Party in November 1967, Cleaver continued, her generation of activists increasingly 
                                                 
     1 Kathleen Cleaver, “Women, Power, and Revolution,” in Liberation, Imagination and the Black 
Panther Party: A New Look at the Black Panthers and Their Legacy, ed. Kathleen Cleaver and George 
Katsiaficas  (New York: Routledge, 2001), 123. 
 2 
fought to end other oppression intertwined with the racism they experienced, particularly 
U.S. military interventions overseas, class domination from the “capitalist powers” of the 
world, and gender discrimination.2 
Cleaver also touched briefly on the multiracial nature Sixties-era anti-racist 
activists, emphasizing the efforts of the Black Panther Party to create connections with 
organizations from a diversity of backgrounds: 
In a world of racist polarization, we sought solidarity. We called for Black power 
for Black people, Red power for Red people, Brown power for Brown people, 
Yellow power for Yellow people, and, as Eldridge Cleaver [former BPP Minister 
of Information and late husband of Kathleen Cleaver] used to say, White power 
for White people, because all they’d known was “Pig power.”3 
 
Across the country in the late 1960s through the 1970s, the Black Panther Party created 
alliances with activists ranging from the Chicana/o Brown Berets and Chinese American 
Red Guard Party in the urban US West to the Puerto Rican Young Lords and the 
Appalachian migrant Young Patriots Party in Chicago. Through these alliances, these 
radicals sought to create a world liberated from the oppressive limitations Cleaver 
discussed for all people within and outside of the United States. 
Yet this explanation of “All Power to the People” highlighted potential problems 
in the application of this phrase. For one, it implied a similar societal position among all 
working-class people struggling against capitalism, erasing the ways that white 
supremacy worked in conjunction with capitalism to perpetuate itself. Cleaver’s analysis 
also glossed over the differences among racial minority groups and the unique histories 
                                                 
     2 Cleaver, “Women, Power, and Revolution,” 124. 
 
     3 Ibid., 125. 
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and problems that differ from other racial groups. As feminist scholar Andrea Smith 
articulates, white supremacy oppresses different racial minorities based on different 
logics; in the context of the 1960s and 1970s, this manifested in divergences in strategies 
and mobilizations among racial minority activists along with the convergences.4 In 
addition, as often with radicals during this era, Cleaver’s rhetoric presupposes an 
inclination toward unity among racial minorities and the working class. Such alliances, 
however, often were characterized by a seemingly contradictory ubiquity and 
unsustainability, as coalitions and solidarity movements abounded while rarely lasting 
beyond a few years. It is this point from which this study departs in exploration of this 
seemingly contradictory dynamic.  
This dissertation explores the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of 
multiracial radical alliances5 in the San Francisco Bay Area from 1967 to 1980. Using the 
approaches of intellectual history and social movement history, I examine the ideological 
underpinnings of Bay Area radicals’ desire for alliance-building endeavors while also 
                                                 
     4 Andrea Smith, “Indigeneity, Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy,” in Racial Formation in the 
Twenty-First Century, ed. Daniel Martinez HoSang, Oneka LaBennett, Laura Pulido (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2010), 68-69. Smith identifies “three primary logics” of white 
supremacy: slavery (Blackness as synonymous with “slaveability”), genocide, resulting in the erasure of 
Indigenous people and traces of their histories and cultures; and orientalism, or the believed perpetual 
“otherness” of those deemed as outside threats of US society. Smith also clarifies in a later interview that 
other logics might exist that constitute white supremacy, with the central idea remaining that  white 
supremacy “operates through multiple logics...are related to each other...and oppress you [racial minorities] 
by making you think that the way to survive is to take part in the other pillars,” such as people of color 
serving in the military against Orientalist enemies. Andrea Smith, quoted in Sharmeen Khan, David Hugill, 
and Tyler McCreary, “Building Unlikely Alliances: An Interview with Andrea Smith,” Upping the Anti, 10, 
<http://uppingtheanti.org/journal/article/10-building-unlikely-alliances-an-interview-with-andrea-s mith/>. 
 
     5 I use “alliance” as an umbrella term under which “coalition” and “solidarity” fall. I define “coalition” 
as a formal merger, temporary or permanent, between two or more organizations or other contingents, 
working actively in tandem toward common goals. I use the term “solidarity” in reference to any public 
proclamations of support from an individual or organization to another. 
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delineating the difficulties of living out this revolutionary praxis. The Bay Area served as 
a locus for radical activism throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as the anti-war and peace, 
Black Power, Asian American, feminist and women’s, American Indian, various 
Latina/o, New Communist, gay and lesbian liberation, environmental, and other 
movements found a base throughout Bay Area communities. In turn, many of these 
radicals and radical organizations sought to forge alliances with others, envisioning 
themselves as combating common enemies, particularly racism, class oppression, and 
patriarchy. Indeed, as I demonstrate throughout this study, multiracial alliances 
comprised a central yet understudied aspect of the history of postwar radicalism in the 
United States, both in the Bay Area and beyond. 
Radicalism, for the purposes of this dissertation, refers to ideas and actions aimed 
toward creating fundamental changes within (or in some cases, the complete dismantling 
of) the structures, institutions, and systems that oversee societies. What exactly 
constitutes “radicalism” remains difficult to pin down, since determining whether 
someone or something is “radical” or not is subject to specific historical contingencies. 
To narrow the subject base for this study, this dissertation will examine activists who 
organized around three symbiotic ideological currents that ran throughout radical leftist 
activism in the context of the post-World War II Bay Area.  
Internationalism comprised the first and most encompassing of these currents.6 
This dissertation defines internationalism as the orientation of an individual or group 
toward envisioning themselves as part of a larger global community beyond the 
                                                 
     6 Although many anarchists have historically been both internationalist and radical, their history in the 
Bay Area during this time is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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boundaries of their locales and countries. Bay Area radicals drew their internationalist 
inspiration from two interrelated developments in the postwar world: the continual 
growth of communism around the world and the decolonization and national liberation 
movements in the Third World of Africa, Asian, and Latin America. Although 
international unity among communists faltered as the Cold War era progressed, 
particularly with the Sino-Soviet split of the 1950s, the political critiques and strategies 
for social change outlined by theorists such as Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Mao 
Zedong sustained the veracity of communism as a vision for societal reorganization 
throughout the world.7 In addition, people of color radicals in the United States drew 
upon the ideologies of Third World liberation revolutionaries such as Franz Fanon and 
Che Guevara in theorizing their strategies for societal change. 
Yet these radicals did not typically just try to rigidly apply these theories of 
revolution to their work in the United States; rather, Bay Area radicals incorporated these 
theoretical insights into analyses of their local conditions and national developments, 
dialectically formulating dynamic new theories of capital, the state, and the intersections 
of racial, class, and gender oppression in a U.S. context that would serve to mobilize the 
U.S. masses. From anti-war activism and political prisoner movements to the building of 
a U.S. vanguard party and the eventual shift toward electoral politics, radicals within the 
Bay Area sought and often found allies in these struggles throughout different “sites” of 
alliance. Bay Area radicals oriented themselves (at the very least, rhetorically) toward the 
                                                 
     7 In the United States, the Communist Party USA and other communist entities faced govern ment 
repression throughout most of the early twentieth century, particularly from the 1930s through the 
McCarthy era of the 1950s. By the 1960s, however, the country saw a resurgence in the prominence of 
communist ideologies among activists on the left, particularly with Marxism-Lenin ism and Maoism. 
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collective liberation of all oppressed peoples, and forming alliances with other activists 
across the lines of race (as well as class, gender, and other social divisions) served as a 
viable and desirable strategy in the struggle against multiple, often intersecting forms of 
oppression. Not only did the ideological underpinnings of these organizations stress the 
need for radicals to advance their causes across racial lines; these radicals also saw the 
benefits and fruits of multiracial organizing and thus placed this at the heart of their 
revolutionary praxis. 
Historian Jason Ferreira has conceptualized internationalist radicalism in San 
Francisco during this time as a “polycentric Third World movement” and an “imagined 
political community.”8 Situating oneself within a broader Third World or other 
internationalist imaginary necessitated the negotiation of these radicals’ subjectivities. 
People of color radicals also simultaneously negotiated new multi-/pan-ethnic racial 
identities that served to unify historically-disparate ethnic groups into larger political 
entities that also tended to have internationalist orientations.9 This process of negotiation 
at times caused issues. Historian Judy Tzu-Chun Wu has noted that a form of “radical 
Orientalism” developed among U.S. Third World radicals during this time, where instead 
of creating an East-West binary that denigrated the East, U.S. radicals held the 
                                                 
     8 Jason Ferreira, “‘With the Soul of a Human Rainbow’: Los Siete, Black Panthers, and Third Worldism 
in San Francisco,” in Ten Years that Shook the City: San Francisco, 1968-1978, edited by Chris Carlsson 
with Lisa Ruth Elliott (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2011), 40. 
 
     9 For more on the process of racial formation during this era, see Michael Omi and Howard Winant, 
Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, Second Edition (New York: 
Routledge, 1994); Yen Le Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), especially Chapter 2; and Tomás F. Summers Sandoval, Jr., 
Latinos at the Golden Gate: Creating Community and Identity in San Francisco (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2013), especially Chapters 4 and 5. 
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revolutionaries in China, Viet Nam, and other parts of Asia as inspirations and models for 
what revolution in the United States could be, thus creating romanticized and idealized 
visions of these revolutionaries, who were essentially above reproach.10 Despite this and 
similar pitfalls, radicals’ situating themselves within the broader global context of 
national liberation struggles formed a critical element of their ideological development 
toward alliance-building endeavors.11 
Anti-imperialism comprised the second major ideological current within the 
larger Bay Area internationalist radical community in the 1960s and 1970s. I define anti-
imperialism as a political orientation against the militaristic, political, economic, and 
cultural imposition of one country or other entity over another. The applicatio n of ideas 
regarding imperialism and colonialism differed among activist organizations. Because of 
their unique history as the Indigenous people of what became the United States, 
American Indians activists struggled with issues stemming from the legacies and 
continuing realities of US settler colonialism. For Black radicals and other non-
Indigenous people of color, the rhetoric of “internal colonialism” served as a metaphor 
for the structural and institutional racism they faced in their lives, particularly the 
segregation and discrimination they faced within urban America. In line with their 
internationalist orientation, radicals articulated racism and other forms of oppression they 
experienced in the United States as domestic forms of imperialism connected with U.S. 
                                                 
     10 Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, Radicals on the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism during the 
Vietnam Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 4. 
 
     11 This dissertation will also sporadically discuss various transnational radical organizations, such as the 
Union of Democratic Filipinos (Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino, or the KDP), who bridged the 
divide between imaging themselves as part of the Third World struggle and formally becoming part of a 
Third World revolutionary movement. 
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interventions overseas. This articulation strengthened these radicals’ understanding of 
themselves as part of global revolutionary and liberation movements, since their 
resistance to U.S. domestic imperialism connected with anti-colonial resistance 
movements against traditional empires of the West, particularly the United States’ 
interventions into Southeast Asia and Latin America. That these imperialist interventions 
in the Third World was rooted in the perpetuation of what sociologist Howard Winant has 
called the “social fact” of racial inequality that the West had implanted into their colonies 
only provided further motivation for US radicals to support Third World national 
liberation movements.12 And this solidarity between US activists and Third World 
revolutionaries also fostered solidarity among self-proclaimed Third World peoples 
(racial minorities) within the United States. 
Self-determination comprised the third major ideological current among Bay Area 
internationalist radicals. For the purposes of this study, I define self-determination as the 
capacity for a commonly-identified people group to control the governance, institutions, 
and systems of production within their community or society. The definition of “self-
determination” varied among Bay Area radicals; while radicals such as the Black Panther 
Party, Los Siete de La Raza, and the Red Guard Party/I Wor Kuen viewed self-
determination as community control of local institutions and governance, American 
Indian radicals viewed the struggle for self-determination in terms of gaining recognition 
and fulfillment of treaties between indigenous nations and the United States federal 
government, along with increased sovereignty in land-use and other rights. Although 
                                                 
     12 Howard Winant, The World is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War II (New York: Basic 
Books, 2001), 1. 
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these specific conceptualizations of self-determination differed, Bay Area radicals 
understood the importance of oppressed peoples gaining autonomy away from their 
oppressors. Working in conjunction with likeminded oppressed peoples provided one 
avenue toward realizing the goals of the struggle for self-determination. 
These three ideological currents pushed radical activists to create organizations 
and movements that addressed a broad range of issues. Bay Area radicals articulated the 
connections between different forms of oppression, most commonly the intersection 
between racism and the economic exploitation of the working class, with these activists 
often including women’s oppression as tied to the former two. Male-dominated 
organizations frequently subordinated anti-patriarchy to anti-racist and anti-capitalist 
endeavors within their agendas. Much of the Left at this juncture also did not consider 
homophobia and heteronormativity important enough to warrant central opposition like 
racism, economic exploitation, and sexism and patriarchy until the late 1970s or beyond. 
Venceremos Brigade member and later Third World Women’s Alliance leader Miriam 
Ching Yoon Louie recalls her organization’s internal debates over this question for the 
better part of the 1970s, finally accepting anti-homophobia as an integral part of their 
activism in the 1980s after they had transformed themselves into the Alliance Against 
Women’s Oppression. More surprisingly, some organizations like the Socialist Workers 
Party and the Revolutionary Communist Party (previously the Bay Area Revolutionary 
Union, then just the Revolutionary Union) considered homosexuality to actually be 
counterrevolutionary, whether because they argued it attracted another form of negative 
attention to the organization like the former or because they believed male homosexuality 
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led to the oppression of women like the latter. As feminist political scientist Wendy 
Brown theorizes, movements and political projects oriented toward liberating oppressed 
peoples often replicate society’s unequal power dynamics within these constituencies.13 
The persistent marginalization of women and LGBTQ communities during the 1960s and 
70s thus stunted an even greater potential toward social change within US society.   
In addition, for all their ideological reformulations and desires to form alliances, 
Bay Area radicals found alliances difficult to sustain over long periods of time, with most 
lasting no more than a few years. Earlier alliances formed the foundation for later ones, 
creating what I term “genealogies of alliance”14 from one organization to others from the 
late 1960s through the 1970s. Although certain alliances might have fallen apart, they 
often laid the foundation for future collaborations, often spearheaded by individuals who 
moved from organization to organizations. I argue that these persistent efforts to form 
alliances across different mobilizations, issues, and organizations demonstrated the 
importance radical activists placed in coalitional politics, even though maintaining a 
united front against all forms of oppression proved elusive. Despite their shortcomings, 
these alliance-building efforts (along with others across the country) comprise an 
important chapter of Sixties radicalism that historians only recently have seriously 
engaged. 
 
                                                 
     13 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), ix, 3. 
 
     14 Although she does not use the specific phrase “genealogies of alliance,” Emily Hobson describes this 
idea in part in her recent study of LGBTQ radicals in San Francisco and Los Angeles from the mid- to late 
1960s. Emily Hobson, “Imagining Alliances: Queer Anti-Imperialism and Race in California, 1966-1990,” 
PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2009. 
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Parameters and Methodology 
This dissertation focuses on a subset of the multitude of organizations comprising 
the Bay Area internationalist radical community, focusing on what sociologist Philip 
Selznick has termed the “grass tops” of this community.15 Put another way, I emphasize 
the leadership among these grassroots organizations, since leadership most often steer 
organizations’ ideological course  The organizations I examine were primarily based on 
similar racial or ethnic identities, such as the Black Panther Party, Brown Berets, Asian 
American Political Alliance, and La Raza Unida Party, but at times also were multiracial 
in composition, such as with the Venceremos organization, the Third World Women’s 
Alliance, and the April Coalition. While not representative of the entirety of the Bay Area 
radicals, the subject base I have chosen for this study exhibited broad visions of what 
their liberation from oppression would look like and were eager in their endeavors toward 
building alliances.  
Although alliances among radicals occurred at the state and national level as well, 
this dissertation hones its scope to a local study in order to more clearly illuminate the 
intricacies and exigencies of the process of forging alliances during this time. Rather than 
looking solely at one city or region, this paper defines “local” as the San Francisco 
metropolitan area as a whole, focusing primarily on Oakland, Berkeley, and San 
Francisco, while including cities south of these ones, such as East Palo Alto and San Jose. 
The growing interconnectedness of the Bay Area via improvements in public 
                                                 
     15 Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949). I first encountered this term in Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, 
Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 2. 
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transportation, the highway system, and communications technologies provided radicals 
greater ease in regularly meeting and organizing with each other. Historian Quintard 
Taylor has recently noted the need to write histories using the metropolitan area as a unit 
of analysis, and while Taylor characterizes “metropolitan” as “urban and suburban,” his 
central point about examining urban areas as larger interconnected entities remains 
pertinent for this dissertation project.16 
Numerous factors provide the rationale for the periodization in this dissertation. 
Although the early and late parts of the dissertation will delve into the years before 1967 
and after 1980, the bulk of the dissertation will occur within this timeframe. This 
dissertation resists easy periodization of the “Sixties” versus the “Seventies” and seeks to 
bridge these two broader periodization schemes. 1967 serves as an ideal starting point for 
this dissertation for two reasons. First, the Spring Mobilization to End the Vietnam 
War—a nationwide mobilization with a western United States rally point in San 
Francisco—in April of this year marked one of the first antiwar protests that prominently 
featured radicals in a multiracial setting. Although the Spring Mobilization as a whole 
was not radical, comprising primarily of reform-minded and U.S. home front-oriented 
activists, radicals such as future Black Panther Party leader Eldridge Cleaver played a 
central role in planning and speaking at the mass rally. The Spring Mobilization steering 
committee also featured a separate Black Caucus and a Mexican Caucus, thus 
demonstrating an understanding of the differential experiences of different activists in 
                                                 
     16 Quintard Taylor, Jr., “People of Color in the West: A Half Century of Scholarship,” Western 
Historical Quarterly, 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 313-318. 
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resisting a common oppressive force.17 1980 marks a suitable ending point for this 
dissertation, since virtually all of the core organizations examined within this project 
disbanded by this date, and the few that remained, such as the Black Panther Party and 
the Bay Area Revolutionary Union, by then recast as the Revolutionary Communist 
Party, had seen their public support and appeal all but vanished. 
Methodologically, this study relies on research and analysis of archival materials, 
newspapers and other periodicals, audio recordings, photographs, video film, 
organizational pamphlets, newsletters, flyers, and other publicity literature, along with 
internal memos and correspondence, and government documents. I also employ the 
methods of oral history research, particularly to fill the gaps in the archival record. Oral 
histories prove particularly necessary to highlight the experiences of women radicals, as 
men often dominated the leadership and decision making of mixed-sex organizations and 
marginalized women’s voices and perspectives in the process. Although at times 
discrepancies existed between written and oral efforts, I avoided privileging one medium 
over the other and instead weighed the sources against each other and other sources, 
marshaling the evidence until I could come to a conclusion or presenting the discrepancy 
when unable to do so. 
 
Scholarly Literature and Contribution 
The extant scholarly literature on radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s is 
voluminous, with a particular upsurge of publications since the turn of the millennium. 
                                                 
     17 “Steering Committee for Spring Mobilization” Box 2, Folder 3, Phillip Shapiro Papers, Special 
Collections, Stanford University 
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Much of this scholarship over the past fifteen or so years has centered the experiences of 
radicals of color, highlighting their heretofore underappreciated centrality during this 
historical moment. In addition, this recent scholarship has sought to disabuse the 
previously-dominant dichotomy of the “good Sixties” versus the “bad Sixties.”18 At 
times, the “good Sixties”/“bad Sixties” divide contrasts the non-violence of African 
American civil rights activists, the Students for a Democratic Society, and other white 
“New Left” organizations with the violent rhetoric and actions of organizations such as 
the Black Panther Party, the Weather Underground, and the American Indian Movement. 
More commonly, this dichotomy either neglects to include much discussion of the more 
“identity-politics” organized groups and movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
within the Black Power, Chicano, American Indian, Asian American, women’s, LGBTQ, 
and other movements or casts these groups as being too divisive with other leftist 
activists and impeding the creation of a unified U.S. Left in the political and social arena. 
Yet as scholars such as Elizabeth Martinez and Robin D.G. Kelley have noted, these 
alleged “bad Sixties” organizations formed because other organizat ions did not 
adequately advocate a broad enough platform for collective liberation and failed to 
integrate the struggles against racial, class, gender, and sexual orientation oppression into 
their agendas; these allegedly “more divisive” organizations actually tended to have 
                                                 
     18 Historian and former activist Paul Buhle coined the “good sixties/bad sixties” term. Paul Buhle, 
“Madison Revisited,” Radical History Review 57 (1993): 248.  The most prominent example of the “good 
Sixties”/“bad Sixties” dichotomy comes from Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1987). Other scholars who reinforce this binary include Michael Kazin and Maurice 
Isserman, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s, Fourth Edition (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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broader and more comprehensive critiques against these intertwined forms of oppression 
and sought to eradicate them simultaneously.19 
The current scholarship tends to examine radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s 
within one racial or ethnic group. Yet whether with the Black Power Movement and the 
Black Panther Party, the Brown Berets within the Chicano Movement, other Latina/o 
organizations such as the Puerto Rican Young Lords, the Asian American movement, 
American Indian radicals and Red Power, or predominantly-white organizations like the 
Weather Underground, scholars tend to leave traces and hints of multiracial coalitions 
and solidarity within their work. Some scholars, such as historians Jeffrey O.G. Ogbar 
and Daryl Maeda, have devoted chapters of their larger monographs to multiracial 
alliances among radicals during this era. Yet overall, much of the recent literature 
confines itself to this narrower scope.20 
The past fifteen or so years, however, has also seen the slow development of the 
historiography of multiracial radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s. Max Elbaum provides 
one of the earliest treatments of this subject in this recent historiography in his 2001 
Revolution in the Air. Elbaum explicitly works against the “good Sixties”/“bad Sixties” 
                                                 
     19 For more criticisms and deconstructions of the “good Sixties”/“bad Sixties” dichotomy, see Elizabeth 
Martinez, De Colores Means All of Us: Latina Views for a Multi-Colored Century (Cambridge, MA: South 
End Press, 1998); and Robin D.G. Kelley, Yo’ Mama’s Disfunktional!: Fighting the Culture Wars in Urban 
America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), especially Chapter 4. 
 
     20 Ogbar, Black Power; Daryl Maeda, Chains of Babylon: The Rise of Asian America (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009), and Rethinking the Asian American Movement (New York: 
Routledge, 2011). For other studies with varying levels of discussion about multiracial alliance-building, 
see Peniel Joseph, Waiting ’Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of the Black Power Movement 
(New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2006); and Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr., Black against Empire: 
The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2013). 
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dichotomy and provides a broad overview of the New Communist Movement in the 
United States, primarily throughout the 1970s, of which the Bay Area Revolutionary 
Union and Venceremos eventually became a part. Jason Ferreira’s 2003 dissertation, “All 
Power to the People,” marked one of the first studies to place Third World radicalism as 
central to radicalism within San Francisco at large and demonstrates the complex and 
complicated nature of multiracial alliances and radicalism during this era.21 
Recent studies from Laura Pulido and Jakobi Williams have demonstrated the 
significance of multiracial radical alliances in the 1960s and 1970s in Los Angeles and 
Chicago, respectively. Pulido emphasizes the differential racialization and thus 
differential activism of the radicals she examines, while Williams’ work proves valuable 
in showing how a multiracial radical alliance of the late 1960s and early 1970s—the 
original “Rainbow Coalition”—formed the standard organizing strategy within Chicago 
city politics thereafter, even leading eventually to Barack Obama’s appropriation (yet as 
Williams stresses, not fulfillment) of the vision of the Rainbow Coalition for his 2004 
U.S. Senate campaign.22 Thus, past multiracial radical alliances have permeated into the 
mainstream of the political landscape of the United States. 
Other recent historiographies provide much needed context for this dissertation. 
Historians such as Mark Brilliant and Shana Bernstein have shown how multiracial 
activism also grew within more mainstream civil rights struggles in California.23 A 
                                                 
     21 Jason Ferreira, “All Power to the People: A Comparative History of Third World Radicalism in San 
Francisco, 1968-1974” (PhD diss., University of California Berkeley, 2003). 
 
     22 Pulido, Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left, 4, 19-21; Williams, From the Bullet to the Ballot, 205-212. 
 
     23 Mark Brilliant, The Color of America Has Changed: How Racial Diversity Shaped Civil Rights 
Reform in California, 1941-1978 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Shana 
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burgeoning historiography on Black-Latina/o coalitions particularly has emerged that has 
complicated scholarly understandings of the relation between these two groups, with 
some scholars such as Lauren Araiza also including radical organizations like the Black 
Panther Party.24  The historiography of the “Seventies” has grown exponentially, 
delineating the multiple developments during this time that explain the rightward shift of 
the country by the 1980s and other difficulties within the political economy of the 1970s 
that radical activists encountered.25 Studies from historians such as Vijay Prashad about 
the broader Third World national liberation and anti-colonial movements after World 
War II elucidate the development of multi- lateral cooperation among these different 
countries and movements, along with the abrupt end to many of the revolutions within 
Third World countries by the end of the twentieth century.26 
                                                 
Bernstein, Bridges of Reform: Interracial Civil Rights Activism in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 
     24 One notable example of this recent Black-Latina/o scholarship is Brian D. Behnken, ed., The Struggle 
in Black and Brown: African American and Mexican American Relations during the Civil Rights Era 
(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2011). Lauren Araiza, “‘In Common Struggle against 
a Common Oppression’: The United Farm Workers and the Black Panther Party, 1968-1973,” The Journal 
of African American History 94, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 200-223, and To March for Others: The Black 
Freedom Struggle and the United Farm Workers (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 
particularly Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
     25 Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New 
York and London: The Free Press, 2001); Beth Bailey and David Farber, eds., America in the Seventies 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004); and Dan Berger, ed., The Hidden 1970s: Histories of 
Radicalism (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2010). 
 
     26 Prashad also advances the idea of “internationalist nationalism” within Third World liberation 
movements in the post-World War II era, whereby revolutionaries’ closest loyalties laid not solely with 
their nation-state but to a broader international struggle for liberation. Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: 
A People’s History of the Third World (New York: The New Press, 2007), 12. For other scholarship on the 
Third World as a whole during this era, see Leften Stavros Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes 
of Age (New York: Morrow, 1981); December Green, Comparative Politics of the “Third World”: Linking 
Concepts and Cases (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); and Robert J. McMahon, ed., The 
Cold War in the Third World (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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This study makes several key interventions into this existing scholarship. First and 
most importantly, in contrast to the dominant view of radicalism during this era as 
divisive, this dissertation will demonstrate the importance radicals placed on forging and 
maintaining alliances with likeminded activists during these two decades. Many radical 
groups emerging out of the late 1960s and early 1970s received criticism for being too 
identity-politics-oriented and thus divisive to the broader US Left. Yet, although 
divisiveness existed among radicals, examining their genealogies of alliance counters this 
criticism and shows that the ideological motivations for collective forms of activism 
remained constant throughout the tumult of the 1960s and1970s, even if the alliances 
themselves did not sustain themselves over the long term. 
In addition, rather than emphasizing the common trope of seemingly “unlikely” 
alliances that scholars such as Lauren Araiza and Sherry L. Smith use, I argue that the 
alliances examined within this study were likely, although not inevitable. In the words of 
geographer Laura Pulido, connections between various radical contingents “had to be 
carefully articulated and cultivated by political activists and leaders.”27 Yet because of 
their ideological orientations and at times similar experiences within US society, 
internationalist radicals in the Bay Area were more inclined toward alliances than not 
with other likeminded activists. 
Ultimately, this dissertation will serve as a usable history of social movements, 
alliance-building, and the difficulties of sustaining alliances for collective liberation. 
Alliance-building endeavors and coalitional politics remain significant within social and 
                                                 
     27 Pulido, Black, Brown, Yellow & Left, 58. 
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political movements in the present, and understanding the promise and problems of 
alliance-building in the past provides a usable history for understanding how societies 
might better work together in the present toward making a more just and equitable world. 
At the same time, the multiple manifestations of racism, economic exploitation, 
patriarchy, and other oppressions signals the need to understand oppressed minority 




Chapter Two lays the backdrop for the rest of the dissertation by establishing the 
broader contexts and developments of the early post-World War II period through the 
mid-1960s. I examine the role of migrations and migrant experiences in the 
reconfiguration of the urban landscape of the postwar Bay Area, focused primarily on the 
creation of the postwar urban crisis, and its relationship to the resurgence of radicalism in 
the 1960s. Although they differed in place of origin and size, numerous migrant streams 
poured into the Bay Area during World War II and the subsequent two decades, and 
many radicals’ experiences as im/migrants from the rural U.S. South, Central America, 
Native American reservations, internment camps, and other places contributed to their 
radicalization. This chapter also considers more deeply the formation of racially-diverse 
urban spaces, such as the South Berkeley/North and West Oakland corridor and the 
Mission District in San Francisco, in the development of the Bay Area as a unique place 
for multiracial radicalism (and activism in general) later in the postwar period. Migrants 
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of color experienced similar strictures under the urban crisis, particularly with residential 
discrimination, and this chapter explores how Sixties and Seventies radicals’ earlier 
cross-cultural commingling in these urban spaces caused by the urban crisis was 
formative in shaping their future orientation toward multiracial activism. Finally, this 
chapter concludes by examining civil rights activism during the postwar era and its 
limitations in addressing the root causes of racial and class inequality embedded within 
the Bay Area’s postwar urban landscape, leading many to turn toward more radical 
ideologies and tactics to combat this oppression. 
The remaining chapters center on one or two events or institutions, with other 
similar events or institutions discussed in a broader context to the central one for the 
chapter. Chapters Three through Six also demonstrate the existence of genealogies of 
alliance from one mobilization or cause to another. Chapters Three and Four focus on 
two different aspects of anti-imperialism within Bay Area internationalist radicalism. 
Chapter Three examines the changes in the nature of radicalism within the Bay Area 
during the 1960s and how it contrasted with earlier radicalism within the Bay Area 
through the 1967 Spring Mobilization against the War in San Francisco. This chapter will 
posit the development of a “Vietnam turn” in postwar Bay Area radicalism, based not just 
on the war in Vietnam per se but more so with how the international context, especially 
with communism and the Third World movements of the postwar era, shaped the 
contours of this zeitgeist of radicalism in the Bay Area. Although the Mobilization was 
more liberal or even moderate, prominent radicals contributed key roles in its planning 
and subsequent rally. In addition, the steering committee for the Spring Mobilization had 
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specific African American and Mexican American leadership caucuses, thus illustrating 
the growing understanding among leftists in the Bay Area that not only was anti-racism 
connected to the antiwar movement, since people of color disproportionately served and 
died in the military, but also that people of color had their own unique experiences and 
issues needing to be addressed within the larger landscape of social movements as a 
whole. 
Chapter Four examines anti-imperialism as a form of domestic struggle by 
focusing on two interrelated political prisoner movements within the late 1960s and early 
1970s Bay Area internationalist radical community as expressions of anti-imperialism at 
the local level, especially as it involved mobilizing multiracial alliances. The Free Huey 
Movement, lasting from 1967-1971 and organized around the trial proceedings of Black 
Panther Party co-founder Huey P. Newton, became a cause de jure for leftists nationwide 
and particularly in the Bay Area. Numerous allies approached the Black Panthers during 
this political prisoner movement, with Latinas/os, Asian Americans, American Indians, 
whites, and other Black organizations with varying degrees of involvement, and many of 
the alliances forged during the early mobilization of the movement, especially in 1968, 
laid the foundation for future alliances and solidarity, such as the 1970-1972 movement 
to Free Angela Davis and All Political Prisoners, which also carried local, national, and 
international resonance. Examining the Free Angela Movement broadens the scope of 
ideological motivations behind Sixties and Seventies political prisoner movements; while 
the main political critiques within the Free Huey Movement centered on the connections 
between racism, class oppression, and U.S. imperialism overseas in relation to political 
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prisoner movements and the justice system, the Free Angela Movement incorporated a 
critique of the justice system as inherently patriarchal, thus illustrating another aspect of 
intersectionality absent within critiques emanating from the Free Huey Movement. 
Chapters Five and Six examine the politics of self-determination through two 
different models. Chapter Five examines the attempt to gain self-determination while 
trying to remain separate from the broader apparatus and grasp of the state by looking at 
two self-proclaimed Third World independent community colleges: Nairobi College in 
East Palo Alto and Venceremos College in Redwood City. Unlike the Third World 
Liberation Front strikes at San Francisco State College and the University of California, 
Berkeley, which aimed to carve out existing space within an existing institution of higher 
education, Nairobi and Venceremos embedded themselves within working-class 
communities of color to signify their belief that self-determination in higher education 
was tied to the struggle for self-determination among communities of color as a whole. 
While the activists at San Francisco State and UC Berkeley also articulated this belief, 
these Nairobi and Venceremos believed that this praxis could only be achieved 
independent of existing institutions, with pamphlets from the Colleges articulating the 
slogan of “The community is the campus.” This chapter will examine the histories of 
Nairobi College from 1969 to 1979 and Venceremos College from 1970 to 1973, with a 
particular emphasis on their struggles in day-to-day operations and making these two 
institutions, which were predominantly Black and Latina/o, respectively, truly Third 
World institutions that were accessible and comfortable for all people of color. 
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Chapter Six examines self-determination “within the system” through the history 
of the April Coalition (later Berkeley Citizens Action) within Berkeley and the efforts of 
the Black Panther Party and former Brown Berets now organizing within La Raza Unida 
Party in Oakland. As the 1960s turned to the 1970s, radical activists in the United States 
increasingly wrestled with the meaning of radicalism, with no issue proving more 
divisive than the entrance of many radicals more seriously, rather than symbolically, into 
the realm of electoral politics. This chapter will explore various dilemmas Bay Area 
radicals experienced while engaging with electoral politics, such as facing two fronts of 
opposition from conservatives and moderate liberals and experiencing the breakdown of 
preexisting multiracial alliances as a result of supporting different politicians at the local 
level. This dissertation ends with a conclusion that discusses briefly the decline of 
internationalist radicalism in the San Francisco Bay Area by the 1980s before 
summarizing the study and its main analytical points. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Migrations, Urban Crisis, and the Roots of the Multiracial Radical Sixties and Seventies 
in the San Francisco Bay Area 
 
This history of internationalist radicalism and the multiracial alliances therein 
emanated from the transformations that the early postwar San Francisco Bay Area. The 
breadth and prevalence of radical activism in the San Francisco Bay Area was perhaps 
unmatched by any other U.S. metropolitan area during the 1960s and 70s. The area has 
also long served as key locus of migration for people within and outside the borders of 
the United States. Few scholars, however, have probed the interplay between radicalism 
and migrations in a Bay Area context, particularly in relation to the reconfiguration of the 
area’s urban landscapes throughout the first two decades after World War II. I argue that 
understanding the interplay between these phenomena is central to understanding the 
roots of Sixties and Seventies Bay Area radicalism. Indeed, prominent Bay Area radical 
activists came of age in the midst of these postwar transformations, often politicized by 
the structural impediments established during these decades. 
Much of the extant scholarly literature on radicalism and migrations in the United 
States frames this relationship around immigrating radicals influencing politics and social 
movements in their new locales, with the state and dominant society working to 
counteract their influence and restrict their entry. These studies also overwhelmingly 
focus temporally on the years before World War II. In contrast, recent scholarship has 
demonstrated the transformative power of migrations themselves, emphasizing how 
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migrants’ experiences with the state and broader society politicized, then radicalized 
them, including those among the numerous postwar migrant streams to and within the 
United States.1 
In line with this recent scholarship, I argue that postwar migrations to the Bay 
Area and Bay Area migrants’ experiences influenced and shaped the later radical 
activism of numerous migrants, while also instilling a predisposition toward multiracial 
activism, in a multi-part dialectical process. First, the Bay Area experienced in-migration 
during and after World War II that was unprecedented in its history. Migrant streams 
differed significantly in size and places of origin, but the majority of these migrants were 
working-class people of color. Internal migrants ranged from Black Southerners like 
Black Panther Party (BPP) co-founders Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale to post-
Internment Japanese Americans like BPP and Asian American Political Alliance (AAPA) 
member Richard Aoki, and included white migrants like Armenian American Bay Area 
Revolutionary Union (BARU) co-founder Robert Avakian. Immigrants who made the 
                                                 
     1 A sample of the dominant conception of radicalism and migration include: Sally M. Miller, The 
Radical Immigrant (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1974); Gerald Sorin, The Prophetic Minority: American 
Jewish Immigrant Radicals, 1880-1920 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); George E. 
Pozzetta, Immigrant Radicals: The View from the Left (New York: Garland Publishing, 1991); Kristofer 
Allerfeldt, Race, Radicalism, Religion, and Restriction: Immigration in the Pacific Northwest, 1890 -1924 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); and Marcella Bencivenni, Italian Immigrant Radical Culture: The Idealism 
of the Sovversivi in the United States, 1890-1940 (New York: New York University Press, 2011). 
Scholarship that discusses pre-World War II migrations as being transformative and radicalizing includes 
Neil Betten, “The Origins of Ethnic Radicalism in Northern Minnesota, 1900-1920,” International 
Migration Review, 4, no. 2 (Spring, 1970): 44-56; Seema Sohi, Echoes of Mutiny: Race, Surveillance, and 
Indian Anticolonialism in North America (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); and 
Kenyon Zimmer, Immigrants against the State: Yiddish and Italian Anarchism in America (Urbana-
Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2015). Among the scholarship focused on how postwar structural 
changes in the Bay Area shaped the future radicalization of postwar migrants, see Robert Self, American 
Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); 
Donna Murch, Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the Black Panther Party in 
Oakland, California (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Ferreira, “All Power to the 
People”; and Tomás F. Summers Sandoval Jr., Latinos at the Golden Gate: Creating Community & Identity 
in San Francisco (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
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Bay Area their new places of settlement often came from areas with U.S. significant 
influence, such as El Salvadorans Rodolfo Antonio “Tony” and Mario Martinez and 
Honduran Danilo “Bebe” Melendez of Los Siete de La Raza, but also included those 
fleeing places without much immediate U.S. influence, such as Shanghai native Ying Lee 
(later Ying Lee Kelly), who immigrated to San Francisco at the tail end World War II. 
The Bay Area also served as a notable site of migration for American Indians, who 
migrated from within the confines of the North American continent yet whose migrant 
experiences were complicated by their often coming from (semi-)sovereign, federally-
recognized tribal reservations, and at times from federally-terminated tribal lands in the 
1950s and 1960s. 
Second, in response to the racial composition of the migrants in these waves, 
white Bay Area residents throughout its regions devised a number of social calculations 
to spatially segregate themselves from these migrant populations. Some of these 
strategies were longstanding practices, most commonly through racially-restrictive 
housing covenants. Buoyed by the availability of favorable, government-secured home 
loans from the Federal Housing Administration beginning in the 1930s, the Bay Area also 
experienced mass suburbanization for the first time during and after World War II. 
Housing developments boomed on and beyond the periphery of San Francisco, Oakland, 
and other urban cores while also transforming longtime farmlands like those in the Santa 
Clara Valley south of San Francisco. White neighborhood organizations, bank lenders, 
and realtors worked, often in concert, to deny racial minorities (especially those of the 
working class) access to this new housing. With the mass exodus of whites from the Bay 
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Area urban cores came the divestment of the tax base from those areas, with some 
companies also moving their sites of operation to these new suburbs. Put together, spatial 
segregation and capital flight to suburbia created what I term “multiple urban crises.” 
Multiple, in that the contours of this spatial segregation varied throughout the Bay Area; 
and multiple, in that racial minorities experienced the strictures of the urban crisis in 
different ways, even if some of their experiences were similar.2 With the formation of 
these multiple urban crises came inequities between the suburbs and urban cores in 
education, employment opportunities, treatment under the law, and other areas of society. 
Yet concurrent with the formation and entrenchment of the urban crises was the 
formation of new panethnic racial identities, primarily among people of color. Although 
tensions initially existed between wartime and postwar migrant groups with their 
corresponding extant racial and ethnic communities, the strictures—or in the case of 
white migrants, the benefits—of the urban crises pushed co-ethnics into similar 
situations, with few racial minorities of any income level having access to new suburban 
housing and its attendant upward social and economic mobility. Moreover, because 
spatial segregation operated along a white/non-white binary, urban spaces such as San 
Francisco’s Mission District and the border along West and South Berkeley and West and 
                                                 
     2 Most of my thinking about “the urban crisis” stems from Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban 
Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); and 
Robert Self, American Babylon. Historian and political scientist Daniel Martinez HoSang has characterized 
the discrimination and segregation facilitated by the state government of California through legislation and 
the proposition system as “genteel apartheid,” and historian Douglas Henry Daniels draws on  Martinez 
HoSang’s work when analyzing the government institutions and mechanisms by which postwar spatial 
segregation developed in Berkeley. Daniel Martinez HoSang, Racial Propositions: Ballot Initiatives and 
the Making of Postwar California (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010), 
Douglas Henry Daniels, “Berkeley Apartheid: Unfair Housing in a University Town,” History Research 3, 
no. 5 (May 2013): 321-341. 
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North Oakland became sites of what I term “constricted commingling” among 
communities of color. Although they had their own unique experiences throughout these 
decades, people of color also faced similar strictures under the urban crises, especially 
limited housing opportunities, which caused increased exposure between and among 
these communities as the postwar era progressed.  
Lastly, as common with marginalized migrant groups, the Bay Area’s 
communities of color would grow increasingly politicized during the postwar era in the 
face of the Bay Area’s multiple urban crises. Continuing in the longer activist traditions 
of the area, these activists and their white allies employed a number of strategies toward 
reforms that would alleviate the urban crises’ ill-effects, including legal battles and new 
legislation passed to protect the civil rights for racial minorities, such as the passage of 
local and state fair housing laws in the mid-1960s. Activism extended beyond the legal 
and legislative realms and into the streets, with organizations like the Community Service 
Organization (CSO) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 
increasingly organized public protests against the segregation and discrimination they 
experienced. Yet these reforms were limited in the changes they could bring and failed to 
address the root causes of the inequalities racial minorities faced. In light of these 
limitations, these activists turned to other avenues for societal change, with many turning 
toward more radical ideologies and praxis by the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
This history holds significance for understanding Bay Area radicalism in the 
Sixties, particularly the multiracial alliances therein. The liberal reforms of the 1950s and 
60s could not undo the inequalities derived from the spatial segregation and wealth and 
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resource disparities ingrained within the multiple urban crises, which arose as part of the 
World War II and postwar liberal state, and thus necessitated more complex and broad-
ranging activism that sought to restructure society. Moreover, while proximity did not 
guarantee affinity, understanding the migrant experiences of future radicals of color, 
along with some white radicals, explains part of the orientation toward organizing across 
racial lines that so many Bay Area radicals held through the Sixties and Seventies. 
Sharing similar struggles in relation to the dominant society helped activists understand 
and envision themselves as being in similar oppressed positionalities within society, 
which predisposed them toward coalitional organizing later in their activist lives. 
 
Migrant Waves 
With the arrival of the first Spaniards and their subsequent colonization of most of 
the region’s Indigenous people came the onset of punctuated migration for the region. 
Even after California came under Mexican, then U.S. imperial control, and became a 
state in 1850, migrations to the Bay Area tended to be sporadic, particularly within the 
borders of the United States. In addition, the passage of increasingly restrictive, racially-
discriminatory federal immigration legislation from the mid-1870s through the 1920s 
decreased the number of immigrants coming from Asia and Europe, and the area’s 
relatively far distance from the country’s borders meant that its migrant populations were 
smaller than those in the northern and southern borderlands.3 
                                                 
     3 Steven Hackel, Children of St. Francis, Missionaries of Coyote: Indian-Spanish Relations in Colonial 
California, 1769-1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005);  Daniel Tichenor, Dividing 
Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); 
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World War II and postwar migrant waves, however, eclipsed prior ones in size 
and scope, with a number of catalysts bringing disparate groups to the Bay Area. The 
entrance of the United States into the war brought the onset of round-the-clock wartime 
manufacturing to the area, on a much grander scale than the similar but smaller boom in 
manufacturing during World War I. An abundance of employment opportunities through 
wartime industries made urban America, particularly in the North and West, proved 
compelling for migrants within and outside of the U.S. looking for work. The early 
postwar era also saw a gradual opening up of U.S. immigration policy. Yet the migrations 
during and especially after the war were often the result of more than just “pull” factors; 
numerous “push” factors would force migrants from their homelands, with many not 
having much choice about whether or not to migrate. 
Perhaps the largest and most noticeable migrant group into the Bay Area was the 
influx of Black Americans from the U.S. South. Hailing from across the region, but 
particularly from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and other western Southern 
states, Black migrants to the Bay Area comprised part of the Second Great Migration to 
the urban North and West. Black Southerners migrated to escape multiple crises; not only 
did they flee the white supremacist terror of the Jim Crow South, but the Great 
Depression-induced and New Deal-funded mechanization of the cotton industry forced 
hundreds of thousands of sharecroppers off tenant farming lands by the end of the 1930s. 
In addition, the economic opportunities in the West and North’s wartime industries 
outpaced those for wage laborers in the South, and the Bay Area long held a reputation as 
                                                 
Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2003). 
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a liberal metropolis where Black-white race relations existed with less hostility than in 
the urban North and especially the South. These combined factors combined caused a 
boom in the Black Bay Area population, from an estimated 18,000 in 1940 to almost 
150,000 in 1950, then 240,000 in 1960; in Alameda County, which experienced the 
largest population boom of any local county, the Black population grew from a little over 
12,000 in 1940 to over 111,000 in 1960.4 
Included among these Black Southerners were future radical leaders like Black 
Panther Party co-founders Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale and San Francisco State 
College Third World Liberation Front striker and future Nairobi College president 
Donald Smothers. Newton, Seale, and Smothers were but a few of the many 1.5 
generation Black migrants who moved as children with their families from the South to 
the Bay Area. Housing opportunities varied for these migrants. Texas-born Seale and 
Smothers were among those who lived in the handful of government housing projects in 
the Bay Area, with the former’s family initially settling into an apartment in Berkeley’s 
Codornices Village upon arrival in mid-1945 and the latter’s into Channel Projects near 
Hunters Point in San Francisco. Black migrants found housing from private renters or 
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realtors, although often with extended families living under the same roof, as did Black 
Panther Party founding member David Hilliard when he arrived in Oakland in 1952. A 
smaller percentage were able to secure their own homes. Nairobi College founding 
president Robert Hoover, who arrived at Stanford University in 1959 to begin graduate 
school after briefly visiting parts of California on his way back from military service 
during the Korean War, purchased a home with his wife Mary in unincorporated East 
Palo Alto three years after his arrival.5 Despite their disparate origins, Black Southern 
migrants tended to be optimistic about new opportunities within their new places of 
settlement. 
Other internal migrant groups of varying circumstances settled in the postwar Bay 
Area, often displaced similarly to Black Southern migrants or in pursuit of more 
substantial economic opportunities. Large waves of white Southern migrants came 
alongside Black Southerners, often from similar economic circumstances. Longtime 
Mexican American migrant farm workers like the parents of Brown Beret Alex Gonzalez 
joined the extant Mexican communities in Oakland, San Francisco, and throughout the 
Bay Area. Many came from California’s Central Valley as former farm workers 
displaced by the construction of freeways like U.S. Highway 99 and the new network of 
canals wrought by the Central Valley Project. White rural Californians also increasingly 
migrated to the Bay Area, taking part in the general urbanization wrought by the postwar 
era. These rural-to-urban migrants included previously-marginalized white ethnic 
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minorities, such as the Armenian American father of Bay Area Revolutionary Union co-
founder Robert Avakian.6 
Some internal migrant waves had not been displaced, but rather coercively 
removed by the federal government, and were comprised of former residents returning to 
the Bay Area, largely the case with people of Japanese descent (Nikkei) after internment 
during World War II. Of the over 120,000 Nikkei living in U.S. western states, 
approximately 20,000 lived in the San Francisco Bay Area in rural and urban 
communities alike and across multiple sectors of the economy. Unlike other western 
urban centers like Seattle, Washington, that saw significant Nikkei postwar population 
loss to the Midwest and other regions, the vast majority of Nikkei internees returned to 
the Bay Area. Yet the area to which they returned changed significantly, most noticeably 
with the influx of Black Southerners who often found residence in former Japanese 
enclaves throughout the Bay Area, such as the Western Addition neighborhood in San 
Francisco and West Oakland, along with areas like the housing projects in Hunters Point. 
Moreover, aside from rare cases like the family of Richard Aoki—whose grandfather 
managed to retain ownership of his house and noodle factory in West Oakland—Bay 
Area Nikkei returnees experienced between $203 and $251 million of income and 
property loss because of internment.7 
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Displacement was also prominent with immigration to the Bay Area as U.S. 
immigration policy gradually opened up from the mid-1940s until 1965. April Coalition 
and later Berkeley Citizens Action member Ying Lee recalls her family moving via chain 
migration away from her hometown of Shanghai beginning in 1937 with the Japanese 
invasion of the city. Migrating elsewhere in China, then Hong Kong and Kowloon City, 
then India, Lee’s family reunited with her father in May 1945 when she was thirteen 
years old. Although San Francisco had long been a hotbed of Sinophobic sentiment and 
public policy, China’s emergence as a U.S. ally toward the end of World War II had 
slightly opened up opportunities for Chinese Americans in the city, with an accompanied 
decrease in outward manifestations of Sinophobia.8 
In other instances, migrations to the Bay Area and the U.S. more broadly came as 
a result of U.S. interventions overseas. Brothers Rodolfo Antonio “Tony” and Mario 
Martinez, who would comprise two of six defendants in Los Siete de La Raza, migrated 
with their families from a barrio in San Salvador, El Salvador, in 1961. Their father had 
been a rural farmworking campesino in various parts of El Salvador, including large-
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scale coffee plantations, who, because of the country’s economic recession in the 1950s 
(wrought in part by U.S. capitalist interventions), migrated to San Salvador and found a 
position as an auto shop worker. As the country experienced increasing turmoil in the 
aftermath of a 1960 U.S.-supported right-wing coup and limited economic and 
educational opportunities, the Martinez brothers’ parents set themselves on migrating to 
the United States, living initially in San Francisco’s Mission District and later moving to 
Daly City just south of San Francisco, even as the brothers frequented the Mission into 
their high school years.9  
American Indian migrants to the Bay Area after World War II also felt 
displacement and exile in their unique migrant situation. Although commonly thought of 
as internal migrants, scholars such as Rachel Buff and Reyna Ramirez have demonstrated 
that American Indian urban migrations are transnational in nature, since most migrant s 
come from (semi-)sovereign Indian reservations under U.S. settler colonial control and 
especially did so in the postwar era. Indians migrated to urban areas, primarily for 
economic reasons, before the implementation of federal Termination policy in 1953. 
Before Alcatraz Island occupation spokesperson Richard Oakes (Akwesasne Mohawk) 
migrated to San Francisco in the 1960s, for instance, he first took part in a longer 
tradition of Iroquois Confederacy peoples migrating to New York City in pursuit of 
economic opportunities, especially within the city’s ironwork industries. Pre-Termination 
migrants to the Bay Area added to the Indian population of the Ohlone and other Native 
groups indigenous to the area, as American Indian Movement leader Russell Means 
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(Oglala Sioux) did with his family upon arrival in 1942 for wartime employment, then 
again a few years after World War II had ended.10 
Yet Termination and its parallel program of Relocation would bring larger 
migrant streams to the urban United States, under more dire circumstances. Termination 
ended federal recognition of dozens of tribes, and with it, any obligations the federal 
government held with these Indians. Moreover, because of the federal government’s 
continual treaty violations with federally-recognized tribes and underdevelopment or 
exploitation of most Indian reservation lands, American Indians experienced widespread 
unemployment with relatively few educational opportunities. United Native Americans 
leader and Alcatraz activist LaNada War Jack (Shoshone-Bannock; formerly Means, 
Boyer) saw the gamut of these experiences growing up the daughter of a former tribal 
chairman on the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. While her father and other Natives on the 
reservation succeeded in resisting federal infringement on their waterways and lands, 
they faced difficulties in convincing government officials for assistance to alleviate the 
poverty most experienced. Relocation served as one of the few avenues of relief Indians 
on reservations had in the postwar era, and from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, over 
200,000 Indians relocated from reservations to urban areas throughout the United States. 
Even with its opportunities, however, Relocation operated in the assimilationist tradition 
that had grounded federal Indian policy since the late-nineteenth century. Among the 
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logics undergirding Relocation was that moving Indians from their home reservations and 
placing them in urban centers would cause Indians to lose their tribal cultural values and 
traditions and assimilate into the fabric of U.S. society, including the broader structures 
of the economy. Housing provided by or found through the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) stemmed from this assimilationist logic, as the BIA dispersed Indians throughout 
urban areas, rather than settle them in enclaves. Relocated American Indians in the Bay 
Area were dispersed around San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose, and throughout 
different neighborhoods of those cities, adding another impediment in their transition into 
urban American life.11 
 
Making Multiple Urban Crises 
In response to the growing numbers and visibility of racial minorities, the 
majority white population reacted in a variety of ways to the non-white migrant streams 
that poured into the Bay Area during and after World War II. Visceral reactions toward 
racial minorities were relatively rare, especially in comparison to the Jim Crow South 
from which African Americans arrived. At the same time, the white majority counted 
racial minorities as undesirable in most societal domains and worked to separate 
themselves in these manners. Although residential segregation and discrimination existed 
before the postwar era, most notably with Chinese in San Francisco’s Chinatown, the 
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prevalence of segregation would come into stark relief after World War II. The specifics 
of each urban crisis, however, would vary by each region of the Bay Area. 
Some discriminatory practices were common throughout the Bay Area. Most 
ubiquitous and longstanding of these practices were racially-restrictive housing 
covenants, a prominent feature of urban life on some scale throughout the urban West 
and North since the early 1900s. Often placed within the deed for a house or a contractual 
agreement with a neighborhood homeowners’ association, housing covenants explicitly 
barred homeowners, landlords, and realtors from selling a house in a neighborhood to 
prospective buyers who did not fit the desired homeowner criteria, in this case by racial 
group. One 1946 neighborhood association flyer from the Portola Heights district of San 
Francisco read, “The master deed of this area states that only members of the white 
Caucasian race are allowed to reside in this district, except as servants.”12 Housing 
covenants throughout the Bay Area persisted even after the Supreme Court ruled them 
unconstitutional in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948). Not all homeowners and landlords upheld 
housing covenants fully or sometimes at all. Richard Aoki recalled renting an apartment 
in Berkeley after his honorable discharge from the military in the late 1950s from a 
fellow military veteran who had excluded Blacks from his housing complex but accepted 
Aoki’s rental application and later “showed [Aoki] the restrictive housing covenant.”13 
Robert and Mary Hoover found an apartment to rent in Palo Alto after repeatedly being 
rejected in their pursuit of purchasing a home in the city, although they stayed in the unit 
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for less than six months after the apartment owner found out the manager had rented to 
Black tenants, against the terms of the building’s housing covenant.14  
Each region of the Bay Area, however, developed unique aspects of its urban 
crisis. Most similar to the urban crises that developed in other U.S. metropolitan areas 
was the suburban boom the Bay Area experienced, especially in the East Bay. The 
manufacturing hubs of the region like Oakland and Richmond had experienced a housing 
crisis during World War II, as available housing failed to keep pace with the booming 
population. While federally-subsidized housing projects formed one source of assistance, 
residents would not experience widespread relief until the mass availability of federally-
backed and -secured home loans from the Federal Housing Administration. FHA loans 
drove the development of single-tract houses in and beyond the periphery of established 
cities, and for the East Bay, these developments largely sprang up in the Berkeley and 
Oakland hills and cities south of Oakland, such as San Leandro and Fremont. The FHA, 
however, left the administration of these loans to local authorities, who were 
overwhelmingly white throughout the country and gave preference to white applicants 
over non-white ones. Moreover, when applying for private loans, racial minorities often 
experienced redlining by banks, the practice whereby bank officials would draw red lines 
on city maps around neighborhoods they deemed undesirable for potential loan 
applicants, thus constricting racial minorities in the private sector as well As East Bay 
suburbs boomed, so did capital follow, such as the relocation of the Ford production plant 
from Richmond to Milpitas in the mid-1950s. Suburbs also sprung up in Marin County 
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north of San Francisco and around San Jose in the South Bay. Yet while pockets of racial 
minorities gained access into suburbs throughout the Bay Area—such as Asian 
Americans in the North Bay and African Americans in the Sunnyhills housing 
development of Milpitas—the vast majority remained relegated to housing within 
overcrowded urban cores.15 
San Francisco received relatively few FHA home loans, since those loans 
facilitated the purchase of new houses. Yet the city’s majority-white residents and 
government still managed to spatially segregate racial minorities through housing 
covenants and unequal distribution of government housing assistance. The San Francisco 
Housing Authority operated five housing projects in the city, and by the early 1940s 
began assigning recipients on the basis of “neighborhood patterns.”16 This policy placed 
tenants in one of the five projects that matched the applicants’ race with the racial 
composition of the neighborhood, in an explicit attempt to curb the settlement of non-
whites into white-dominated neighborhoods. Virtually all Black applicants for public 
housing were placed in the Westside Courts project in the now predominantly-Black 
Fillmore District while the other four projects remained virtually all-white. The 
neighborhoods in the postwar era marked a break from the ethnic succession of previous 
decades whereby one migrant group like Irish Americans would achieve upward social 
and economic mobility and move out of working-class neighborhoods and into more 
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affluent neighborhoods around the city. Although Italian Americans and a number of 
white ethnic groups experienced this reality in the immediate postwar era in San 
Francisco, with a number of residents also moving out into the suburbs north and south of 
the city, new migrants of color were denied such opportunities. San Francisco’s urban 
crisis thus laid largely within its city limits, as upward mobility remained elusive for its 
predominantly-non-white working class and impoverished residents.17 
In some regions, postwar spatial reconfigurations resided not along an urban-
suburban divide or between neighborhoods but rather throughout a suburban landscape. 
Such was the case most notably with the Peninsula, the area along the San Francisco Bay 
stretching southward from San Francisco to San Jose. The onset of round-the-clock 
wartime manufacturing and its subsequent demobilization did not reorganize the area as it 
did in San Francisco and the East Bay. Rather, the Peninsula’s white power brokers 
reconfigured the area toward promoting and supporting the Cold War through scientific 
and technological research, creating what historian Margaret O’Mara has termed “cities 
of knowledge.”18 Deliberate planning was at the heart of this reconfiguration, which 
included: suburban tract homes replaced longtime farmlands in the area; corporations 
modeling their business sites after university campuses by separating buildings for 
different stages of planning and production; and the expansion of transportation 
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infrastructure between San Francisco and San Jose, particularly with the Bayshore 
Freeway (Highway 101) in the early 1950s. As a result, the Peninsula did not have urban 
cores like their Bay Area counterparts.19 
Similarly to other parts of the Bay Area, however, the Peninsula saw uneven 
development related to the demographic changes of the area. Before World War II, ethnic 
Japanese comprised the largest ethno-racial minority group in the Peninsula, along with 
Mexican Americans, Chinese Americans, Filipinas/os, and a handful of Black Americans 
and American Indians. Nikkei internment in the early 1940s and a wartime and postwar 
migrant population boom of primarily Black Southerners and Mexican migrants soon 
made the latter communities the largest communities of color in the Peninsula. White 
society, however, shut communities of color out of the planning and decision-making 
processes of the postwar Peninsula, and the reconfiguration of the Peninsula marginalized 
these communities. Similar to the East Bay, Federal Housing Administration loans almost 
exclusively were made available for white residents.  In addition, the spatial 
reconfiguration of the Peninsula—spearheaded by the 1956 Federal Highway Act and 
other state of California infrastructural legislation—underdeveloped the public 
transportation in the area and often isolated people of color across class lines into 
unincorporated areas like East Palo Alto, East Redwood City, and East Menlo Park. 
Between 1959 and the mid-1960s, East Palo Alto changed from a majority-white area to 
nearly ninety percent Black. Thus, although the Peninsula did not have an urban 
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landscape like San Francisco and Oakland, its communities of color experienced similar 
forms of spatial segregation as elsewhere in the area.20 
With the reconfiguration of the Bay Area’s urban landscapes came multiple 
impediments for people of color, particularly in the working class. With masses of East 
Bay white residents moving to suburbs and the subsequent relocation of many employers 
came the divestment of the tax bases for urban cores like Oakland and Richmond. In San 
Francisco, governance of the city’s neighborhoods often came from the city council and 
other municipal offices, dominated by middle- and upper-class white politicians and 
officials. The unincorporated areas of the Peninsula had no formal governance of their 
own institutions and instead were under the purview of the County of San Mateo and the 
other counties of the region. Tax divestment, perpetual discrimination, and unequal 
governance resulted in the widening of disparities between the white and non-white 
populace. The relatively small or unequally-distributed tax bases to which communities 
of color had access meant their cities or neighborhoods had underdeveloped educational 
opportunities and transportation infrastructure. East Palo Alto, for example, had less than 
half of its roads properly paved. Along with continual hiring discrimination, the location 
of manufacturing and scientific research and development industries away from urban 
cores and unincorporated areas wrought mass unemployment and underemployment for 
people of color throughout the Bay Area, with some areas like the predominantly-Black 
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East Palo Alto experiencing an unemployment rate twice that of the national average by 
the 1960s.21 
One markedly different institution throughout the Bay Area was law enforcement, 
growing more punitive toward communities of color as the postwar era progressed. Huey 
Newton and Bobby Seale were among the East Bay Black residents who regularly 
witnessed the largely-white police departments of the area harass and brutalize of people 
of color. Further south, one longtime East Palo Alto Black resident recalled, “The 
Sherriff’s department [of the County of San Mateo] was just racist…people were getting 
beat up, and people were being arrested for nothing,” even for merely being seen driving 
outside of East Palo Alto.22 Because of East Palo Alto’s unincorporated status and 
relatively low influence within county politics, the Sherriff’s department met little 
accountability or recourse for their treatment of the county’s people of color. Law 
enforcement agencies did not always react to communities of color in this fashion. In 
1962, San Francisco Police Chief Thomas Cahill established the Community Relations 
Unit with Lieutenant Dante Andreotti as its head. Andreotti hoped to build and maintain 
trust between the San Francisco Police Department and the city’s communities of color, 
in contrast to Cahill’s desire to maintain “law and order” at all costs. But after the 
September 1966 Hunter’s Point rebellion—in response to the police killing of Matthew 
Johnson—Andreotti was forced to resign, and the subsequent year would see Cahill sign 
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General Order 105 to establish a “Tactical Squad” for paramilitary, allegedly riot-patrol 
operations, but also to quell political protests like that in Hunter’s Point. Further 
militarizing the department was the establishment of the Crime Prevention Headquarters 
Squad, which escalated racial profiling throughout the city. Punitive policing added to the 
economic and social strictures of the multiple urban crises, resulting in an overall bleak 
and precarious situation for most people of color, particularly wartime and postwar 
working-class migrants.23 
 
Panethnic Racial and Multiracial Formations 
In the midst of the Bay Area’s multiple urban crises came the development of 
panethnic racial identities and multiracial affinities. Scholars have noted how later 
politicization shaped racial formation. For Huey Newton, Bobby Seale, and other Black 
Power activists who joined the Merritt College chapter of the Revolutionary Action 
Movement, “Blackness” transformed from a U.S.-centered identity into an identity based 
on internationalist solidarity with others in the African diaspora, particularly African anti-
colonial revolutionaries of the post-World War II era. Although activists like Richard 
Aoki grew up among other Asian Americans and some like Chinese and Korean 
American Third World Women’s Alliance member Miriam Ching Yoon Louie were 
                                                 




themselves multiethnic, Asian American panethnic racial formations, as Yen Le Espiritu 
notes, largely arose from similar historical experiences with discrimination.24 
Yet earlier cross-cultural relations under the urban crises —what I term 
“constricted commingling”—also shaped these identity formations.  As sociologists 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant note, historical circumstances and contexts have 
shaped racial formations throughout U.S. history, particularly during moments of 
structural upheaval.25 Confinement to limited spaces throughout the metropolitan areas 
facilitated the growing association of disparate people groups with each other under 
various panethnic identities. Because the urban crises operated along a white-non-white 
binary, constricted commingling also increasingly, though not inevitably, facilitated the 
formation of affinities across racial lines primarily among people of color, but also 
including white residents, in multiracial “borderhoods” such as San Francisco’s Mission 
District and the North/West Oakland-West/South Berkeley corridor.26 
Panethnic racial formations occurred on small and large scales. For example, 
tensions often existed between established Black residents and wartime and postwar 
Black Southern migrants. The latter held regional and rural cultural distinctions from the 
former and was largely working-class or working-poor, in contrast to the more middle-
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class established populace. Established Black residents at times blamed Black migrants 
for the eruptions of blatant racism by the white majority after World War II, pejoratively 
referring to the Southerners as “suitcase Negroes.”27 Yet as disparities widened as a result 
of the urban crises and predominantly-Black places like West Berkeley and East Palo 
Alto had residents across socioeconomic class, the established/migrant divide began to 
break down among Black residents, especially when engaged with political activism.28 
In a similar situation, although there were initial divisions between established 
white Bay Area communities and white Southern migrants, the latter soon found 
themselves integrated into the former, even as they often retained some distinct 
characteristics. More significant among white residents was the growing inclusivity of 
“whiteness” in the postwar era. As historian David Roediger has noted, World War II and 
the early postwar era broke down the racial hierarchies between Northern and Western 
Europeans and heretofore “inbetween” Southern and Eastern Europeans.29 As the country 
built a “civic nationalism” that moved away from biological conceptions of race (and its 
related racism), Southern and Eastern Europeans and white western Asians like Armenian 
Americans gained full inclusion into numerous spheres of society, including labor union 
organizing and national electoral politics. Bob Avakian noted the contrast between his 
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childhood and teenaged years compared with his father Spurgeon’s. Spurgeon 
experienced ethnic discrimination because of his Armenian surname, from his childhood 
in Fresno, California, through his years at Boalt Hall, the law school of the University of 
California, Berkeley. This discrimination ranged from other students innocuously using 
terms like “hungry as a starving Armenian” to being denied positions in law firms 
because of his surname (and Spurgeon’s refusal to change it). By the time Bob was 
growing up in Berkeley, such intra-white hierarchies had receded. Yet as Roediger 
demonstrates, this inclusive whiteness relied on the continual exclusion of non-whites, 
particularly African Americans. Housing marked one of the starkest manifestations of 
this reality; while Southern and Eastern Europeans easily obtained FHA loans, FHA 
public housing was the extent of government housing subsidization that most racial 
minorities received. Thus, for some postwar migrants, new panethnic racial formations 
came not from under the strictures of the Bay Area’s multiple urban crises but rather as 
the beneficiaries of these postwar transformations.30 
Some panethnic racial formations followed in a longer tradition of identity 
formations among migrant groups with shared cultural backgrounds. The Bay Area had 
been site of multi-ethnonational relations among migrants from Latin America since at 
least the 1848 California Gold Rush, with the influx of Chilean, Peruvian, and other 
South American migrants joining the extant Mexican population. During the late 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, some urban spaces fostered a growing multi-
ethnonational affiliation as “Spanish-speaking” peoples, such as La Iglesia Guadalupe in 
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San Francisco that served Mexicans, Guatemalans, and other Spanish-speaking peoples, 
including some Filipinas/os. Migrations from Latin America during and after World War 
II largely came from Central America and grew to the point where they surpassed the 
ethnic Mexican population in certain cities, including San Francisco. These growing 
postwar migrant communities developed a new sort of latinidad, or Latina/o identity, 
from their lived experiences in the constricted commingling of the Bay Area’s urban 
crises. As historian Jason Ferreira explains, calls for “La Raza” in the Bay Area 
beginning in the 1960s included more than solidarity among ethnic Mexicans, as was the 
case through much of the U.S. West during this era. Rather, “La Raza” in the Bay Area 
was an inclusive identity that included all Latinas/os. Los Siete de La Raza member 
Danilo “Bebe” Melendez identified himself as “strictly ghetto property” who held an 
affinity with other Latinas/os in the Mission District because of their shared experiences 
of oppression.31 Third World Women’s Alliance Member Cheryl Perry-League recalled 
the mixed Mexican and Central American composition of the Latinas within the Bay 
Area chapter of the TWWA, with most coming from Oakland and San Francisco. While 
retaining their ethnonational and cultural identities, Latinas/os across the Bay Area 
developed latinidad based on their similar societal positions within the area, which would 
serve them later in organizing around these lines.32 
Similar processes ran parallel with American Indians in the Bay Area. Because 
relatively few Indians resided there and most had been dispersed throughout the region, 
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Indians tended to gravitate toward any other nearby Indians, despite different tribal 
membership. Or as LaNada Boyer articulated, “On the reservations, it was easy to divide 
Indians against Indians; but in a major city, we are so glad to see other Indians, we don’t 
care what tribe they are. They are natives, and that’s all that counts.”33 The process of 
migration also helped some Indians develop panethnic (or what historian Kent Blansett 
calls “intertribal”) identities.34 For instance, when Richard Oakes first migrated from the 
St. Regis Reservation in upstate New York to New York City, he experienced some 
intertribal relation. But it was not until his secondary migration to California in 1967 that 
Oakes began understanding more deeply the plight of American Indians across the 
country. While driving across the country, Oakes visited a number of reservations about 
whom he had read while growing up and in his spare time from working. In contrast to 
what he read “about love and friendship for your fellow man,” Oakes saw “bickering and 
barroom fights between Indians.”35 When he arrived in San Francisco, Oakes saw similar 
occurrences, along with limited and poor housing conditions, economic exploitation, and 
a general inaccessibility to their tribal and cultural practices and customs. Yet American 
Indians also fought resiliently to create intertribal cultural spaces, establishing places like 
the Oakland Friendship House (later Intertribal Fellowship House), the San Jose Indian 
Center, and the San Francisco Indian Center. The latter served as a site for intertribal 
powwows and other community events; its burning down in 1969 even provided a 
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catalyst for local American Indian activists toward more radical forms of protest like the 
Occupation of Alcatraz, since neither the BIA nor the city of San Francisco would 
provide enough funding to replace the building. Similar to Latinas/os in the Bay Area, 
American Indian migrants their unique cultural identities while creating new ones from 
their current circumstances and lived experiences.36 
In addition to the emergence of new panethnic identities after World War II, 
migrants who would later be radicalized often developed interethnic and interracial 
affinities earlier in their upbringings. Proximity did not guarantee affinity. For example, 
Samoan migrants and American Indian migrants in the Mission District often clashed 
with each other, even though they all experienced displacement wrought by U.S. 
colonialism.37 Yet intercultural interactions within the constricted commingling under the 
Bay Area’s multiple urban crises often led to cross-cultural friendships and an 
understanding of similar societal problems people of color experienced. 
In West Oakland and other nearby neighborhoods, Black Southerners constituted 
the majority by the early 1950s. Yet longtime and newcomer Mexican American 
communities also formed a significant part of those neighborhoods. Alex Gonzalez 
recalled growing up around African Americans and playing sports with many other 
Latinos and African Americans at the local recreation center run by Rockwood Education 
Department. Latinas/os and African Americans also attended the same public schools, 
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including the local district community college, Merritt College. Oakland chapter Brown 
Beret co-founder Jorge Gonzalez first met Huey Newton and Bobby Seale while at 
Merritt in struggles for a diverse and relevant curriculum for people of color.38 
Neighborhoods throughout San Francisco and the Peninsula also fostered this sort 
of interaction. San Francisco State College striker and later Nairobi College President 
Donald Smothers “always seemed to have a bond with minorities.”39 After migrating 
from Texas as a child, Smothers attended Irving M. Scott School, which held regular 
“international days” that celebrated the cultures of African Americans, ethnic Mexicans, 
Filipinas/os, Samoans, and many other people groups that constituted the school’s 
demographics. When he moved to East Palo Alto during his junior high school years, he 
found a significant Latina/o populace at Everett Junior High School. LaNada Boyer had 
friendships with Latinas/os and African Americans in the Mission District, and Tony and 
Mario Martinez made friends with other people of color in the Mission as well.40 
Some migrants’ unique circumstances within their migrant groups facilitated 
these cross-cultural relations. While Richard Aoki grew up with some Chinese Americans 
and Filipinas/os and lived among Japanese Americans, he largely gravitated toward 
African Americans in West Oakland. Part of this stemmed from their predominance in 
the area. Yet Aoki’s family history also played a role in this development. Aoki’s 
grandfather retaining ownership of his noodle factory in West Oakland after Internment 
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defied the odds; that he had the means to open the factory in the first place indicated that 
Aoki’s family immigrated to the United States with more capital and means than most 
Japanese immigrants of that time. In addition, Aoki and his brother were often excluded 
in Japanese American social circles because of their father, who other Nikkei called 
dorobo (meaning “thief” or “troublemaker” in Japanese) because of his propensity 
toward fighting, robbery, gambling, and other activities viewed unseemly by the broader 
society. As a result, Aoki and his brother experienced social isolation from Japanese 
Americans, meaning the majority of their social circle in West Oakland would be 
Black.41 
Bob Avakian also came to cross-racial friendships through somewhat unique 
circumstances. Avakian regularly traveled to Fresno to visit his father’s family, and two 
things continually stuck out to him. First, his father’s family held racist views about the 
African Americans and other racial minorities in the area, despite Armenians facing 
discriminatory treatment within his older relatives’ lifetimes. But more startling for 
Avakian was the spatial segregation of Fresno by race, where “Blacks and the Latinos 
and Asians lived on the other side of the freeway in Fresno, where the conditions were 
markedly and dramatically much worse.”42 Such was also the case in his hometown of 
Berkeley, where the Berkeley Hills in which he grew up were virtually all-white. Like 
Alex Gonzalez in Oakland, Avakian socially mixed with African Americans in local 
sports activities, like at the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) center in 
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Berkeley. Through these activities, Avakian realized that he and Black Berkeleyans had 
vastly different experiences in the same city. As he started playing in the city’s school 
leagues, Avakian noticed that schools in predominantly-Black neighborhoods were often 
in disrepair compared to the schools he attended. His matriculation at Berkeley High 
School marked the first time he attended a white-Black integrated school, and through 
sports, Avakian took an affinity to his Black classmates. Avakian learned about the plight 
of Black Berkeleyans through these classmates, especially on long bus rides to and from 
sporting events where they would discuss the issues of the day. Although much of 
Avakian’s childhood was segregated, his interactions with his Black peers helped him 
become aware of racial inequalities and would be instrumental in his later activism.43 
Some migrants developed multiracial affinities even within the more punitive 
facets of the urban crises. With the escalating militarization of local police departments 
came an accompanied rise in the number of juvenile delinquents apprehended, 
particularly youth of color. Gary Lescallett, the son of a Nicaraguan mother and a white 
American father, spent time in the local Youth Authority prison on charges stemming 
from a burglary charge in Pacifica, south of San Francisco. While Lescallett “stuck with 
La Raza” while in prison, he also began understanding the similar struggles that 
Latinas/os and African Americans faced in their local communities.44 When volunteering 
to speak with a group of “at-risk” youth with a Black fellow prisoner, Lescallett was 
struck by his fellow prisoner’s proclamation that there was no difference “between black 
                                                 
     43 Avakian, From Ike to Mao and Beyond 
 
     44 Lescallett, quoted in Heins, Strictly Ghetto Property, 40-42. 
 55 
and brown people” and racial difference were “just a trick the Man has made to make us 
go at each other’s throats.”45 Through experiencing similar manifestations of oppression, 
Bay Area youth could envision themselves as part of a similar struggle, even if they could 
not yet fully articulate these connections. 
 
The Limits of Liberal Reform 
The urban transformations and identity (re)formations communities throughout 
the Bay Area experienced generated an insurgency of political protests and other forms of 
activism. As Omi and Winant note, “Since race and racism involve violence, oppression, 
exploitation, and indignity, they also generate movements of resistance and theories of 
resistance.”46 The strictures of the Bay Area’s multiple urban crises pushed both migrant 
and established communities of color toward activism, joined by white allies throughout 
the area. 
Postwar activism reflected the wide-ranging nature of previous eras of Bay Area 
activism. Black protests in the 1940s Santa Clara Valley against ongoing minstrel shows, 
for example, hearkened back to the 1910s when the San Francisco NAACP organized to 
stop screenings of the film The Birth of a Nation. Some protests in the Bay Area lent 
solidarity for those in struggle elsewhere in the country, such as the mid-1960s lunch 
counter sit-ins in San Jose organized by Black activists—despite these businesses not 
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excluding them from eating in the restaurants—that demonstrated Black Southern 
migrants’ continual observance of social issues from their places of origin.47 
Older civil rights organizations like the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Mexican American Legal Defense 
Fund (MALDF) engaged with newer organizations like the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Community Service Organization (CSO) in 
numerous local struggles against housing, educational, and employment discrimination 
through the 1950s and 60s. Direct-action protests became more commonplace, with left-
leaning leaders like Dr. Carleton B. Goodlett organizing a series of anti-discrimination 
protests in 1964 against the Sheraton-Palace Hotel in San Francisco. Some activists also 
worked to provide community uplift in their local neighborhoods through local Offices of 
Economic Opportunity and other federal War on Poverty programs beginning in 1964. 
Huey Newton and Bobby Seale worked in one such office in Oakland in 1966, and 
members of Los Siete de La Raza worked in a similar office within the Mission District. 
American Indian activists advocated continually with Bureau of Indian Affairs officials, 
while also taking part in some War on Poverty programs.48 
In response to ubiquitous housing and employment discrimination, liberal 
politicians fought to enact government-backed protections against the racism of the local 
housing industry and employers. Most prominent in these battles was for fair housing 
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legislation and legal protections. Court cases beginning in the early 1950s desegregated 
certain exclusionary areas, such as Chinese American Sing Sheng and his family gaining 
access to the Southwood suburban development in South San Francisco through the 
court’s ruling in Sheng v. Southwood (1952). As the 50s turned to the 60s, broader 
housing protections became an integral activist issue throughout the Bay Area. While 
observing his parents’ activism for fair housing protections, Bob Avakian learned how 
much of a touchstone issue housing discrimination became by the 1960s. The city of 
Berkeley created statutes in 1962 that extended anti-discrimination protections to 
prospective homebuyers and tenants. The next year, Byron Rumford, the state 
assemblyman from Berkeley, introduced the Fair Housing Act to the California 
legislature. Upon its passage, the 1963 Rumford Act marked one of the first of its kind in 
the country and scored a significant victory to local activists.49 
Yet activists’ efforts to undo the ill-effects of the urban crises were hamstrung in 
two ways. First, civil rights reforms met continual resistance from conservative and even 
some moderate liberal political forces, particularly with fair housing legislation. Soon 
after the passage of the Rumford Act, for instance, opposition mounted in the form of a 
campaign for the passage of a California ballot initiative that would undo many of the 
gains instituted by the act. Proposition 14, which passed in 1964, defended the legality of 
private citizens’ discriminatory housing practices under the guise of protecting the 
“rights” of property-owners, even though the latter themselves had mostly gained their 
homes through exclusion and discrimination. The actions of private organizations and 
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citizens exacerbated this situation, as homeowners who did not abide by racially-
restrictive covenants or neighborhood association mandates risked legal and social 
retribution. The case of one white homeowner who rented and later sold a house to a 
Black family on Berkeley’s Linden Street in 1958 illustrates the extent to which 
retribution could occur. Not only did the local Federal Housing Administration office 
sanction this homeowner; a minister who attended the “house blessing ceremony” for the 
Black family received an immediate transfer to Palo Alto; the bank manager of the 
branch that provided the family’s loan received a reprimand and transfer to 
predominantly-Black South San Francisco; and a white neighbor who befriended the 
family lost his job after regular harassment by his employer.50 
Second, most civil rights activism focused on future protections against 
discrimination while not addressing the root causes of these racial inequalities. In the 
struggle for fair housing, for example, proponents for anti-discriminatory legislation did 
not always connect this issue with the broader issues of under- and unemployment for 
communities of color, meaning that even with the passing and enforcement of fair 
housing legislation, the majority within these communities did not even have the means 
to   Ultimately, the reforms of liberalism could never undo the systems and structures of 
oppression that the liberal state helped create; for liberalism’s prescriptions were often 
race-neutral and colorblind and thus did not address the underlying conditions and logics 
that perpetuated the Bay Area’s multiple urban crises. By going through legislation, legal 
challenges, and other established channels for social and political change, activists from 
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the 1940s through the mid-1960s could only achieve piecemeal progress, not large-scale 
changes for the masses of people of color, particularly working-class people of color. 
 
Conclusion 
By the late 1960s, the San Francisco Bay Area’s multiple urban crises had 
entrenched racialized and class-inflected hierarchies throughout its regions. The 
confluence of numerous social calculations in response to the predominantly non-white 
migrant streams flowing into the Bay Area during and after World War II spatially 
reconfigured the area. White residents within local governments, the real estate industry, 
banks, and neighborhood associations were all complicit in segregating the vast majority 
of people of color from the virtually-all-white suburbs that continued to expand as the 
postwar era progressed, from higher-quality neighborhoods within a few urban cores like 
San Francisco, and into unincorporated areas like East Palo Alto and East Redwood City 
in the Peninsula. With the entrenchment of the urban crises came inequalities not only in 
the availability and quality of housing, but also within employment opportunities, 
education, governance, and treatment under the law. This situation cast an overall dire 
shadow over the majority of people of color.  
As these urban crises persisted, so too did the Bay Area see an increasing in 
political and social activism, as migrants’ experiences within these postwar 
transformations pushed them toward fighting for societal reform. Coming of age in one of 
the Bay Area’s multiracial communities and developing cross-cultural affinities also 
instilled a predisposition toward organizing across racial lines that would manifest 
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themselves later in the 1960s and 70s. Yet this predisposition alone would not create 
multiracial alliances, and multiracial radicalism was not inevitable. Instead, there also had 
to be ideological developments toward multiracialism to develop these alliances. This 
would need to occur both on the individual level but also within the changing political 
landscapes within the Bay Area as the 1960s progressed, especially with the increasing 
prominence of. Third World internationalism, a growing dissatisfaction with the limits of 
liberal reform, and the escalating involvement of U.S. troops in Vietnam. And with this 
growing internationalism came a growing radicalization on the part of Bay Area social 
and political activists toward bringing not just reform, but revolution to the area, the 
country, and the world at large. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The “Vietnam Turn”: The Bay Area Radical Tradition, Anti-Imperialism, and the 1967 
Spring Mobilization against the War 
 
On April 15, 1967, an estimated 60,000 people packed into San Francisco’s Kezar 
Stadium, the longtime home of the San Francisco Forty-Niners franchise of the National 
Football League. This crowd, however, did not gather to watch a football exhibition. 
Rather, Kezar Stadium hosted one of the largest assemblies of protesters in the Bay 
Area’s history for the Spring Mobilization against the War. Serving as the Western US 
venue for the National Mobilization against the War, this rally capped a week of protests, 
teach-ins, and arts performances that culminated in a 40,000-person march through the 
streets of San Francisco to the stadium. Although US interventions into Vietnam would 
not cease until 1975, the Spring Mobilization in San Francisco and its 100,000-person 
counterpart in New York City would represent a shift in the nature of protest against the 
war in the US. Liberal activists did not only unite with radicals across racial lines to voice 
opposition to the war with the interests of US citizens in mind. They also rhetorically 
situated the United States as an empire looking to expand its militaristic and economic 
grasp into Southeast Asia through Vietnam, emphasizing the oppression of the 
Vietnamese people themselves as a motivation for opposing the war.1 
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This chapter examines the 1967 Spring Mobilization as a case study of anti-
imperialist protest within the broader antiwar movement in the Bay Area. The Spring 
Mobilization marked the convergence of developments that by the mid-1960s had swept 
up the area while its communities of color coped with and struggled against the postwar 
urban crisis in its various forms (Chapter Two). Intertwined with the transformations of 
the Bay Area’s urban landscapes was the expansion of the Bay Area’s radical tradition 
from primarily being focused around labor union organizing to the growth of 
organizations not formally aligned with socialist or communist entities from around the 
world. The US rose to preeminence on the global stage in light of the destruction World 
War II visited upon most of the industrialized world. During the early Cold War, the 
country positioned itself as the world’s champion of democracy and capitalism against 
the spreading communist influence of the Soviet Union. During the three decades after 
World War II, national liberation movements permeated European colonies throughout 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. At times, these movements operated with the support of 
the Soviet Union; in general, however, they worked as part of a general “Non-Aligned 
Movement” of “Third World” people working to create their own countries apart from 
the influence of the United States or Soviet Union. As historian Vijay Prashad notes, part 
of this Non-Aligned Movement was internationalist solidarity with other Third World 
nations fighting for decolonization and against interference from traditional imperialist 
powers from the West. This “internationalist nationalism” resonated with activists in the 
United States, especially among self-proclaimed Third World radicals, who found new 
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inspiration and systems of thought within these national liberation movements throughout 
the world.2 
The Spring Mobilization embodied much of what I argue was significant about 
how the Vietnam War marked a break from previous war efforts, particularly among 
people of color. The “Vietnam turn” involved a growing opposition of racial minorities 
(and US citizens at large) to the war. Whereas racial minorities heretofore tended to view 
military service as a way to prove one’s patriotism and deservingness of full equality 
within U.S. society, the Vietnam War marked the first mass dissent among people of 
color against a war, as they comprised ranks in the armed forces disproportionate to their 
percentage of the general population and continued to experience racism within the 
military. In addition, the “Vietnam turn” saw not only a mass movement away from this 
rationale for serving in the military but also toward an anti-imperialist orientation as the 
motivation for antiwar opposition. Anti-imperialism in the United States predated the 
1960s, particularly among the Black Left. From W.E.B. Du Bois’ 1900 proclamation of 
support for the independence of the “darker races of mankind” from their Western 
European colonizers to the emergence of groups like the Council on African Affairs in 
the 1940s and particularly with the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) and other 
communist and socialist organizations, the affairs of other oppressed peoples around the 
world drew the attention of activists in the US. Even more mainstream activist 
organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) under the leadership of Walter White voiced similar support. Yet the entrance 
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of protests like the Spring Mobilization into the mainstream of US society set this era of 
anti-imperialism apart from prior ones.3 
The Spring Mobilization similarly bridged liberal and more radical contingents 
that now comprised the broader 1960s antiwar movement. Indeed, one of the core goals 
for the National Mobilization was to foment more public opposition against the war, 
particularly among white middle-class liberals. Liberal luminaries like civil rights leaders 
Coretta Scott King and Julian Bond joined organized labor representatives including Paul 
Schrade and Morris Evenson from the United Auto Workers Union and Painters Local 
#4, respectively, along with representatives from radical organizations like Eldridge 
Cleaver of the Organization of Afro-American Unity and Robert Scheer of the 
Community for New Politics as the featured speakers at the rally.4 This collaboration 
between liberals and radicals, especially across racial lines, generated red-baiting from 
opponents, including from the federal Committee on Un-American Activities. In a March 
31st report published just a few weeks before the Mobe, the Committee accused the 
National Mobilization organizers of working “to advance the world Communist 
movement” within the United States.5 Rather than giving “honest and legitimate dissent” 
and debate—through which, according to the Committee, protesters would eventually 
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come to agree with the government’s foreign policy—the National Mobilization 
organizers were working “to do injury and damage to the United States and to give aid 
and comfort to its enemies.”6 
The Committee’s accusations were not completely without merit. Although many 
communist and socialist organizations did not join the Mobilization, some sectors of the 
CPUSA and other Marxist organizations like the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) took 
active roles in promoting the National Mobilization. Some on the Left, such as the 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), criticized this decision by YSA and other 
similarly-minded activists. SDS viewed the YSA’s involvement as a contradictory 
alliance with liberal activists who shared neither the Left’s anti-imperialist orientation nor 
the desire to work toward the “general radicalization of the American working class” 
toward revolution in the United States, which was one of the central tenets of the YSA.7 
In response, the YSA framed their alliance as part of a resurgent “united front” strategy 
popular within the Marxist tradition, arguing that the broader US Left should unite behind 
the banner of the National Mobilization, despite the dominant involvement of liberals, 
because they all had the common goal of the withdrawal of the US military from 
Vietnam. Moreover, the YSA argued that, rather than become usurped by the liberals 
within the Spring Mobilization, radicals could use the Mobilization as part of the general 
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radicalization of the American public, particularly targeting liberals.8 Indeed, the Spring 
Mobilization highlighted the moment of flux U.S. radicalism experienced in the late 
1960s and signaled the nature of radicalism in the Bay Area for the next decades. 
 
The Bay Area Radical Tradition and Global Post-World War II Contexts 
Although the late 1960s through the mid-1970s marked perhaps the apex of 
radicalism in the Bay Area’s history, multiple lineages in the area’s longer radical 
tradition predated this era. Most of this radical activism flowed through labor unions, 
such as the International Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and the International 
Longshore and Warehouse Union, and comprised part of the labor uprisings of the 1930s 
that led to reforms under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal like the 
passage of the Wagner Act in 1935. Momentum for organized labor grew through World 
War II, culminating in the December 3-5, 1946 General Strike in Oakland. Spearheaded 
by predominantly- female downtown department store workers, the General Strike grew 
to include most of the city’s American Federation of Labor (AFL)-affiliated unions, 
ranging from the Teamsters to the Transit Workers. Not only did the General Strike arise 
in solidarity with the downtown department store worker, but it also marked the 
dissatisfaction organized labor had with the direction of the postwar political economy of 
the East Bay, particularly with the demobilization of many wartime industries and 
conflicts with the vision that Oakland’s downtown business elite held (as further 
articulated in Chapters Two and Six). A number of Oakland strikers had participated in 
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the 1934 San Francisco General Strike and took initiative with specific tactics stemming 
from the lessons of the San Francisco strike, such as Oakland strikers cutting off local 
(negative) news coverage of the strikers and encouraging mass rallies and picketing 
downtown, instead of strikers simply staying home. The General Strike and the furor it 
caused among Oakland’s economic elites demonstrated the power that labor unions 
within the Bay Area had developed by this point.9 
Included within this radical labor organizing were Marxist organizations, most 
notably the Communist Party USA. From the early 1900s through the early 1940s, the 
CPUSA grew alongside and largely within this tide of organized labor—forming part of 
the leadership for the 1934 San Francisco General Strike—even as it periodically 
experienced government repression. By the 1940s, other Marxist organizations had arisen 
separately from the CPUSA or from expelled or splintered factions, often stemming from 
ideological differences regarding the nature of revolution in the U.S. and the manner in 
which U.S. communists and socialists should work toward an international revolution. 
The Socialist Workers Party and its affiliated Youth Socialist Alliance, for example, 
adhered to the ideologies of Leon Trotsky instead of the Marxism-Leninism of the Soviet 
Union at the time, largely because the former focused more on internationalist solidarity 
than the latter. While these ideological foundations created fissures among the Marxist 
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U.S. Left, these Leftist organizations shared enough points of overlap to generally against 
similar opposition, even when not formally allied with each other.10 
Yet the power of labor unions and the radicalism therein would soon recede in the 
face of stiff Cold War opposition. Through the early postwar era, many gains organized 
labor made saw a rollback, such as with the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 that weakened the 
power of workers to collectively bargain, strike, and boycott. The power of organized 
labor also grew limited in the mainstream unions affiliated with the AFL, since the AFL’s 
leadership was less radical than the rank-and-file and found more compromised solutions 
with management, rather than gaining clear victories over them. Even the 1946 Oakland 
General Strike ended when many union leaders called off the solidarity strikes, leaving 
the department store workers largely isolated. Anti-communist sentiment also began to 
mount as the 1940s and 50s progressed; not only did the Taft-Hartley Act contain 
provisions meant to root out communists among the ranks of organized labor, but a 
fervent anti-communist wave swept throughout the country in the 1950s and into the 
early 1960s. The House Un-American Committee (HUAC) led much of the federal 
government’s Red Scare, targeting individuals ranging from government officials to 
college professors and even popular culture figures. HUAC held numerous hearings and 
investigations in the Bay Area during the 1950s and 60s, and although Leftists won a 
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number of these legal battles with HUAC, the general repression of the time wreaked 
havoc on the Bay Area Left as a whole.11 
The fissures among Leftists also mounted as the 1950s and 60s progressed, 
especially among Marxists of various stripes. The CPUSA particularly felt the effects of 
these fissures, as the organization fell from its preeminence among the Left as more 
groups splintered from them or were expelled. Part of this fall from preeminence 
stemmed from the CPUSA’s aligning with the Soviet Union, even with the Soviet 
Union’s continued imperialistic interventions into Eastern European countries like 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. U.S. Marxists increasingly repudiated the Soviet Union 
and its accompanying Stalinism in favor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the 
ideologies of Mao Zedong and other Chinese communists after the 1957 Sino-Soviet 
split. The broken relationship between the Soviet Union and the PRC also led to a mass 
exodus from the CPUSA, with the Progressive Labor Movement (later Progressive 
Labor, then the Progressive Labor Party) being one such faction that left or was later 
expelled from the CPUSA for the latter’s continual support of the Soviet Union.12 
Other ideological divisions plagued the Left. The AFL, its affiliated unions, and 
other mainstream organized labor entities historically excluded large swaths of the 
working class, namely racial minorities and women. Black Panther Party co-founder 
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Bobby Seale, for instance, recalled that his father could not find steady work upon his 
family’s arrival from Texas to Berkeley because of his exclusion from joining a 
carpenters’ union. Only a handful of major unions in the Bay Area, such as the 
International Longshore and Warehouse Union, had desegregated their ranks before 
World War II, which saw the opening up of many unions’ memberships. This opening 
up, however, stemmed largely from the result of wildcat strikes by excluded workers or 
through court rulings mandating desegregation, such as the California Supreme Court 
decision in James v. Marinship (1944) against the Boilermakers Local No. 6 in Marin 
County. Even into the early 1960s, mainstream labor unions favored the interests of white 
(male) workers over others, such as diverting almost all the resources for a taxpayer-
funded training program for high-wage labor toward this group. Then-Socialist Workers 
Party member and future field general of the Black Panther Party Richard Aoki recalled 
similar issues the day after the 1965 Watts uprising in Los Angeles within the 
predominantly-white, unionized factory where he worked. When Aoki arrived to work, 
he noticed almost half of his coworkers were absent from work that day. He later learned 
from the foreman that his missing comrades stayed home out of fear that Black rioters 
from Watts were making their way to the Bay Area to ransack their (suburban) homes, 
and this racially-charged paranoia illustrated to Aoki the need to address anti-racism 
within the working class. Although not the sole or even primary reason for the decline in 
its political and social clout, mainstream organized labor’s lethargy in fully incorporating 
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racial minorities and women or supporting other unions that did divided the U.S. working 
class at a moment where unity and cooperation was needed.13 
Inclusion among Marxist radicals also often proved to be an issue. Two of the 
most significant points of conflict among U.S. Marxists throughout their history were the 
“National Question” (specifically the “Negro Question” when focused on Black 
Americans) and the “Woman Question” that centered on the relationship between the 
struggle against racial and gender oppression, respectively, with the struggle of the 
working class. As historian Robin D.G. Kelley notes, this conflict plagued Marxists since 
their advent in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. Before the 1960s, both 
Marxist-Leninists and Trotskyists predominantly theorized that since racial and gender 
oppression stemmed from capitalism, the former would wither away after the working 
class’ revolution against the latter. Yet in practice, this meant that many Marxists who 
were neither racial minorities nor women typically ignored the immediate and material 
effects of racism and sexism. Moreover, since both racism and sexism predated 
capitalism, the abolition of the latter did not ensure the abolition of the former. By the 
early 1960s, people of color who identified as Marxists or drew from Marxist theories 
turned more toward the writings of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong and 
identified increasingly with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC influenced 
many Third World national liberation movements and through the 1960s voiced 
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solidarity and at times gave military support to other Third World revolutionaries. For 
activists of color in the U.S. who turned to more radical ideologies, Maoism provided a 
coherent system of thought that held anti-racism and women’s liberation as intertwined 
with the international working-class revolution, holding the latter unachievable without 
the former. While some joined multiracial radical organizations, many established new 
organizations or chapters of existing national ones, such as the Northern California 
chapter of the Revolutionary Action Movement, a Marxist-leaning Black Power 
organization originally founded in Cleveland, Ohio, from which Huey P. Newton and 
Bobby Seale would split in 1966 to form the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. 
Although many U.S. Marxists incorporated racial and gender oppression into their 
political analyses and movement work by the early 1970s (as further explained in Chapter 
Five), their general inability to do so throughout most of their history only inhibited the 
working-class revolution they worked toward fomenting in the United States.14 
This shift in in U.S. Marxism was influenced by the changes occurring on a global 
scale. The heightened anti-communism of the 1950s and 60s not only resulted from the 
growing international influence of the Soviet Union but also because of the Third World 
anti-colonial national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Although 
the roots of this wave of decolonization were planted early in the twentieth century, these 
revolutions would not erupt until after World War II. Third World peoples under the 
colonial rule of Western European countries (and a few under US rule) agitated for their 
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independence in the aftermath of the war, pointing out the contradictions between the 
rhetoric of the Allied countries about the need to make the world free for liberty and 
democracy while continuing to exploit and oppress their colonies. These national 
liberation movements often included leadership from Marxist or Marx-inspired 
revolutionaries, taking their lead from either the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of 
China. 
Third World revolutionaries at times held conferences to discuss their 
movements’ strategies and progress and show solidarity for each other. The April 1955 
Bandung Conference in Indonesia between primarily African and Asian countries 
symbolized this solidarity. The “Bandung Spirit” that arose from this conference 
constituted not only “a refusal of both economic subordination and cultural oppression” 
that European imperialism brought, but also a commitment to “cultural cooperation” that 
included learning about the cultures of the other twenty-nine Bandung countries.15 Other 
conferences, such as the 1966 First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America in Havana, Cuba, carried on the “Bandung Spirit,” even in the midst 
of growing ideological disagreement among Third World revolutionaries about the proper 
strategies for gaining liberation and building their subsequent decolonized societies. 
These Third World countries would at times serve as havens for U.S. radicals in exile, 
such as Black Power and armed self-defense proponent Robert F. Williams in Cuba 
beginning June 1960 or Kathleen and Eldridge Cleaver in Algeria beginning in late 1968 
(Chapter Four). They also hosted delegations of U.S. allies, such as the late 1960s and 
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1970s Venceremos Brigades to Cuba or the Eldridge Cleaver-led pilgrimage to the 
People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the 
Democratic Republic of North Vietnam. This preferential treatment by Third World 
leaders would at times contribute to U.S. activists creating romanticized versions of the 
former and overlooking issues within those countries, such as the persistence of racial 
discrimination against Afro-Cubans. Yet because of Third World leaders’ outreach to and 
vocal support of the struggles of internationalist radicals in the United States, the latter 
only grew to reciprocate this solidarity to the Third World movements from which they 
drew inspiration.16 
The most renowned and internationally-captivating of these Third World 
revolutionary movements was the Vietnamese struggle for self-determination. In the 
aftermath of World War II, Vietnam agitated for independence from France, who refused 
to allow this for Vietnam or any of its remaining colonies, now referred to as “overseas 
territories,” despite Vietnamese national movement leaders using arguments for their 
freedom modeled after those from revolutions in the West, including the French 
Revolution.17 On September 2, 1945, communist leader Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam 
sovereign and independent from France, leading to a war that lasted until the Northern 
Vietnamese Army defeated the French military at the Battle of Dienbienphu on May 7, 
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1954. That the United States financed much of France’s decimated military during this 
attempted suppression of the Vietnamese independence movement heightened tensions 
between the US and the newly-independent Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, 
especially after Vietnam’s partitioning at the seventeenth parallel as part of the Geneva 
Accords peace treaty between the Vietnamese and the French. The United States 
constantly intervened with the affairs of South Vietnam, unwilling to allow the South turn 
communist like the North, to the point of supporting the totalitarian Ngo Dinh Diem 
regime after Diem gained office as chief of state in a rigged election in October 1955 and 
subsequently filled the South Vietnamese legislative assembly with his supporters in 
another rigged election in March 1956. The US also financed and trained Diem’s 
military; in turn, Diem used military forces to suppress dissent and democratic reforms, 
incarcerating thousands of dissidents and executing a multitude of them.18 
Despite the continual repression Diem inflicted upon the South Vietnamese 
people, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, then President John F. Kennedy maintained 
support for South Vietnam as a bulwark against the spread of communism throughout 
Southeast Asia. Diem’s regime, however, soon grew untenable and uncooperative. 
Kennedy supported a Central Intelligence Agency-backed coup against Diem in 
November 1963, which launched South Vietnam into further disarray and subsequent 
civil conflicts among different military factions. With chaos in the South and the growing 
presence and support of communist revolutionaries therein, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
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(after the assassination of Kennedy in late November) escalated US involvement in South 
Vietnam. Johnson subsequently mischaracterized the nature of the August 1964 Gulf of 
Tonkin incident—a small skirmish that erupted between a US naval destroyer and two 
North Vietnamese patrol boats, followed by a likely-falsified retaliatory attack by the two 
patrol boats—in order to ask Congress to declare war on North Vietnam and formalize 
US military involvement in the region. By the end of 1966, almost 400,000 US troops 
had been sent to Vietnam for the war effort, with nary a trace of the end of the war in 
sight.19 
 
Anti-Imperialism and the Spring Mobilization 
As US interventionism in Vietnam escalated during the Johnson administration, 
so too did the antiwar movement. At a November 26, 1966 nationwide conference for 
antiwar organizations in Cleveland, Ohio, a national Spring Mobilization Committee to 
end the Vietnam War formed and selected its national leadership, with A.J. Muste, one of 
the most prominent socialists in US history, serving as the founding chairman. The 
national committee comprised a mix of radical and liberal activists, such as Liberation 
editor David Dellinger, foreign policy specialist Professor Robert Greenblatt, and 
Ramparts editor Edward Keating, who also served as the West Coast Chairman for the 
Mobilization.20 The national committee set its sights for an April mobilization, and 
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organizing for this event began soon after the conference dispersed. The subsequent 
Student Mobilization conference in Chicago, a few weeks later to organize a student 
campus strike counterpart to the National Mobilization found radicals and liberals among 
their ranks, especially Marxists like the Young Socialist Alliance. The Spring 
Mobilization Committee aimed not to usurp or compete with those already within the 
antiwar movement but instead to “stimulate increased activity everywhere” in opposition 
to the war, echoing the sentiments of Young Socialist Alliance’s “united front” strategy.21 
The Steering Committee for the Spring Mobilization in San Francisco reflected 
the united front strategy with the large umbrella they built in seeking out participants for 
the April 15th rally. Although white radical and liberal men comprised much of the 
leadership for the Steering Committee, numerous subcommittees formed that centered 
around different communities in the Bay Area. The subcommittees ranged from those 
with activist orientations like the Afro-American, women’s, labor, and religious 
committees to logistics- and financing-oriented ones. One subcommittee unique to the 
West Coast Mobilization was the Latina/o subcommittee, featuring leaders such as 
longtime labor organizer Bert Corona.22 This subcommittee focused its efforts within the 
Bay Area’s Mexican American and other Spanish-speaking communities, including 
bilingual publicity and recruiting. They also emphasized the anti-imperialist nature of the 
Spring Mobilization. One such flyer featured a photograph of a Vietnamese women with 
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an infant in her arms and another child by her side weeping and mourning over the death 
of a male family member. The flyer proceeded to highlight the catastrophe the war 
produced for the civilians of Vietnam, which protesters argued largely existed to promote 
the interests of American corporations ahead of both the Vietnamese and everyday U.S. 
citizens. Moreover, the English side of the flyer characterized U.S. intervention in 
Vietnam as “a racist war against a colored people,” demonstrating the Latina/o 
subcommittee’s envisioning of the Vietnamese as engaged in a similar struggle against 
white supremacy as minorities in the United States.23  
Other racial minorities within the Bay Area Steering Committee made this 
connection between white supremacy in the United States and the Vietnam War, most 
prominently the “Afro-American Committee.” Among the members of this subcommittee 
were local leaders within various civil rights and Black Power organizations, such as Dr. 
Carleton B. Goodlett of the 1964 Sheraton Hotel strike (Chapter Two) and Eldridge 
Cleaver, who also would serve as one of the speakers for the April 15 th rally. Goodlett 
represented the growing convergence of some Bay Area Black civil rights activists with 
Black radicals. Although he organized protests more in line with mainstream civil rights 
activism, such as the Sheraton strike, Goodlett also increasingly spoke out in support of 
Black Power activists and other radicals, even circulating copies of the communist 
People’s World at local NAACP meetings, to the chagrin of other leaders.24 
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Other Black civil rights activists with the mainstream by joining the Mobilization. 
By the end of 1966, the National Committee counted civil rights organizations among its 
constituents, installing Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) member James 
Bevel as the National Director for the committee in December. In addition, Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee leader Julian Bond and SCLC leaders Rev. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and Coretta Scott King lent their support as speakers for the 
Mobilization, with Bond and Scott King scheduled for the San Francisco rally and King 
for its New York counterpart. The Kings’ and Bond’s decision to support to anti-war 
movement reflected a growing trend among Black activists that advanced this cause in 
conjunction with civil rights activism. The NAACP and other mainstream organizations 
had voiced solidarity with the anti-colonial national liberation movements in Africa and 
the rest of the Third World in the aftermath of World War II. During the Red Scare of the 
1950s, however, most turned away from this political orientation, because most of these 
Third World movements emanated from communists and socialists, often with the 
support of the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China.25 
For Bevel, the Kings, Bond, and others like them, however, the Black struggle for 
equality in the United States expanded beyond the country’s borders, as they viewed their 
oppression as stemming from the same source as the oppression that Third World 
revolutionaries faced. Coretta Scott King first became involved with internationalist 
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solidarity efforts as a student at Antioch College in Ohio during the mid-1940s. Scott 
King matriculated at Antioch after moving from her hometown in Alabama yet was first 
surprised, then frustrated at the persistent prejudice and de facto segregation she faced 
within the college and the surrounding areas. Seeing the prevalence of anti-Black racism 
in the North, Scott King dove into activist organizations, such as the Antioch chapters of 
the NAACP, Race Relations Committee, and Civil Liberties Committee. Further spurred 
by this activism, she also entered into international peace work through the Quaker peace 
groups she found at Antioch. After meeting and marrying Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
moving to Atlanta in the 1950s, Coretta Scott King joined the Women’s International 
League for Peace and Freedom, with whom she remained in contact even as she began 
centering her activism against the Jim Crow apartheid system in the South and other 
Black struggles. In March 1962, Women’s Strike for Peace invited her to serve as a 
delegate for an international conference for the burgeoning anti-nuclear movement. 
King’s internationalist solidarity intertwined with her civil rights and women’s movement 
activism, believing that “the women of the world, united without any regard for national 
or racial divisions, can become a most powerful force for international peace and 
brotherhood.”26 The Spring Mobilization thus was one way for her to demonstrate this 
goal toward a greater global peace.27 
Julian Bond and Martin Luther King, Jr. shared similar motivations for protesting 
the war, expanding their critique toward anti-imperialism. Bond had previously faced 
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backlash relating to his anti-war position, as the Georgia Legislature refused to seat him 
after he gained election in June 1965. Bond was then the Communications Director of the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) who in January 1966 issued a 
statement regarding the connections between the Vietnam War and their civil rights 
struggles within the U.S. The SNCC position paper emphasized the country’s history in 
deceiving or showing bad faith in their interventions or support of Western colonizers in 
the Third World, such as with the Dominican Republic and South Africa. Identifying 
themselves as a people struggling for liberation and self-determination, SNCC recognized 
the right for all people to determine their own futures, free of oppression, and saw the 
Vietnamese struggle as part of their fight for self-determination. Bond himself publicly 
supported this position paper because of his self-identification as a pacifist and because 
of the hypocrisy he saw in the United States allegedly fighting for freedom overseas 
when they could not even provide the same for all of its citizens at home. Bond 
disavowed communism and warfare altogether yet also recognized that he needed to 
oppose “things that...are wrong if they are in Viet Nam or New York, or Chicago, or 
Atlanta” or elsewhere, even if it meant critiquing the government.28 Bond eventually 
gained his seat in the Georgia legislature after the state of Georgia received a late-1966 
mandate from the United States Supreme Court in Bond v. Floyd, with their decision 
centering on the Georgia legislature’s action violating Bond’s First Amendment rights. 
Yet even with his victory, Bond’s ordeal demonstrated the consequences that could arise 
from linking civil rights activism with an antiwar critique.  
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King laid out his rationale in his April 4, 1967 “Beyond Vietnam” speech, given 
in New York eleven days before the Spring Mobilization. King pointed to his and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s realization that their goal to “save the soul 
of America” could not “ignore the present war. If America’s soul becomes totally 
poisoned, part of the autopsy must read ‘Vietnam.’”29 In other words, part of saving the 
United States from destruction stemming from the oppression that it held over Black 
Americans and other minority groups included ending U.S. oppression overseas. King 
emphasized the early revolutionary history of Vietnam, noting how they claimed their 
independence from Japanese and French colonization, even as the U.S. supported the 
latter’s efforts despite it conflicting with the will of most Vietnamese people. King also 
emphasized how the destruction from U.S. bombings during the war most often damaged 
non-combatants, particularly women, children, and the elderly, arguing that the bombings 
and other horrors of war only detracted from the country’s fight to contain communism 
and ability to make allies internationally. King emphasized the struggles of the 
Vietnamese people in his appeal for peace, tying their struggle to the fate of America 
itself.30 
Eldridge Cleaver served as one of the few Black Power movement representatives 
on the Afro-American Committee for the West Coast Mobilization Committee and the 
only one who spoke at the April 15th rally. Cleaver would gain most of his prominence 
(and notoriety) as a leader for the Black Panther Party later in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
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At this point, however, he was involved primarily with the Organization of Afro-
American Unity, originally founded by Malcolm X in 1964, and writing on the staff of 
Ramparts alongside West Coast Mobilization chairman Edward Keating. Cleaver risked 
the revocation of his parole with his political activism but remained a prominent figure 
within the Bay Area’s Black Power and antiwar scenes. Cleaver laid out his analysis of 
the relationship between Black America and the Vietnam War in a 1966 essay that he 
would later publish as part of his renowned Soul on Ice in 1968. Cleaver drew out 
connections between Black Americans’ struggles with those of the Vietnamese and other 
Third World peoples overseas, pointing to Bond’s ordeal in gaining his successfully-won 
seat in the Georgia legislature as one indicator of the cross-current of Black America and 
the Vietnam War. Like others, Cleaver emphasized the commonalities between the 
oppressed status of Black Americans in the United States with the oppression of Third 
World revolutionaries, arguing that because of the history of broken promises by both the 
Republican and Democratic Parties toward Black Americans, Black Americans could not 
continue to rely on the Parties to secure their liberation. Instead, the only guarantee that 
“the future of their people is secure” was to cultivate an international revolution against 
U.S. oppression.31 In Cleaver’s analysis, “The relationship between the genocide in 
Vietnam and the smiles of the white man toward black Americans is a direct relationship. 
Once the white man solves his problem in the East he will then turn his fury again on the 
black people of America, his longtime punching bag.”32 In addition, he argued that the 
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white supremacist and capitalist foundations of the U.S. empire were at their most 
vulnerable in U.S. history, pressing the urgency of this moment and making it imperative 
for Black Americans to join this anti-imperialist struggle. Although not stemming from 
the pacifist orientation of the Kings and Bond, Cleaver’s critique still demonstrated a 
similar line of critique against the United States and an explicit connection between 
Black Americans and those oppressed peoples overseas.33 
Although based in San Francisco, Bay Area activists based in other cities worked 
feverishly to promote the Spring Mobilization. The Berkeley-based Community for New 
Politics (CNP) was one such organization and also worked to promote the accompanying 
Campus Mobilization. Although the CNP focused geared itself toward electoral politics, 
the organization’s base largely came from local antiwar and other activist communities. 
With CNP leader Robert Scheer serving as one of the speakers for the April 15 th rally, the 
CNP took an active role in promoting the Spring Mobilization. One CNP newsletter 
emphasized the broad appeal of the Spring Mobilization, listing some of the nationally-
renowned speakers like civil rights leaders Julian Bond and Coretta Scott King. The 
newsletter also played up the uniqueness of the Spring Mobilization, including attracting 
labor organizations, which they noted “ha[d] not previously been engaged in war 
protests” and “represented in the Bay Area by Santa Clara County Central Labor Council, 
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AFL-CIO, and the Northern California District Council of the International 
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union.”34 
The Spring Mobilization efforts west of the Mississippi River also flourished 
outside of the Bay Area, particularly in the U.S. West. Mobilization Committees formed 
in major urban areas such as Los Angeles, Seattle, and Denver, who arranged local 
demonstrations leading up to the April 15th rally and also arranged bus rides and other 
logistics for protesters traveling to San Francisco. Some activists like Los Angeles-based 
Japanese American union organizer Karl Yoneda had long been active in anti-imperialist 
solidarity mobilizations, with Yoneda’s organizing largely coming within Los Angeles’ 
multiracial communist circles. Yoneda’s labor union networks connected him with the 
labor union efforts within the Bay Area and helped him recruit other labor union activists 
from Southern California to the Spring Mobilization. Others had more recently become 
involved with activism in general. With many of the Bay Area’s activist communities 
engaged and mass support pouring into San Francisco on April 15, the Spring 
Mobilization generated numbers and publicity that could not be ignored.35 
However, vestiges of the Old Left remained in stark visibility for the rally, most 
notably with the issue of representation. Male activists dominated planning and steering 
of the Spring Mobilization, ranging from the all-male National Committee to the vast 
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majority of the San Francisco Steering Committee being men. Moreover, white men 
specifically comprised the majority of these leadership roles, including at the April 15 th 
rally in San Francisco, where Bond, Cleaver, and Coretta Scott King served as the only 
non-white prominently-advertised speakers for the day. Not all the subcommittees for the 
West Coast Mobilization Committee received representation at the rally itself. Most 
surprisingly, Mexican American or other Latina/o leaders had been announced to speak, 
and bilingual translation was not readily available, in contrast to the Mexican American 
subcommittee’s efforts in the Bay Area’s Spanish-speaking communities. King’s 
inclusion in drew particular attention, as publicity documents for the Kezar Stadium rally 
referred to her as “Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.” Even her introduction at the April 15 th 
rally did not include her name. Such reference as only the wife of her more renowned 
husband masked the reality of Coretta Scott King’s internationalism actually predating 
and shaping her husband’s, particularly with her work with Women Strike for Peace 
during her college years in the 1940s and solidarity efforts with the Ghanaian national 
liberation movement during the 1950s. Thus, even as the Spring Mobilization marked 
part of the turning tide of Leftist politics in the Bay Area progressed, certain inequalities 
in the power dynamics of this coalitional organizing remained. As the decade progressed 
and turned to the 1970s, racial underrepresentation and the marginalization of women 
continue to cause problems in alliance-building endeavors among Leftist activists 
throughout the Bay Area.36 
                                                 
     36 Lewis V. Baldwin, To Make the Wounded Whole: The Cultural Legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 278; William D. Watley, Roots of Resistance: The Nonviolent Ethic of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. (Prussia, PA: Judson Press, 1985), 102; “Vietnam War Protest March to  Kezar 
 87 
Conclusion 
The 1967 Spring Mobilization Against the War did not mark the turning point of 
U.S. popular support from the Vietnam War. The Northern Vietnamese’s Tet Offensive 
in 1968 would serve as this watershed moment, as their offensive during the Vietnamese 
New Year demonstrated to the American public the extent to which the Northern 
Vietnamese would fight to gain victory in this war. The Spring Mobilization, however, 
was significant in the way that it represented the shift toward anti-imperialism within the 
anti-war movement, considering not only how the war affected the lives of Americans but 
also those overseas. The Spring Mobilization also represented the convergence between 
some liberal and radical contingents on the Left, along with some of its persistent issues 
in terms of representation and leadership. 
Anti-imperialist protests would continue to be the most visible form of resistance 
against the Vietnam War, with an increase of draft resistance sweeping the Bay Area by 
early 1968. Activists would continue to organize various regional and national 
mobilizations annually through the early 1970s, echoing the rhetoric of the 1967 Spring 
Mobilization. Bay Area radicals continued to voice and work toward anti-imperialist 
solidarity for Third World peoples after the 1960s as well, ranging from Cambodia in the 
early 1970s to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in the 1980s and the national liberation of the 
South African and Palestinian peoples throughout these decades.  
Anti-imperialist resistance also manifested itself within the United States in forms 
other than solidarity for Third World peoples and protest against U.S. interventions 
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overseas. As some activists who were part of the Spring Mobilization noted, the struggle 
against oppression at home was tied to the struggle against oppression abroad. The 
political prisoner movements of the 1960s and 70s echoed this sentiment, as the court 
proceedings of these activists on trials generated mass support and critiques of the justice 
system that extended beyond the courtroom or jailhouse. And with these political 
prisoner movements, some alliances from the Spring Mobilization reconstituted 




Anti-Imperialism at Home: The Political Prisoner Movements to Free Huey P. Newton 
and Angela Y. Davis 
 
On August 5, 1970, a multiracial crowd numbering in the hundreds waited in 
anticipation outside Alameda County courthouse in Oakland for Black Panther Party co-
founder and Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton. Released on bail ahead of a retrial, 
Newton’s nearly three-year-long incarceration stemmed from charges of assault with a 
deadly weapon against an Oakland police officers. Local KQED Channel 2 news footage 
captured the frenzied scene outside the courthouse, joining the Black Panther Party in 
chants of “Free Huey” and “We Want Huey, Off the Pigs,” and as Newton walked out of 
the courthouse and toward a waiting automobile, the crowd swarmed him to congratulate 
him on his release.1 
Just two days later, approximately twenty-five miles northwest at the Marin 
County courthouse in San Rafael, a shootout occurred between several Black Panthers 
sprung free in the middle of their trial and local police officers. Among the death toll in 
the shootout were three of the four Panthers and Judge Harold Haley, one of the hostages 
the Panthers took and killed during their attempted escape. Soon after, a warrant was 
released for Angela Y. Davis in connection with Haley’s kidnapping and murder. Davis 
was a Panther associate, an outspoken member of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA), 
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and a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles, whose 1969 
dismissal from UCLA for being a communist thrust her into the media spotlight and 
brought criticism against the state of California, particularly Governor Ronald Reagan. 
Police authorities tied Davis to the Marin County courthouse shootout because Jonathan 
Jackson, the Panther who led his indicted counterparts in their escape, possessed firearms 
registered under Davis’ name. Many of those who supported Newton’s innocence would 
soon support Davis, as their supporters connected these two trial proceedings not only 
because of membership or association with the Black Panther Party but how these 
political prisoner movements spoke the liberation of these two radical activists to the 
liberation of oppressed people at large.2 
This chapter examines the domestic theater of anti-imperialism through the 
alliances and solidarity garnered for Huey Newton and Angela Davis, two of the most 
prominent Bay Area radicals on trial during the turn of the 1960s to the 1970s. These 
political prisoner movements bridged activists not only across racial lines but across 
ideological lines as well. Along with likeminded radicals, the Free Huey Movement drew 
in mainstream activist organizations and Black communities at large, who sympathized 
with Newton’s plight as a wrongfully-accused Black activist. The movement to free 
Angela Davis unified disparate leftists around a common goal during a time when many 
Marxist-inspired radicals had rejected the CPUSA for a number of reasons, such as 
continuing to align with the Soviet Union even after its 1950s and 60s invasions of 
Eastern European countries. In addition, support for Davis stretched to activist 
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communities who tended to be hesitant or uncomfortable with communism, such as 
mainstream Black civil rights organizations.3 
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, Bay Area radicals articulated a number of 
domestic struggles as different “fronts” of anti-imperialist resistance, invoking the image 
and rhetoric of the post-World War II Third World national liberation movements. Anti-
imperialism permeated Bay Area internationalist radicalism so extensively that some 
organizations adopted the term into their name, such as the Bay Area Anti-Imperialist 
Coalition. At times, these mobilizations centered on protesting diplomatic meetings in the 
Bay Area that facilitated U.S. military and economic incursions overseas, such as the 
1969 Japan Week protests led by a coalition of Asian American and white activists, 
including the Asian American Political Alliance (AAPA), the Maoist- and Black Panther 
Party-inspired Red Guard Party, and local chapters of Students for a Democratic Society 
(SDS).4 
More commonly, domestic anti-imperialism engaged with the everyday struggles 
of oppressed people in the United States. Although seemingly unrelated to anti-
imperialist resistance globally, U.S. radicals drew parallels between their struggles and 
those of Third World revolutionaries and other anti-imperialists overseas. Most 
ubiquitous for U.S. radical activists were mobilizations against the state in the form of 
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political prisoner solidarity movements. Dozens of legal defense committees formed in 
the Bay Area during the 1960s and 70s around activists on trial for charges stemming 
from a range of activities, including labor strikes, student campus protests, resisting the 
draft, opposing evictions, and their alleged involvement with murders or conspiracy to 
murder. So numerous were political prisoner movements during these decades that 
organizations like the San Francisco-based Movement Liberation Front published legal 
advice booklets detailing the trial process.5 Activists indicted on charges relating to the 
murder of public officials such as police officers and judges carried additional legal 
burdens and gained broader exposure than other political prisoners, since a guilty verdict 
brought the probability of the death penalty.6 
Rather than solely focusing on the release of an indicted or incarcerated activist, 
political prisoner movements served as vehicles for organizing against and critiquing 
broader systemic issues. Some critiques were more immediate to the situation, such as 
prevalent police brutality against racial minorities and the working poor, along with racial 
inequalities within the conviction rates and punishments meted for those convicted. Yet 
political prisoner movements also linked their cause to systemic and structural oppression 
within the broader society and overseas. Within the Free Huey Movement, activists 
articulated the intertwined nature of racism, economic exploitation, and U.S. militaristic 
interventions. Newton himself drew parallels between the Black freedom struggle in the 
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United States with the Vietnamese national liberation movement, articulating in 1967 
that, “Because Black people desire to determine their own destiny, they are constantly 
inflicted with brutality from the occupying army, embodied in the police. There is a great 
similarity between the occupying army in Southeast Asia and the occupation of our 
communities by the racist police.”7 Thus, the Free Huey Movement provided Bay Area 
radicals another front in the worldwide struggle against U.S. imperialism. 
Similar critiques arose from the movement to free Angela Davis, highlighting the 
intertwined oppressions of racism, capitalism, and militarism within the United States 
and overseas. Activists emphasized Davis’ status as a Black political dissident, which 
they argued caused governmental figures to indict her in a frame-up for the Marin County 
shootout. In addition to these oppressions, allies in Davis’ movement also focused on the 
patriarchal aspects of the justice system, which often intersected with racism and 
economic exploitation within the United States. Women allies articulated a number of 
gendered analyses, with an emphasis on the disproportionate representation of working-
class women, particularly women of color, among the female prison population and how 
desperate economic and social circumstances often led women to commit the crimes for 
which they were most commonly arrested.  
Genealogies of alliance would manifest themselves across these two 
mobilizations. Eldridge Cleaver and other organizers within the Spring Mobilization 
Against the War (Chapter Three) would prove integral in the early Free Huey Movement, 
and some allies the Panthers gained during the Free Huey Movement would continue 
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their solidarity by extending support to Angela Davis during her trial proceedings, as 
Davis herself also voiced solidarity with Newton and other incarcerated Panthers. 
Maintaining active alliances, however, proved difficult for many activists, both within 
these two mobilizations and after the exoneration of Newton and Davis.  
 
The Roots and Early Mobilization of the Free Huey Movement 
The Black Panther Party emerged as a manifestation of Bay Area’s 
transformations as a result of its post-World War II urban crises (detailed in Chapter 
Two). Co-founders Huey Newton and Bobby Seale intimately experienced these changes 
as World War II-era Black Southern migrant youth who felt the brunt of the capital and 
tax divestment from Oakland and found themselves caught up within the Sixties activist 
zeitgeist. Newton and Seale also grew dissatisfied with their involvement in federally-
funded War on Poverty programs and activist groups such as the Revolutionary Action 
Movement and the Soul Students Advisory Council, viewing the former as inadequate for 
alleviating the problems of Black urban plight and the latter as lacking the desire and 
ability to mobilize the Black masses. Inspired by a litany of theorists, especially Malcolm 
X, Robert F. Williams, Frantz Fanon, Mao Zedong, and Che Guevara, Newton and Seale 
founded the Black Panther Party as an alternative to mainstream Black activism, 
advocating for Black self-determination through control over their local governments and 
community institutions.8  
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Yet the BPP’s politics were often overshadowed by their association with 
violence. The Panthers openly brandished firearms, advocated citizens’ right to armed 
self-defense from police brutality, and at one point even openly called for “guerrilla 
warfare methods” to liberate Black communities.9 This association with violence came to 
a head on October 28, 1967 when John Frey, an Oakland police officer with a local 
reputation for harassing Black civilians, stopped the automobile that Newton was driving 
and ordered him out of the car. Although the exact details of the subsequent events 
remain unclear, a shootout ensued that ended with the death of John Frey and the severe 
wounding of Newton and officer Herbert Heanes. Newton managed to make it to a local 
hospital before losing consciousness, and police authorities arrived to arrest him shortly 
afterward. Newton faced felony charges of first degree murder, attempted murder, and 
kidnapping; if found guilty, he would receive the death penalty. Newton’s subsequent 
trial proceedings dramatically changed the trajectory of the Black Panther Party, and in 
this moment of crisis, the Panthers would need to seek support outside the party.10 
Upon hearing the news of Newton’s detainment, the Panthers mobilized for 
action. Beyond acquiring the greatest legal expertise they could find in lead attorney 
Charles Garry—a socialist who defended other high-profile radicals like the Oakland 
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Seven—the Panthers turned their attention toward gaining public support for the Free 
Huey Movement. The Panthers received vocal but fleeting support from other Black 
Power organizations across the ideological spectrum, such as the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Los Angeles-based US Organization. 
Community outreach posed a difficult task for the Panthers, whose membership 
heretofore remained miniscule because of the prevalence of other Black activist 
organizations locally and the Panthers’ association with violence. Yet sympathy for 
Newton as a wrongfully-accused Black activist presented an opportunity for the Panthers 
to reach out to the Bay Area’s Black communities, and the Panthers capitalized on this 
sympathy through the various strategies they employed. The BPP staged rallies and 
informational sessions about the case throughout an array of venues in the Bay Area, 
such as public parks, auditoriums, and college campuses, and devised multiple kinds of 
fundraising events, ranging from garage sales to a Free Huey rally in February on 
Newton’s birthday. As important as monetary donations were to the Free Huey 
Movement, however, the active support shown by other activist organizations proved as 
important in garnering public support for Newton’s cause.11 
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With Seale serving time in prison until late 1967, Eldridge and Kathleen Cleaver, 
who had joined the BPP earlier that year, provided the early organizing leadership for the 
Free Huey Movement. Since his release from prison in 1966, Eldridge Cleaver had 
forged ties with the local white Left, particularly through his position as a staff writer for 
Ramparts, a radical periodical and press based in San Francisco. He also held previous 
experience in multiracial organizing, most notably with the April 1967 Spring 
Mobilization against the Vietnam War, a nationwide antiwar rally with its local extension 
in San Francisco. Eldridge would draw on these earlier mass-mobilization experiences 
and the ties he maintained among activists in the Bay Area as he and Kathleen navigated 
the planning and execution of the Free Huey Movement.12 
These seeds of earlier multiracial organizing yielded fruit early in the movement, 
as the Panthers did not always need to actively seek support. Sometimes, organizations 
such as the Peace and Freedom Party (PFP) sought them out first. This largely white, 
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middle-class, California-based third party emerged locally in San Francisco in June 1967 
out of numerous organizations, most notably the Community for New Politics (CNP), 
that comprised the peace movement within the Bay Area. With a political platform based 
around ending the Vietnam War, the PFP sought to establish itself as a viable third party 
alternative to the political hegemony of the Democratic and Republican Parties. By 
January 1968, the Peace and Freedom Party had registered over 100,000 voters and 
secured a place on November’s ballot.13 
But the PFP’s platform included more than antiwar activism. As articulated in 
their party policy guidelines, the party aimed to draw in members from oppressed groups 
throughout U.S. society. Not only did this involve voicing solidarity with “the Black 
Liberation movement… Mexican-Americans, Indians, and other [racial minorities]” but it 
also included supporting “poor people, workers, students, and other groups in their 
struggle for economic justice.”14 Rather than seeing the antiwar movement as separate 
from race- and class-based struggles, the PFP saw all three as linked together; racist 
attitudes against Asians overseas and the possibility of new economic markets in Asia 
provided the motivation for U.S. involvement in this war, and those in the poorest sectors 
of society (disproportionately racial minorities) were more prone to be drafted into or 
enlist in the military because of a paucity in educational and employment opportunities.15 
The PFP also understood that larger societal problems (such as racial inequality and class 
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oppression) affected different groups of people in different ways, with their maintenance 
of a “Black and Brown Caucus” within the party demonstrating their awareness of this 
reality.16 
Despite adopting an official anti-racist platform, however, the PFP experienced 
difficulties in generating a large-scale political base within Black communities. These 
difficulties particularly resonated with PFP leaders Robert Scheer and Bob Avakian, who 
had also adopted anti-racism as a CNP position, attempted to form a CNP-BPP coalition 
earlier that year, and even penned an article in solidarity with Newton in the 
Communiqué for New Politics soon after his arrest. As the Free Huey Movement began to 
mobilize, the PFP seized upon this opportunity to demonstrate to Black America at large 
their commitment in the struggle against racial and class oppression. Scheer, a colleague 
of Eldridge Cleaver’s at Ramparts, and Avakian, a longtime Panther sympathizer and 
friend of Bobby Seale, led the PFP leadership in working with the BPP leadership to 
organize a formal coalition between the organizations. Kathleen Cleaver also mediated 
between the BPP and the Peace and Freedom Party; in particular she called on the PFP to 
demonstrate their support of the Panthers by running Newton as their candidate for the 
seventh congressional district and selecting a Black anti-capitalist radical instead of a 
Black candidate from the Democratic Party establishment for their 1968 presidential 
candidate.17 
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Yet the formation of this alliance generated conflict within the Peace and 
Freedom Party. Disagreement over the nature of the coalition arose among PFP members 
who supported a BPP-PFP coalition. Eldridge Cleaver assured the PFP at their inaugural 
convention in March 1968 that the coalition would exist narrowly on the issue of freeing 
Newton, yet many were still wary that the Panthers might eventually control the PFP 
agenda.18 Dissention also existed within the party over whether or not they and the 
Panthers should even create this alliance. Some doubted Newton’s innocence and found 
protesting the alleged injustice (or in the words of one member, “immorality”) of 
Newton’s imprisonment as separate from and less justifiable than protesting the war.19 
More commonly, party members like Barbara Israel argued that the PFP should work 
only toward their own specific endeavors, since  a coalition detracted energy and focus 
away from their larger goal of ending the Vietnam War.20 Yet because of the opportunity 
to appeal to a national Black voting constituency, along with the persistence of the 
Radical Caucus within the party (especially Scheer and Avakian), the PFP maintained 
their position in the Free Huey Movement through the November elections of 1968.21 
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Along with officially voicing their solidarity, the Peace and Freedom Party 
showed their commitment to the Free Huey Movement by working with the Panthers to 
stage joint rallies, distribute flyers, and fundraise. PFP members like Jackie DiSalvo also 
took it upon themselves to educate local white communities about Newton’s case in the 
context of the racism Blacks and other minorities faced. Activists of color often implored 
their white allies to conduct antiracist education and awareness in their home 
communities, largely to no avail; the PFP’s commitment to this organizing work within 
white, especially white middle-class communities, was therefore notable. Although 
dissent over the Free Huey Movement persisted within the Peace and Freedom Party, the 
party remained one of the Panthers’ staunchest allies throughout most of 1968.22 
Connections with the Peace and Freedom Party also factored into the Black 
Panther Party’s alliance with the Asian American Political Alliance. Yuji Ichioka and 
Emma Gee, the founding organizers of AAPA, formed this largely middle- and working-
class student organization in Berkeley in early 1968 primarily from Asian Americans 
they found on PFP membership rolls and Berkeley college campuses.  Although some 
interethnic organizations predated it, AAPA emerged as the first pan-ethnic Asian 
political organization in U.S. history.23 
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Like much of the broader Asian American movement of the 1960s and 70s, 
AAPA, in the words of Daryl Maeda, drew from “the discourses and ideologies of the 
Black Power and anti-war movements in the United States, as well as decolonization 
movements around the globe.”24 One early AAPA position paper reflected this 
confluence of internationalist, antiracist, and anti-imperialist thought by arguing that 
“American society is historically racist and is one that has systematically employed social 
discrimination and economic imperialism both domestically and internationally to exploit 
all people, but especially non-whites.”25 A later AAPA Newspaper editorial echoed this 
sentiment, affirming themselves as Asian Americans who “oppose the imperialist policies 
being pursued by the American Government,” calling the United States a “White Racist 
Society” since its inception, and admonishing Asian Americans to work with other 
minorities to create “an American Society which is just, humane, equal and gives the 
people the right to control their own lives.”26 AAPA thus did not represent a complete 
break from the Peace and Freedom Party, since like the PFP, AAPA voiced anti-
imperialist solidarity with Third World peoples both within and outside of the country. 
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AAPA also aimed to distance themselves from the “model minority” myth that 
had emerged after World War II. This stereotype held that people of Asian descent, 
particularly Chinese and Japanese Americans, had experienced racism throughout their 
histories yet had still gained upward social and economic mobility and assimilated into 
the fabric of American society through hard work and perseverance. White scholars and 
policymakers used the model minority myth against African Americans, Latinas/os, and 
other racial and ethnic minority groups who had not achieved the same levels of upward 
social mobility that Asian Americans were perceived to have experienced, ignoring or 
denying the existence of systemic and structural racism throughout the country. In 
contrast, AAPA positioned itself as a group of racially-marginalized people in support of 
other racially-oppressed peoples, both in the United States and internationally. As stated 
in their “AAPA Perspectives” editorial, AAPA “refuse[d] to cooperate with the White 
Racism in this society” and rather worked to “support all oppressed peoples and their 
struggles for Liberation.”27 The Free Huey Movement provided AAPA an opportunity to 
demonstrate this multiracial solidarity.28  
Although AAPA, like the Peace and Freedom Party, contained both a radical and 
a more moderate liberal contingent, establishing an alliance with the Black Panther Party 
went virtually uncontested within the organization. One of the organization’s founding 
members and emerging spokespeople, Richard Aoki, was actually an official member of 
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the BPP and helped bridge the alliance between AAPA and the Panthers. A third-
generation Japanese American who grew up in the predominantly-Black West Oakland 
neighborhood, Aoki met Huey Newton and Bobby Seale while enrolled at Merritt 
College. Aoki also was involved with other multiracial organizing, such as the Tri-
Continental Students Committee at the University of California, Berkeley. Reflecting 
years later on the rationale behind Black-Asian American solidarity, Aoki articulated the 
position that “the struggle for freedom, justice, and equality transcends racial and national 
boundaries,” and thus necessitated interracial resistance.29 Because comrades in past 
organizations balked at his membership in the BPP, Aoki initially hid this part of his life 
from AAPA, yet his concerns over his status as a Black Panther subsided after AAPA 
voted unanimously in favor of joining the Free Huey Movement.30 
While public support for Newton proved to be no issue for Aoki, Yuji Ichioka 
initially wavered on this issue. He fundamentally disagreed with parts of the Panthers’ 
ideology, viewing them as practicing “suicidal politics” because of their willingness to 
wield and use firearms.31 At the same time, Ichioka believed that all U.S. citizens 
deserved due process and the full extent of their rights and protections under the law. 
Furthermore, as the Free Huey Movement garnered widespread local and national media 
attention, voicing solidarity with Newton provided a platform for AAPA to gain public 
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exposure and increase their membership. AAPA would thus show their solidarity through 
frequent participation in public demonstrations in the “political theater” of the Free Huey 
Movement, receiving publicity to grow their own political base.32 
Although they have not received as much scholarly attention as the PFP and 
AAPA within the Free Huey Movement, the Brown Berets served as another radical 
organization that dedicated themselves to Newton’s cause. Founded in Los Angeles, 
California, in May 1966 as the Young Citizens for Community Action YCCA) before 
their transformation in January 1968, the Berets spread rapidly to other Mexican 
American communities throughout the U.S. West, drawing heavily from the rhetoric and 
aesthetics of the Panthers, such as modeling their political platform off the latter’s Ten-
Point Platform and wearing military-style outfits with berets.33 
The Berets formed an alliance with the Los Angeles chapter of the Black Panther 
Party soon after their 1968 transformation. Not only did they and Los Angeles Panthers 
experience a common struggle against police brutality in their communities, but the 
Berets themselves became increasingly multiracial and internationalist. David Sanchez, 
who orchestrated the YCCA’s transformation into the Berets, articulated this position in 
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an April 1968 radio interview. Sanchez favored “a closer alliance between brown and 
black,” arguing that the white capitalist power structure in the United States “was 
exploiting the fighting capabilities of young Chicana/o and young African Americans by 
sending them to fight against the Vietnamese.”34 Furthermore, according to Sanchez, 
Chicanas/os and the Vietnamese shared a common ancestry, since he believed that 
Chicanas/os’ indigenous ancestors migrated from Asia across the Bering Strait land 
bridge thousands of years prior, and thereby making Asians and Chicanas/os allies, not 
enemies. The problems with this historical interpretation aside, Sanchez conveyed the 
Berets’ growing commitment to the struggles of Third World peoples around the world.35 
The Berets’ participation in the Free Huey Movement demonstrated how alliances 
developed in one locale could emerge in others. Behind the organizing direction of Aaron 
Manganiello, the Berets had established a number of Northern California chapters by the 
summer of 1968, most notably in San Francisco’s Mission District and in Oakland. The 
Berets never gained much of a foothold in the Mission; although this neighborhood held a 
heavily-Latina/o population, many were of Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and other non-
Mexican ancestry, meaning the Berets’ appeals to ethnic solidarity often fell on deaf 
ears.36 
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Throughout the East Bay, however, and particularly in Oakland’s increasingly 
multiracial Fruitvale neighborhood, Chicanas/os gravitated toward the Berets. Jorge 
Gonzalez and other Oakland Beret leaders had previously connections with Newton and 
Seale, working toward diversifying curricula and campus life while students at Merritt 
College, and the horrors Gonzalez witnessed during a tour of service in Vietnam pushed 
him into antiwar activism upon his return to the United States.37 Early recruit and 
eventual Chairman and Minister of Information Manuel Gomez—a former member of the 
Peace and Freedom Party drawn into anti-police brutality activism after three police 
officers shot and killed unarmed Mexican American Gilberto Garza in Hayward in 
1967—explained the Berets’ attractiveness as an activist organization.38 The “symbols of 
the Berets…the jacket, the beret, the patch, the rituals, the gathering, the discipline,” 
according to Gomez, stirred up the East Bay’s Mexican American youth, and the 
organization’s focus on education and activism against police brutality as the “defenders 
of La Raza” provided additional appeal that swelled the Oakland chapter’s ranks.39  
Echoing Sanchez and the Los Angeles Berets, the Oakland Berets voiced 
internationalist solidarity with the Vietnamese people. In the words of Gomez, 
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Chicanas/os and the Vietnamese people were “brothers involved in the same struggle for 
justice against a common enemy” of U.S. imperialism.40 The Oakland Berets also 
demonstrated their commitment to multiracial organizing with the composition of their 
membership, as Gomez and early member Alex Gonzalez recall that the Berets counted 
American Indians and Filipinas/os among their ranks in the early years of the 
organization. Their many parallels and points of intersection in terms of ideologies and 
lived experiences thus made an alliance between the Panthers and Oakland Berets 
mutually-beneficial and appealing.41 
The solidarity voiced by more nationally-prominent organizations such as SNCC 
and SDS demonstrated the national support Newton received during his trial ordeal. 
Support from public figures such as film stars Marlon Brando and Jane Fonda and writers 
James Baldwin and Norman Mailer showed the growing mainstream appeal of the Free 
Huey Movement and the Black Panthers. Kathleen and Eldridge Cleaver and other BPP 
leaders traveled abroad over the next few years to cultivate international solidarity, not 
only in Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, and other Third World countries but also to Japan, 
Western Europe, and Scandinavia. Yet it was the efforts of local radical allies, working 
alongside the Black Panther Party, which contributed most directly to the Free Huey 
Movement.  Moreover, although Newton’s trial proceedings took an unexpected turn and 
old alliances weakened or even dissolved, inter-organizational solidarity from the early 
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mobilization of the movement would manifest itself again in later activist efforts 
throughout the Bay Area.42 
 
Weakened Alliances, Sustained Solidarity 
After nearly four days of deliberation, the jury presented a mixed verdict on 
September 8, 1968, finding Newton guilty of voluntary manslaughter for shooting Frey 
and not guilty of the lesser charge of assault with a deadly weapon against Heanes.43 The 
verdict was based on faulty logic—in the words of Charles Garry, “Either [Huey] had a 
gun or he didn’t.”—but the end result spared Newton of the death penalty.44 In addition, 
the inconsistent verdict allowed Newton’s defense team to appeal to higher courts for a 
retrial. Yet the mixed verdict muddled the movement’s future. The appeals process 
moved slowly, and Newton’s sentencing two weeks later led to his transfer over two 
hundred miles away to the California Men’s Penal Colony in San Luis Obispo, 
California, which brought further impediments to the local mobilization. While 
occasional “Free Huey” rallies occurred in both 1969 and 1970, Newton’s absence from 
the Bay Area made it difficult to generate the same level of fervor for his cause. Indeed, 
by the day of Newton’s sentencing, the daily crowds outside the Alameda County 
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courthouse had dwindled from hundreds and even thousands on some days to a few 
dozen. The Free Huey Movement remained a cause célèbre among Bay Area radicals yet 
increasingly faded away from its position as a cause de jure.45 
As the local movement lost steam, so too did these early alliances. The Brown 
Berets remained allies with the Black Panther Party, often appearing at rallies alongside 
each other. At the same time, the Berets experienced increasing internal turmoil, 
particularly along ideological lines, as the fault line between cultural nationalism and 
Marxist, Third World internationalism grew increasingly polarized. Such divisiveness 
grew to be so acute that Aaron Manganiello left the organization by the time the Berets 
disbanded nationally in October 1972. Moreover, tensions mounted between and among 
numerous East Bay Black and Chicana/o organizations, with issues ranging from the 
personal to disagreements about the feasibility of armed revolution. Relations 
deteriorated to the point where some activists like Manuel Gomez left the Bay Area, 
concerned that these simmering tensions would erupt.46 
The Asian American Political Alliance remained nominally allied within the Free 
Huey Movement. As its membership grew, however, AAPA shifted their main focus to 
issues within Asian American communities, ranging from the anti-eviction movement for 
impoverished Filipinas/os and Chinese Americans at the Internationa l Hotel in San 
Francisco to supporting striking Chinese garment workers. AAPA also continued to 
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engage in internationalist, multiracial organizing, including their September 1969 Japan 
Week protests against the U.S. military presence in Japan and Asia more broadly and as 
part of the Third World Liberation Front (TWLF) strikes at San Francisco State College 
(SFSC) and U.C. Berkeley throughout 1968 and 1969. Yet AAPA’s new endeavors 
dictated a decline in regular, active involvement within the Free Huey Movement. 47 
The Panthers’ coalition with the Peace and Freedom Party, unlike their alliances 
with the Brown Berets and AAPA, dissolved soon after Newton’s sentencing. The PFP 
leadership never could bring the rank-and-file members to consensus regarding the 
coalition with the Panthers. Furthermore, the PFP leadership decided to run Eldridge 
Cleaver as their candidate in the 1968 presidential election as a way of showing further 
support for the Panthers. This decision, however, proved to be the unmaking of the BPP-
PFP alliance. During that summer, Cleaver published his commercially-successful and 
popular Soul on Ice, a collection of biographical essays and social critiques. While some 
critics and activists hailed its anti-establishment and Black masculine empowerment 
orientation, other activists—predominantly Black women—blasted the rampant 
misogyny in the book.48 One of the many shocking passages included Cleaver’s 
discussion of his past rapes, which he described as “an insurrectionary act” that 
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“delighted” him, since he viewed it as “defying and trampling upon the white man’s 
law.”49 
In addition, Cleaver led a contingent of Panthers in an attempted ambush of 
Oakland police officers in April 1968.50 Partially in response to the recent assassination 
of Martin Luther King, Jr. but also as a form of support and revenge for Newton, this 
ambush ended with the killing of Bobby Hutton and the arrest of the other Panthers. 
Despite Cleaver’s insistence at the time that the police had attacked first, his flight from 
the country later that year suggested otherwise. These events destroyed the PFP’s 
credibility as a “peace” party, alienating their voting base to the point that the Cleaver 
ticket garnered fewer than 27,000 votes nationwide in the November election. The Peace 
and Freedom Party never returned to the heights they reached in January, and little 
cooperation existed between the PFP and the Panthers thereafter.51 
Yet while active support of Newton declined, the Free Huey Movement generated 
solidarity in new forms. Radicals who participated in the early movement continued to 
espouse support for Newton in their new endeavors. Prominent participants from the 
early mobilization of the movement also took part in the Third World Liberation Front 
                                                 
     49 Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1968), 14. In another essay criticizing 
social critic James Baldwin, Cleaver called homosexuality “a sickness” and compared it to “baby -rape or 
wanting to become head of General Motors.” Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 110. However, fewer leftist radicals 
took Cleaver to task over his homophobia than his sexism and misogyny, reflecting the overall attitude of 
the Left at that time. 
 
     50 Cleaver initially maintained that Oakland police officers attacked the Panthers contingent first but 
eventually admitted to initiating the shootout later in his life. See Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, with 
Sara Flynn, eds., Voices of Freedom: An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s through 
the 1980s (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 514-517. 
 
     51 Joseph, Waiting ’Til the Midnight Hour, 239-240; Wilson, “Free Huey,” 354-364. 
 113 
strike at San Francisco State College from November 1968 to March 1969. The TWLF 
encompassed the student of color organizations at SFSC and “included the Black Student 
Union (BSU), the Asian American Political Alliance (AAPA), Intercollegiate Chinese for 
Social Action (ICSA), Philippine American College Endeavor (PACE), Latin American 
Student Organization (LASO), and the Mexican American Student Confederation 
(MASC),” along with American Indian students who did not yet have an independent 
campus organization.52 Through the strike, the TWLF struggled to gain educational self-
determination, not only through the diversification of curricula but also through an 
increase in admissions of students of color, the establishment of an autonomous “School 
of Third World Studies,” and control in hiring faculty for the school.53 
Early allies of the Free Huey Movement involved in the TWLF strike included: 
AAPA, now with a San Francisco chapter; Donna James and Roger Alvarado, two radical 
Latinas/os influenced by the Brown Berets’ work in the Mission District and who 
continued to take part in Free Huey rallies; and George Murray, director of the SFSC 
undergraduate tutorial program and the Minister of Education of the Black Panther Party. 
Murray himself served as a catalyst for the strike, as his firing at the end of October 
stemmed partially from his organizing a Free Huey rally on SFSC’s campus and provided 
one of the sparks for the subsequent strike.54  
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Furthermore, the trials of the over seven hundred strikers (“the San Francisco 
700”) arrested by January 1969 paralleled the Free Huey Movement in distinct ways. The 
700’s defense team used similar legal defense tactics, relying heavily on communities 
throughout the Bay Area for solidarity and monetary support. But more telling than 
shared tactics was the 700’s defense team’s explicit linkage of Newton’s struggle with 
the 700’s, invoking his name on flyers they sent out and the rallies they held. One such 
flyer tied the racism involved in Newton’s imprisonment and the imprisonment of the 
700 to the economic oppression faced by the working class in the United States; 
specifically, it argued that capitalists and American leaders worked to maintain racial 
inequalities, particularly with circumscribed education opportunities, in order to keep the 
working class divided. As they mutually- identified with each other as racially-oppressed 
peoples in the United States, so too did the TWLF strikers view themselves as fighting 
the same struggles as Newton.55 
Earlier ties within the Free Huey Movement also produced a new alliance 
between the Panthers and Los Siete de la Raza. Los Siete emerged from the trial 
proceedings of seven Latino youth accused of murdering a San Francisco police officer 
and wounding another in the Mission District in early May 1969. Los Siete came from 
working-class upbringings, had previously engaged in community work, and almost all 
had been politicized in part by local Brown Berets like Aaron Manganiello. As 
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community support grew in the cause to “Free Los Siete,” activist colleagues in the 
Mission established an eponymous organization that channeled this popular support into 
other forms of community-oriented social activism that lasted after their acquittal in 
November 1970.56 
The Los Siete case mirrored Huey Newton’s case in multiple ways. Both Newton 
and Los Siete grew up experiencing urban plight within the Bay Area and faced racial 
oppression from society and the state in their everyday lives. Newton and Los Siete had 
each also worked within government-supported programs in their local communities 
before growing disillusioned with their slow pace and inadequate scope and starting their 
own community- improvement endeavors. Most significantly, Newton and the members 
of Los Siete were accused of killing one police officer with a history of racial profiling 
and brutality and injuring another, with the defendants facing the possibility of the death 
penalty if found guilty. 
These similarities did not escape Bobby Seale, now the de facto leader of the 
Black Panther Party after Newton’s imprisonment and Cleaver’s flight from the country. 
Seale felt more comfortable about forming alliances with Los Siete, the Puerto Rican 
Young Lords in Chicago and New York, and other Third World organizations, 
particularly those with working-class backgrounds, than white, largely middle-class 
organizations like the Peace and Freedom Party. Since “the brown American people 
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[we]re suffering from the same things black American people [we]re,” and it was “the 
poor oppressed people who have to dictate their political desires and needs, and explain 
what should be done and what should not be done,” Seale felt Third World organizations 
better understood the complexities of how racial and class oppression reinforced each 
other in the United States.57 Seale saw solidarity with Los Siete as a way to gain another 
Panther ally; that several of the accused were present at a Free Huey rally in San 
Francisco on the day of their arrest only added to Seale’s support. The families of Los 
Siete also sought allies, and Oscar Rios, the brother of José Rios, traveled to Oakland to 
discuss the prospect of an alliance between the Panthers and Los Siete.58 
After hearing from Rios about the ordeal that Los Siete faced, Seale pledged the 
Panthers’ support to the “Free Los Siete” movement. Along with giving Los Siete space 
in the BPP’s newspaper, Seale also promised to ask Charles Garry, whom the Panthers 
and Los Siete shared as lead counsel, to temporarily stop working on the Panthers’ court 
cases and devote his time to the Los Siete case. The Panthers and Los Siete subsequently 
held joint rallies for their respective political prisoners, and Huey Newton even attended 
several sessions of their court proceedings after his release from prison in August 1970. 
In an interview with the San Francisco-based The Movement newspaper, Tony Martinez 
expressed gratitude to the Panthers not just for their monetary support and other acts of 
solidarity but also for the Panthers’ political critiques and tactics, many of which Latina/o 
activists could adopt. The Panthers and Los Siete de La Raza remained in solidarity until 
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the slow dissolution of Los Siete de La Raza throughout 1973 and the relocation of its 
remnants, now called La Raza Workers Collective, to San Jose and Los Angeles. Along 
with the Third World Liberation Front strikes, the BPP-Los Siete alliance demonstrated 
the continual importance of solidarity between radicals of color within the Bay Area as 
the 1960s turned into the 1970s.59 
Even the Peace and Freedom Party, with its acrimonious breakup with the 
Panthers, saw some of its former constituency continue to voice solidarity with Huey 
Newton. In particular, Bob Avakian continued to support Newton and the work of the 
Panthers more broadly. Drawing from the writings of Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and 
Mao Zedong, Avakian envisioned the formation of a revolutionary communist party that 
would end class- and race-based systems of oppression in the United States, then all over 
the world. Avakian formed this party out of the Bay Area Revolutionary Union (BARU), 
a peace and anti-racist organization he co-founded in 1968. Avakian’s role as one of the 
primary PFP coalition negotiators translated into his later establishment of BARU as an 
explicitly “multinational” organization where “people of all races, or nationalities—
Black, Latino, Native American, white, Asian—would all be united in this one vanguard 
party.”60 As BARU morphed into the Revolutionary Union, then the Revolutionary 
                                                 
     59 Earl Caldwell, “Coast Radicals Rally Behind 6 Latin Youths on Trial in Slaying of Policeman,” New 
York Times, Oct. 11, 1970, 54; “Basta Ya!,” The Movement, Nov. 22, 1969, 12; “6 Cleared in Death of 
Coast Policeman,” New York Times, Nov. 8, 1970, 70; “Marin Frameup – Magee & Davis,” ¡Basta Ya!, 
March 1970, 11, Latino Periodicals Collection, CEMA 155. Department of Special Collections, UC Santa 
Barbara Library, University of California, Santa Barbara; Ferreira, “All Power to the People,” 381-385. 
 
     60 Bob Avakian, From Ike to Mao and Beyond: My Journey from Mainstream America to Revolutionary 
Communist (Chicago: Insight Press, 2005), 192. 
 118 
Communist Party in 1975, Avakian consistently linked the plight of African Americans 
and other people of color to the struggles of the working class around the world.61 
A BARU flyer for a May Day 1970 rally conveys the congruent motivations that 
Avakian held in establishing solidarity with Newton in both the Peace and Freedom Party 
and the BARU. This rally involved more than celebrating the revolutionary efforts of the 
working class around the world; the flyer asserted that “…the masses of Black people in 
[the United States]… stand shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese people and all those 
oppressed people who are waging heroic struggles of liberation against the vicious 
system of U.S. Imperialism.”62 This statement echoed Panther critiques and the PFP 
platform through its linkage of racial inequality, economic oppression, and U.S. 
imperialism in Southeast Asia. Newton’s picture appears prominently throughout this 
flyer, as BARU identified Newton’s wrongful imprisonment as an example of Black 
oppression in the U.S. and an opportunity for the working class to coalesce around a 
cause that would disrupt the ruling capitalist order. While neither as prominent nor as 
influential as the Peace and Freedom Party, the Bay Area Revolutionary Union provided 
Avakian the opportunity to continuously support Newton and the Panthers within 
multiple organizations over the lifespan of the Free Huey Movement and thereafter. 
Newton’s release from police custody in August 1970, and his exoneration in 
December 1971 marked the end of the Free Huey Movement. Yet the genealogies of 
alliance that ran throughout the movement would soon manifest themselves again in 
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perhaps the most high-profile political prisoner case of the 1970s. The movement to free 
Angela Davis transcended ideological conflicts, even more so than the Free Huey 
Movement, momentarily unifying divisive factions within the Marxist-inspired Left. 
More importantly, the solidarity espoused by allies—particularly radical women—
incorporated a gendered critique of the police, the justice system, and the state as a 
whole. In other words, the Free Angela Movement not only critiqued racism, capitalism, 
and militarism as part of U.S. imperialism but also identified sexism and patriarchy as 
inextricably intersected with these other forms of oppression.63 
 
The Origins of the Angela Davis Trial 
Unlike Huey Newton, Angela Davis did not spend her formative years in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, nor did she experience her political transformations in the midst of 
the area’s radical political traditions (as discussed in Chapter Three). By 1970, however, 
she had experienced a few formative, radicalizing moments that would place her on a 
similar trajectory as Newton, toward her own political prisoner movement as well. Davis 
was born in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1944, into a middle-class family embedded within 
the city’s Black activist circles. Her mother, Sallye Bell Davis, had organized 
mobilizations alongside both Black and some white Communists during the 1930s, such 
as the defense case for the Scottsboro Boys, while a national officer and leading activist 
in the CPUSA-affiliated Southern Negro Youth Congress. Davis witnessed the violent 
white supremacist manifestations of the Jim Crow South at an early age, recalling in her 
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autobiography fights she witnessed as a child and noting that “bombings were such a 
constant response that soon our neighborhood became known as Dynamite Hill.”64 
During these early childhood experiences, Davis grew to resent white people, despite her 
mother’s admonitions about the potential good within them, including their capacity for 
allied activism. As she progressed into her teenaged years, she grew increasingly 
discontent with her middle-class social circles in Birmingham, resolving to leave when 
she was fifteen to an American Society of Friends (Quaker) program that placed Southern 
Black teenagers into Northern white homes to attend high school. Through the Society of 
Friends, Davis relocated to Brooklyn, where her hatred toward white people started to 
subside.65 
Davis’ political radicalization began while reading the writings of Utopian 
socialists, then The Communist Manifesto, which, although not explicitly discussing 
Black liberation, led Davis to draw linkages between Black liberation and the abolition of 
capitalism. During these early forays into this literature, Davis began attending meetings 
of Advance—a Marxist-Leninist youth organization where she met Bettina Aptheker, 
Mary Lou Patterson, and other the children of prominent Black and white Communists— 
and working in rallies for the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. After graduating 
high school, Davis spent her collegiate years at Brandeis University, studying under the 
Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse and spending a few years in Germany and France, 
where she encountered anti-Black racism and began to more fully understand the 
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international dimensions of white supremacy and the legacy of colonialism. Davis 
returned to the United States to study under Marcuse at the University of California, San 
Diego, briefly joining southern California chapters of SNCC, then the Black Panther 
Party. Needing to find a new cadre after the dissolution of SNCC locally and put off by 
the hypermasculinity of the BPP, Davis officially joined the Communist Party USA in 
1968.66 
Although historically the largest and most renowned Marxist and radical Left 
organization in the United States, the CPUSA had fallen out of favor among many radical 
activists in the 1950s and 60s (Chapter Three). By the late 1960s, however, parts of the 
CPUSA began to focus more on giving antiracist struggles the same importance as anti-
capitalist ones. Perhaps the most influential of these cell groups was the Che-Lumumba 
Club, through which Davis joined the CPUSA in July 1968. Named after the 
Argentinian-born co-leader of the Cuban revolution Che Guevara and the Congolese 
national liberation movement leader Patrice Lumumba, the primarily-Black Che-
Lumumba Club not only focused its efforts on campaigns against police brutality and 
other antiracist issues but also incorporated women into positions of power, such as 
nominating Che-Lumumba founding chairperson Charlene Mitchell as the CPUSA 
presidential candidate for the 1968 general election. Through the Che-Lumumba Club, 
Davis could pursue the intertwined goals of Black liberation and the end of capitalism 
without needing to prioritize one struggle over the other.67 
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Davis’ early CPUSA activism included political education for Black youth in 
Southern California, first briefly as an affiliate of the Black Panther Party in Los Angeles, 
then with the San Diego-based Black Student Council (BSC) and the Mexican-American 
Youth Association (MAYA). Even after she was hired as professor of philosophy at the 
University of California, Los Angeles, for the 1969-70 academic year, Davis continued 
her activist work, with political prisoner movements becoming her primary cause. 
One of Davis’ earliest forays into political prisoner solidarity was for a Black 
prisoner by the name Hekima who subpoenaed her to testify on his behalf in court. 
Although she did not know who he was, Hekima hoped to enlist Davis’ support in 
creating a “political case” to defend himself for his retrial of a first-degree murder charge. 
He stressed two points to Davis: first, that Hekima himself did not kill anybody himself 
but was part of a group of Black men who robbed a white man who was pushed, fell and 
hit his head on the pavement, and later died of head injuries; second, and more 
importantly, that he was driven to desperate measures by the racism that caused rampant 
poverty throughout society. Although Hekima was again convicted of first-degree 
murder, this episode convinced Davis that if radicals, particularly Black radicals, “did not 
begin to build a support movement for [their] sisters and brothers in prison, [they] were 
no revolutionaries at all.”68 
Of most immediate concern to Davis were Huey Newton, Bobby Seale, Ericka 
Huggins, and other Panther leaders imprisoned in the late 1960s. In a November 1969 
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speech at a rally for the Panthers in Oakland’s DeFemery Park (referred to as “Bobby 
Hutton Park” within the circle of Panther allies), Davis specifically named Newton, 
Seale, and Huggins throughout her speech and identified the BPP as the foremost target 
of government repression as she related their incarceration with the Black and Latina/o 
liberation movements, the workers’ movement, and the antiwar movement. In contrast to 
the idea the Vietnam War was a “single issue movement” geared solely on formally 
ending U.S. combat in Vietnam, Davis echoed the commonly-articulated connections 
between the Vietnam War and racism and capitalism. The war was “a symptom of 
something that's happening all over the world,” argued Davis, “And in order for the anti-
war movement to be effective, it has to link up with the struggle for black and brown 
liberation in this country with the struggle of exploited white workers.”69 Against the 
common enemy of “American Imperialist aggressive policies throughout this world,” 
Davis continued, “only this kind of united force [could] be victorious.”70 Davis explicated 
the consequences of narrowly-focused activism during this era: 
[I]f the anti-war movement defends only itself and does not defend liberation 
fighters in this country, then that movement is going to be doomed to failure…if 
we in the black liberation movement and the liberation movement for all people 
in—all oppressed and exploited people in this country, defend only ourselves, 
then we too will be doomed to failure…There ought to be victory for the 
Vietnamese. There ought to be also recognition of the revolutionary government 
in South Vietnam and I think this is perhaps most important, we ought to demand 
the release of political prisoners in this country…it is our responsibility to fight on 
all fronts, to fight on all fronts simultaneously to defeat and to humiliate the US 
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Government and all the fascist tactics by which it is repressing liberation fighters 
in this country.71 
 
As Davis continued developing her activism for political prisoners, she became 
increasingly focused on the cases against George Jackson, Fleeta Drumgo, and John 
Wesley Cluchette. Taken together, they were known as the Soledad Brothers and stood 
accused of the January 16, 1970 killing of a white Soledad State Prison guard in 
Monterey County, just south of the Bay Area. While the three had been imprisoned on 
charges relating to robbery or burglary, a murder conviction against a prison guard would 
bring upon the death penalty for the Soledad Brothers. Drawn to Jackson’s writings about 
Black struggle and revolution, Davis joined the Soledad Brothers Defense Committee in 
February 1970 and eventually became the co-chairperson for the southern California 
division. In a June 27, 1970 interview with a documentary filmmaker, Davis expressed 
the urgency of supporting the Soledad Brothers and other political prisoners. Although 
not all Black people would be incarcerated, all should have an investment in freeing 
Black political prisoners, Davis reasoned, because without the liberation of political 
prisoners, there could be no liberation of the masses.72 
By late 1969, however, Davis’ activism and political affiliations would have her 
embroiled in national controversy. After UCLA hired Davis, the Board of Regents for the 
University of California system discovered her Communist Party membership and 
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proceeded to unilaterally fire her in October 1969. Campus-wide protests, organized 
primarily by Kendra Alexander and other Che-Lumumba Club members, followed Davis’ 
firing, as did a subsequent campus hearing, then Davis taking her firing to court and 
winning an injunction against the Regents. Throughout the rest of the 1969-70 academic 
year, tensions mounted between Davis and her allies and the Regents and Governor 
Ronald Reagan. When on June 19, 1970 the Board of Regents declined to renew her 
contract—stemming partially for her public support of the Soledad Brothers—Davis 
continued to fight these simultaneous struggles.73 
Yet the events that unfolded at the Marin County courthouse on August 7, 1970 
would change the direction of both Davis’ personal employment and academic freedom 
struggle and her work for the Soledad Brothers Defense Committee. During the trial of 
Black Panther Ruchell Magee, Jonathan Jackson, a fellow Panther and younger brother to 
George, unfurled firearms he had snuck into the courtroom, freed Magee and fellow 
Panthers James McClain and William Christmas in custody in the courtroom, and took 
Judge Harold Haley and a handful of other hostages in an attempted getaway. Local 
police officers and San Quentin prison guards at the courthouse that day opened fire on 
Jackson’s getaway vehicle, eventually killing him, McClain, and Christmas. Before 
dying, however, Jackson had shot and killed Haley, and since a few of the firearms he 
used were registered under Davis’ name, the Marin County Superior Court issued a 
warrant for her arrest seven days later for the charges of aggravated kidnapping and first 
degree murder of the judge. Although Davis fled California, fearing for her life, and 
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evaded the police for several months, she was eventually apprehended in New York City 
in mid-October and extradited back to San Rafael in late December. Like Newton and the 
Soledad Brothers before, Davis faced the prospect of the death penalty if found guilty of 
the murder charges against her.74 
With this being their most high-profile court case since the McCarthy Red Scare 
of the 1950s, the Communist Party USA led Davis’ legal defense efforts. Among the 
numerous members of Davis’ legal team were chief counsel Howard Moore Jr., and 
longtime CPUSA lawyer Leo Branton Jr., both Black attorneys who had represented 
Black activists on trial from within and outside of the CPUSA. National chairman Henry 
Winston, recently ascending to that position in 1966, also traveled to California to 
personally meet and support Davis, both as a CPUSA member and as a Black American. 
Moore, Branton, and the rest of Davis’ legal team eventually secured a change of venue 
for the trial—from the Marin County courthouse in San Rafael to the Santa Clara County 
courthouse in San Jose—while also securing bail for Davis after a long arduous ordeal. 
From the onset of her political prisoner struggle, Davis and her supporters emphasized 
the need to make her trial proceedings about more than just her own personal freedom. 
Instead, they would focus on the structural inequality within the justice system and how it 
tied into the inequalities oppressed people in the United States and internationally. Thus, 
the solidarity movement around Davis would not just be the “Free Angela Movement” 
but rather the movement to “Free Angela Davis and All Political Prisoners.”75 
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On the heels of her arraignment, Davis received an outpouring of solidarity from 
across the country and stretching across the globe. In a November 1970 interview about 
the connections between the civil rights movement in the United States and the struggle 
against European colonialism internationally, James Baldwin ended his discussion by 
reading excerpts from an open letter he wrote to Davis, echoing her own political 
analyses when he said that “her fight for freedom and justice here in America is part and 
parcel of the international fight against the same enemy, the same enemy that promotes 
racism within these boundaries is the one that is exploiting and subjugating people 
around the world.”76 Sympathizers overseas—within Communist Parties and otherwise—
staged protests outside U.S. embassies in countries ranging from Finland to Australia to 
India.77 Women’s organizations like the Women’s International Democratic Federation in 
Germany called on “all women to take up the cause of Angela Davis,” advocating within 
their own countries and to the U.S. federal government for her release.78 In one March 
1971 letter signed by “the oppressed and struggling women of the liberation movements 
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of the Portuguese Colonies in Africa, and Southern Africa,” women revolutionaries 
criticized the contradiction between the United States’ claim of moral and just superiority 
to the rest of the world while continuing to oppress Black Americans, assuring Davis that 
they were “obliged by human feelings, and by our own conditions prevailing in our 
respective countries to associate our struggle with yours” and that Davis’ ordeal was not 
“an isolated one” but rather “part of the international struggle for justice and peace.”79 
These women revolutionaries and others from Third World liberation movements 
particularly reciprocated the internationalist solidarity toward which Davis worked prior 
to her imprisonment. 
Similarly to the Free Huey Movement, solidarity for Angela Davis relied heavily 
on local allies, in addition to national and international support, and drew in both radical 
and mainstream activist organizations. Local chapters of national women’s organizations 
voiced solidarity with Davis, including the most prominent one, the National 
Organization for Women (NOW). NOW often historiographically and popularly stands in 
as the embodiment of “second-wave” (white) feminism in the mid-twentieth century 
United States, since their national leadership was middle-class, heterosexual, white, able-
bodied women and main political platform mostly discussed issues pertaining to this 
group of women. This narrow scope oftentimes caused conflict with women whose issues 
extended beyond this scope, initially including Angela Davis. Black women’s 
liberationist Frances Beal recalled one such incident during NOW’s August 26, 1970 
March for Equality that commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of (white) women’s 
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suffrage. The New York chapter of the Third World Women’s Alliance joined with NOW 
and other women in this march, yet some white NOW members took issue with Beal’s 
carrying a sign that read “Hands Off Angela Davis,” believing that “Angela Davis has 
nothing to do with women’s liberation,” even as Davis was actively evading capture.80 
This conflict between Beal and NOW members embodied the struggle women of color, 
particularly radicals, faced with mainstream, moderate-liberal white feminists. 
However, by the early 1970s, the San Francisco chapter of NOW had begun to 
expand the scope of their women’s liberation activism, even appointing their first Black 
officer, Aileen C. Hernandez. A former union organizer with the International Ladies 
Garment Workers Union, Hernandez was later elected National President of NOW in late 
1970. Soon after Davis’ extradition back to California, Hernandez visited her at the 
Marin County jailhouse. Under her presidency, NOW had developed a statement in 
support of Davis that Hernandez shared, calling on the U.S. justice system to give Davis a 
just trial instead of the unequal treatment she faced as a woman, a Black person, and 
someone who “espoused an unpopular political cause.”81 Despite her initial surprise and 
skepticism about Hernandez and NOW’s statement, Davis appreciated Hernandez and 
NOW’s solidarity and conversed with Hernandez for the brief time the guards allowed, 
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with Davis talking mostly about the deplorable conditions and worse treatment of women 
prisoners within the jail.82 
 
The Genealogy of Solidarity from “Free Huey” to “Free Angela” 
As Angela Davis voiced solidarity for the Soledad Brothers, Erick Huggins, Huey 
Newton, Bobby Seale, and other Black Panthers, so too did the BPP reciprocate solidarity 
with Davis. Newton offered up support for Davis during numerous times, the first being 
in the October 17, 1970 issue of The Black Panther newspaper. Newton accused the U.S. 
state of using Davis as a “scapegoat” with a murder charge to cover up its own crimes of 
murdering Black Americans without recourse.83 Newton showed his appreciation for 
Davis’ prior solidarity, saying that she “exemplified the highest expression of concern for 
the people” and admonishing the masses to “rise up and do whatever is necessary to free 
Angela Davis.”84 
Perhaps the closest ally of the BPP by the end of the Free Huey Movement, Los 
Siete de La Raza extended their solidarity to Davis and Magee. Members of Los Siete 
regularly helped organize the early Free Angela rallies at Marin County Courthouse, 
where relatively sparse crowds initially formed. Los Siete also published articles in 
solidarity with Davis and Magee in their bilingual newspaper. These articles accused the 
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state of California of framing Angela Davis with her murder and kidnapping charges; 
furthermore, Los Siete rhetorically placed the state on trial for orchestrating Davis’ 
frame-up and for its inability to administer true justice, rather than target movement 
activists. Los Siete also used Davis and Magee’s trial proceedings to critique mass 
incarceration of Black and Brown people, echoing George Jackson’s critiques regarding 
the political prisoner status of all incarcerated Black people in the United States.85 
Similarly to Los Siete, the multiracial Venceremos organization—comprised of 
former members of both the Brown Berets and the Bay Area Revolutionary Union, along 
with other Bay Area Maoist cadre—showed support through attending rallies for Davis 
and dedicating space within their newspaper for Davis and Magee’s cases. Venceremos 
mirrored Los Siete’s critiques by dismissing the charges presented against the defendants 
as frame-ups and highlighting the political nature of the cases. One newspaper article 
argued that the state of California was not prosecuting Davis because of her alleged 
connection to the Marin County shootout but because she was “a revolutionary Black 
women dedicated to the liberation of all oppressed people.”86 Venceremos was one of the 
most vociferous critics of the CPUSA among internationalist radicals in the Bay Area; 
founding Central Committee Chairperson Aaron Manganiello even publicly referred to 
the CPUSA as a “right-wing communist party” that needed to give way to Venceremos 
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and other organizations who could form a mass-based communist movement.87 In spite of 
this visceral division with the CPUSA, Manganiello and the Venceremos organization 
maintained their solidarity with Davis through her exoneration in 1972, even as the 
organization itself experienced internal ideological and structural fractures (as detailed in 
Chapter Five). 
 
“All Women Are Political Prisoners” – Women’s Liberationists88 in Solidarity with 
Davis 
The political prisoner solidarity mobilizations for Angela Davis expanded their 
anti-imperialist critiques beyond that of the Free Huey Movement. Still central was the 
nexus of anti-racism, anti-capitalism, and anti-militarism that marked the mobilizations 
for Newton. Yet, as Davis herself noted in a letter of solidarity to Ericka Huggins while 
the former was imprisoned, the political prisoner movements of the day often overlooked 
the staggering numbers of and unique struggles that women faced while incarcerated; this 
oversight, in Davis’ words, was “an inevitable byproduct of a male-oriented society,” and 
“the vast majority of women prisoners—who are Black, Chican[a] and Puerto Rican” 
suffered in conditions comparable or worse to male prisoners.89  Anti-imperialist women 
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liberationists, particularly women of color, would thus incorporate anti-sexism/patriarchy 
into their critiques of the U.S. justice system. 
An editorial published during Davis’ trial proceedings in the People’s World, the 
periodical of the CPUSA, laid out the inherently patriarchal aspects of the prison system. 
Despite the heteronormativity of the editorial—which reflected the overall attitude of the 
broader Left during the 1960s and 70s—and the bare discussion of the sexism women 
faced while working outside the home, this editorial shed light onto how sexism and 
patriarchy were embedded within the justice system and connected to the sexism and 
patriarchy of society at large. The editorial, entitled “Women: The Political Prisoners,” 
began with a quotation from leftist women’s liberationist Marilyn Salzman-Webb, who 
argued, “In the U.S. all women in jail are political prisoners because their alleged crimes 
are actually acts of survival necessitated by our political and economic system.”90 The 
editorial continues this line of societal critique, identifying five major areas of crime for 
which women were most frequently arrested and explaining how those crimes fit within 
society’s patriarchal structure. Larceny and prostitution—the former identified as the 
crime for which women were most commonly arrested and the latter as “the only ‘crime’ 
automatically connected with women”—often resulted from dire financial situations 
caused by capitalist societies’ polarized economic structure; poverty disproportionately 
affected women of color, and arrests related to prostitution largely ignored the men 
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involved.91 Murder, another of the five main crimes, most commonly occurred in the 
home against a woman’s “husband or lover” and stemmed from “the desperation that 
comes from monotonous, repetitive physically and emotionally exhausting work” of 
homemaking and ensuring the happiness of her husband, children, and the rest of her 
family.92 This desperation also provided the grounds for “Drug Addiction and 
Drunkenness,” the final two major crimes for which women were arrested.93 In short, the 
editorial argued that women’s crimes largely stemmed not from individual criminality but 
as a result of oppressive societal situations caused by racism, economic exploitation, 
sexist cultural expectations of women, and the policing of women’s bodies. 
Davis also received solidarity from women of color organizations in the Bay 
Area, most prominently from the Third World Women’s Alliance (TWWA). The 
TWWA’s origins stemmed from women involved in formation of the Black Women’s 
Liberation Caucus (BWLC) of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in and 
around New York City in 1968. Fed up with their marginalized position within SNCC’s 
ranks, the BWLC split from SNCC in 1969 and reformed into the Black Women’s 
Alliance (BWA), focusing explicitly on women’s liberation issues and growing 
increasingly internationalist. As the BWA began incorporating Puerto Rican and some 
Asian American women into their ranks, they changed their name to the Third World 
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Women’s Alliance, signifying their commitment to multirac ial struggle and solidarity 
with the Third World liberation movements of the time.94 
The TWWA’s political platform exhibited what Black feminist and legal scholar 
Kimberlé Crenshaw would later term “intersectionality,” or the interconnectedness of 
different types of oppression.95 Intersectionality in the context of the TWWA resided at 
the nexus of racism, sexism, and capitalism, used interchangeably with imperialism, 
which the organization articulated in one of their early organizational platform papers. 
After recounting their development from SNCC to the TWWA, the organizational paper 
laid out the need for independent Third World women’s organizations. “The rulers of this 
society,” the paper continued, “would like us to continue thinking that racism is the only 
problem, or that men are inherently the enemy, thus diverting our attention from the 
economic basis of our oppression.”96 Third World women’s organizations, therefore, 
would serve as a reminder about the continual multiplicity of oppressions and the ways 
radicals needed to be mindful of how their activism would work liberation from racism, 
economic exploitation, and sexism and patriarchy simultaneously. Furthermore, the 
TWWA argued for the necessity of a worldwide socialist revolution to dismantle 
oppression overseas; not only should U.S. radicals focus on bringing equality and justice 
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to the United States but to also live “in a society that does not exploit and murder other 
people and smaller nations.”97 Among the many specific areas of society where the 
TWWA platform specified the need for liberation were the family structure, sex roles and 
gendered expectations of women, employment, women’s health, social services, and 
education. 
The TWWA expanded this analysis to prisons and the criminal justice system in 
their next publication, the first issue of their periodical, Triple Jeopardy.98 Similar to the 
People’s World editorial, an article in this issue critiqued the structurally-oppressive 
nature of the justice system. “The prison system in America,” read the article, “has 
historically been nothing less than concentration camps for Third World people”; and, 
rather than try to rehabilitate prisoners, the conditions within the prison system and their 
lack of opportunities after prison made them “develop the need for more so-called 
‘crimes’” to survive.99 The article also argued that jails were becoming impounds for 
political prisoners, who the white power structured treated as “enemies of the state” and 
“P.O.W.’s.”100 Because of these continuing realities of the prison system, Third World 
peoples and their allies needed to support political prisoners materially and emotionally 
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while also working to liberate all political prisoners by dismantling the prison system as 
is. In other words, the Third World Women’s Alliance recognized political prisoner 
solidarity movements as part of their anti-imperialist struggle toward collective 
liberation. 
The Bay Area chapter of the Third World Women’s Alliance was born out of the 
TWWA’s anti-imperialist endeavors, forming out of a group of women activists who met 
during the Venceremos Brigade (not to be confused with the Venceremos organization 
from Chapter Five). Marxist-inspired cadre from across the United States organized three 
Brigades in the late 1960s and early 1970s that traveled to Cuba to donate their labor for 
a variety of state tasks, such as political education and agricultural work. Through the 
Venceremos Brigade, Bay Area activists including Linda Burnham and Miriam Ching 
Yoon Louie met and had discussions with TWWA members from New York City, and 
when TWWA-NYC member Cheryl Perry League moved to Oakland in 1971, these 
discussions led to the formation of the Bay Area chapter of the Third World Women’s 
Alliance, eventually headquartered in Berkeley.101  
The Bay Area TWWA’s composition and solidarity work expanded beyond the 
New York City chapter’s scope. While the latter was almost entirely Black and Puerto 
Rican in membership, the Bay Area chapter included Black, Chinese American, Japanese 
American, Mexican American, Filipina, and Central American women among their ranks 
                                                 
     101 Springer, Living for the Revolution, 49; Interview with Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, August 8, 2015, in 
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in varying numbers. This greater diversity partially reflected the growing diversity of the 
East Bay and San Francisco, particularly among Asian Americans, and partially reflected 
the ideological influences the Bay Area TWWA held, including the Chinese Communist 
Party, the Filipino Communist Party, and its U.S. counterpart, Katipunan ng mga 
Demokratikong Pilipino (KDP; translated as the Union of Democratic Filipinos). 
According to Ching Yoon Louie, the Bay Area TWWA held a particularly close 
relationship with the KDP, whose primary purpose was to aid the Filipino Communist 
Party in toppling the dictatorship of Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos. The 
TWWA extended their coalitional activism to the issues that Filipina/o Americans faced, 
ranging from aiding with the building of the Paolo Agbayani Retirement Village in 
Delano, California, for Filipino Manong farmworkers to joining AAPA and other 
activists in opposing the eviction of longtime Chinese and Filipino occupants of the 
International Hotel in San Francisco.102 
Even before they formally constituted the TWWA-Bay Area, however, members 
demonstrated solidarity for Davis, regularly driving to San Jose to attend rallies and sit in 
on her trial. Perry League recalled that even though these women supported a wide range 
of political causes, “…as women, we all gravitated toward Angela’s case.”103 Davis’ case 
represented the internationalism and “triple oppression” that the TWWA worked to 
inculcate as central to women’s liberation. When Davis’ trial began, TWWA members 
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continued their solidarity by organizing support for Davis alongside and appealing to 
other women’s organizations, such as holding a 1972 luncheon with a multiracial, multi-
class group of women in San Jose to discuss ways to further draw in Bay Area women’s 
organizations and publicize Black women’s and other women of color organization’s 
support for Davis. Triple Jeopardy often published articles with updates about Davis’ 
case and occasionally included letters describing her experiences and reflections on her 
time in the prison system. Even after her exoneration in June 1972, Davis and the 
TWWA maintained a reciprocal supportive relationship, with Davis holding rap sessions 
with TWWA members about political prisoners and the justice system and being featured 
frequently within Triple Jeopardy.104  
 
Conclusion 
The political prisoner solidarity movements for Huey P. Newton and Angela Y. 
Davis demonstrated the ability for leftist radicals to traverse racial lines and ideological 
disagreements and rally around common causes. These movements reflected the rise of 
anti-imperialist politics as a way to articulate forms of oppression in the late 1960s San 
Francisco Bay Area, along with the proliferation of alliances that radical activists formed 
in their anti-imperialist struggle. The coalitions and solidarity in the Free Huey 
Movement explicitly connected his trial ordeals to the struggles against racism, 
capitalism, and U.S. militarism overseas. Incorporated with these three forms of 
oppression was antisexist and anti-patriarchal solidarity from fellow women’s 
                                                 
     104 “Luncheon in San Jose in Support of Angela Davis” report, Folder 5, Box 5, Third World Women’s 
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liberationists within the movement to free Angela Davis. The genealogies of alliance 
from the early mobilization to the later parts of the Free Huey Movement demonstrated 
how solidarity could persist despite organizational upheaval and the breakdown of formal 
alliance. Solidarity for Davis from allies within the Free Huey Movement showed how 
alliances from one mobilization could continue with another, and the reciprocity between 
Davis and the Panthers illuminated the value internationalist radicals placed on mutual 
support for other activists. 
Although both Newton and Davis were eventually exonerated, however, political 
prisoner movements tended to be quasi-pyrrhic victories for radical organizations, 
especially as the number of activists on trial escalated into the early 1970s. Trials drained 
time, money, and energy away from other functions of their organizations. In addition, 
political prisoner movements could critique but ultimately could not attack the root 
causes for the movements that both solidarity mobilizations identified: the unequal 
meting out of punishments by the justice system, the prison-industrial complex, and the 
structural oppressions embedded within society that caused desperation among working-
class and poor people, especially people of color. 
Political prisoner movements and other manifestations of anti-imperialism within 
the United States ultimately signaled the need for oppressed peoples to transform the 
institutions and systems of their society toward eliminating the inequalities and injustices 
they faced. Internationalist radicals, particularly people of color, framed this societal 
transformation as a struggle for self-determination similar to the Third World liberation 
movements of the era. Yet organizing toward self-determination proved more difficult 
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than anti-imperialist organizing. While the latter involved so-called “oppositional 
politics” where disparate radicals could coalesce against the advancement of a common 
enemy, struggles for self-determination often manifested the differences in visions for a 
liberated society that circulated among different radical organizations. As the next two 




To Liberate Campus and Community: Nairobi College, Venceremos College, and the 
Struggle for Self-Determination in the Southern San Francisco Bay Area 
 
The September 1969 transformation of 805 Runnymede Street in unincorporated 
East Palo Alto, California, seemed inconspicuous from the outside. Little fanfare 
accompanied this occasion, nor did local media coverage descend upon the location. This 
moment, however, marked a significant shift within the history of higher education in the 
San Francisco Bay Area, particularly among self-proclaimed “Third World” people. The 
Runnymede house served as the central administrative building of the new Nairobi 
College; more precisely, it served as the only building of the college that did not serve 
another function within the community. Nairobi’s library consisted mostly of books 
donated by local residents, a local hamburger stand functioned as their de facto cafeteria, 
and Nairobi students held their classes in churches, the local teen center, and homes 
throughout East Palo Alto. Community volunteers and the students themselves staffed, 
resourced, and operated the college, with the latter also engaging in work-study initiatives 
to the benefit of local residents, such as tutoring for schoolchildren and drug 
rehabilitation centers.1 
Nairobi College’s structure and organization contrasted with to the Third World 
Liberation Front strikes at San Francisco State College (SFSC) and the University of 
                                                 
     1 Valerie Jane Miner, “Nairobi College: Education for Relevance; One Interpretation of the Community 
Service Function,” U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, Office of Education, December 8, 
1969, 1. 
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California, Berkeley in 1968-69 that carved out spaces for students of color within the 
university. Nairobi—and Venceremos College, its sister school in Redwood City, 
established in January 1970—theorized that Third World peoples could only achieve 
educational self-determination outside the apparatus of existing state institutions.2 
Moreover, after the TWLF strikes at both SF State and UC Berkeley, numerous student 
activists returned to or starting working within local communities of color as a way to 
connect their newly-established and hard-fought institutional spaces on campus with 
those communities.3 Nairobi and Venceremos also believed that Third World educational 
institutions should connect with and serve local communities of color; yet the Colleges 
believed they could accomplish this only by embedding themselves within and attuning 
themselves to the needs of their communities. They thus envisioned each institution to be 
“truly a college without walls,” adopting the slogan, “The community is the campus.”4 
Yet the Colleges could never evade the grasp of the state. Even as Nairobi and 
Venceremos attempted to bend state funding and resources to their will, state institutions 
and constituents influenced the direction of the Colleges. In negotiating the state’s 
influence, Nairobi and Venceremos developed alternative strategies toward gaining self-
                                                 
     2 Although many media reports and public announcements list Redwood City as the site of Venceremos 
College, many of the major community institutions were located in East Redwood City, an unincorporated 
area which, like East Palo Alto, was under the jurisdiction of the County of San Mateo. 
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determination for their communities, which ultimately shaped their divergent trajectories 
in this history.5 
This chapter reconsiders the interplay of Third World education and self-
determination through an examination of the histories of Nairobi College and 
Venceremos College. I analyze the ideological motivations the Colleges held for 
establishing their own institutions and the struggles they faced in implementing their 
ideas. Driven by the activist zeitgeist of the era, the late 1960s and the 1970s saw the 
massive diversifying of higher education in terms of race, class, and gender, as students 
from traditionally-marginalized communities saw attending college become more 
accessible.  
Along with this diversification came the proliferation of alternative institutions of 
education, particularly within communities of color. Part of this growth came from 
schools like the Mid-Peninsula Free University in Palo Alto that dabbled in new forms 
experiential Alternative community schools marked one way that people of color could 
carve out more autonomous spaces within society, and Bay Area radical activists were 
prominently involved with local manifestations of this phenomenon. Some institutions, 
like the Black Panther Party’s Napier Institute (later Intercommunal Youth Institute, then 
Oakland Community School), were similar to the Colleges in that they provided 
alternatives to state-run public schools. Others, like the Chinese community school in San 
Francisco’s Chinatown, provided supplemental linguistic and cultural instruction to the 
                                                 
     5 Miner, “Nairobi College: Education for Relevance,” 4. I define “the state” as the institutions of 
governance in a polity. In this context, the state included federal, state, and county entities, including the 
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city’s public schools, with members of the Wei Min She radical organization playing a 
role in its maintenance. And a handful of schools like the Thunderbird University—
devised by the Indians of all Tribes during their 1969-71 Occupation of Alcatraz Island—
never materialized on ground but provided a conceptual space where activists could 
envision the possibilities and structures of Indigenous-controlled education. Similar 
institutions emerged across the nation, including: the Corky Gonzales- led auxiliary 
Chicana/o schools in Denver, Colorado; the Chicana/o Colégio César Chávez outside of 
Portland, Oregon; and—perhaps the most similar institutions to Nairobi and 
Venceremos—tribally-controlled colleges and universities on Indian reservations, such as 
Sinte Gleska College in Mission, South Dakota, and Navajo Community College in 
Arizona.6  
Using educational institutions as vehicles toward self-determination, however, 
produced dilemmas and contradictions, as the examples of Nairobi and Venceremos 
Colleges demonstrate. A lack of financial self-sufficiency loomed over the Colleges 
throughout their histories. Ideologically, Nairobi and Venceremos had limited or 
contradictory conceptions of who and what constituted “Third World” people in the 
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United States. Nairobi never fully developed ideas of how to fully eradicate poverty in 
East Palo Alto, and at times its vision of self-determination fixated too narrowly on local 
control of public schools. Conversely, while Venceremos theorized ways in which they 
could take control of their local political economy, toward the elimination of economic 
exploitation, they struggled to remain relevant to local Mexican American communities, 
particularly as they clashed with local police authorities with increased frequency. 
Despite their shortcomings, the Colleges’ history remains significant in signaling 
the need for scholars to analyze and critique the relationship between higher education 
and society at large. The Colleges were one of many constituents engaged in debates and 
struggles in the postwar era over the purpose of higher education, especially as college 
campus protests escalated through the 1960s and early 1970s. Some took the position of 
New York Times editor William V. Shannon, who in an April 28, 1969 editorial for the 
Times described the university as a place “to transmit knowledge and wisdom…not a 
forum for political action.”7 “The university,” Shannon continued, “is a quiet place 
deliberately insulated from the conflicts and pressures from the larger society around it” 
that should not be asked “to be deliberately ‘relevant’ to today’s crises of cities and 
races.”8  
Yet contrary to Shannon’s assertions, U.S. colleges and universities were 
inextricably linked to society at large, particularly during the Cold War. This reality 
applied to Stanford University, with whom Nairobi and Venceremos had the most 
                                                 
     7 William V. Shannon, “One Man’s View of the Unquiet Campus,” New York Times, April 28, 1969, 40. 
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frequent contact among local institutions, perhaps more than any other institution. 
Politically, the Red Scare of the 1950s wreaked havoc on the campus’ academic freedom. 
As historian Rebecca S. Lowen argues, Stanford University was also one of many 
institutions that moved higher education “from the periphery to the center of the nation’s 
political economy” after World War II, with the federal government pouring 
“approximately $10 billion annually on research and development” for military use by 
the 1960s, including war technologies used in the Vietnam War.9 
Such ties to federal mandates and eventual private industry interests permeated 
into all levels of education. Under the restructuring of California’s public higher 
education system through the passage of the Donahoe Education Act of 1960 (“the 
Master Plan”), community colleges shifted its focus to vocational training, often building 
programs based on the funding they received from airlines, law enforcement, and other 
local corporations and state institutions that invested in community colleges.10 These new 
realities led Stanford University professor and future Venceremos Central Committee 
member H. Bruce Franklin to conclude in a 1969 debate that “American universities…are 
essential sources of power within our society, and thus throughout the world” but were 
currently controlled by the ruling capitalist class.11 
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But even with the growing influence of the federal government and hegemony of 
capitalist leaders, government and private industrial interests alone did not dictate the 
entire operation of colleges and universities. Liberal reformers like University of 
California President Clark Kerr and College of San Mateo President Julio Bortolazzo—
often inspired by the civil rights and other movements of the era—worked to make their 
institutions into vehicles of social change. Students on campus, especially students of 
color like those during the SF State and UC Berkeley Third World Liberation Front 
strikes, pushed their administrators to implement changes; the legacy of these protests 
include increased admissions, increased resources for retention, and the diversification of 
curricula for students of color through the establishment of ethnic studies departments 
that offered more culturally-relevant courses and research. Although Nairobi and 
Venceremos Colleges viewed transforming institutions from within as a limited course of 
struggle, they too are part of this legacy and history. The Colleges demonstrated that 
Third World self-determined education went beyond diversifying curricula and 
broadening admissions for people of color; their history conveys how we might theorize a 
university that not only resists complicity in militaristic and economic exploitative 
systems but also directs institutions to serve the needs of those on the margins of society. 
  
Origins of the Colleges 
While the Peninsula did not experience mass urbanization as a result of the World 
War II manufacturing buildup that San Francisco and the East Bay experienced (Chapter 
Two), spatial and demographic reconfigurations did transform the area, and along with it, 
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the exacerbation of racial and class inequities. As the postwar era progressed, so too did 
the tide of activism in the struggle to overturn the segregation and discrimination 
Peninsula communities of color endured. The civil rights zeitgeist of the 1960s swept 
through institutions of higher education, inspiring leaders such as Julio Bortolazzo, the 
president of the College of San Mateo (CSM). Bortolazzo spent his professional career 
resuscitating community colleges throughout California, beginning this endeavor at CSM 
by focusing on improving transfer and retention rates among the college’s students, 
particularly students of color. Social upheaval stemming from the inequalities found in 
urban America particularly concerned Bortolazzo, especially in the aftermath of the 1965 
Watts uprising. Believing that education held the key to the door out of poverty, 
Bortolazzo implemented the College Readiness Program (CRP) at the beginning of the 
1966-67 academic year. The CRP provided tutoring assistance and other resources for the 
retention of Black CSM students, who heretofore experienced an approximately ninety 
percent dropout rate. Moreover, rather than focus on academic tracks leading to 
transferring to four-year colleges and universities, the bulk of CSM students of all races 
entered into vocational work, particularly through programs funded by local entities like 
United Airlines and law enforcement agencies. Through the College Readiness Program, 
Bortolazzo aimed to expand the educational and career options for students of color while 
giving them the resources to pursue their chosen career paths. Over the next two years, 
the CRP expanded recruitment to other students of color, hired more staff, and eventually 
experienced an almost complete inverse in the dropout rate.12 
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May 4, 2006, accessed January 14, 2015, 
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Much of the achievement turnaround among CSM students of color stemmed 
from the efforts of its two earliest staff members. Among the extant faculty and staff at 
the College of San Mateo, Bortolazzo could only recruit counselor and English instructor 
Jean Wirth to the CRP. Born in New York City and raised around the country before 
finishing high school in Baltimore, Maryland, Wirth arrived in the Bay Area in the early 
1950s to attend Mills College, first for a bachelor’s degree, then for her master’s. Her 
father’s falling gravely ill in 1958 and needing financial support for his treatment pushed 
Wirth to withdraw from her doctoral program at the University of California, Berkeley, 
and begin teaching English courses at the College of San Mateo. That same year, Wirth 
met Ed Roberts, a CSM student with polio dependent on an iron lung, for whom she 
began serving as a student services counselor. Wirth helped devise strategies for Roberts 
to more easily join other students in her English class and his other classes, including 
situating her classroom to accommodate his wheelchair and arranging his on-campus 
meetings in rooms only on the ground level of buildings. Through her work with Roberts, 
Wirth demonstrated her willingness to aid students outside of the classroom, ability to 
understand student needs and find solutions to those problems, and orientation toward 
social justice, on which she would draw in her new role with the College Readiness 
Program.13 
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Along with the recruitment of Wirth, the hiring of East Palo Alto Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee organizer Robert Hoover served as the second 
instrumental CRP staff member spearheading this achievement turnaround among CSM’s 
students of color. Born and raised in North Carolina, then Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
Hoover’s activism extended back to his undergraduate education at Penn State University 
when he first experienced housing discrimination and joined Entre Neu, a campus 
organization for Black Penn State students. After graduating from the university in 1959, 
Hoover enrolled in a master’s program at Stanford University, where white Palo Altans 
refused to sell him a house. Moreover, the apartment owner attempted to evict him and 
his now wife Mary, enrolled in a PhD program in education at Stanford, because the 
apartment manager had violated the racially-restrictive policy the owner had placed for 
tenants. The Hoovers eventually settled into a house in East Palo Alto, with this episode 
of racial discrimination pushing them into civil rights activism through SNCC.14 
Wirth, Hoover, and the volunteers they recruited expanded the focus of student 
services beyond tutoring to address what they called “the whole student.” Not only 
should the College of San Mateo focus on students’ needs within the classroom, they 
argued; the college also needed address the external factors that shaped students’ 
classroom success, such as the cost of room, board, and textbooks and the reliability of 
transportation to and from the campus. As student and later leading CRP volunteer Aaron 
Manganiello explained in a 1969 interview, CSM moved its campus in the early 1960s 
                                                 
     14 Interview with Robert Hoover, July 15, 2014, in possession of the author; Zora Roberts, “Counselor 
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from its former location in Coyote Point to its current College Heights location, farther 
away from the concentration of the Peninsula’s communities of color and bereft of public 
transportation options and affordable nearby housing options for those students. The 
college’s relocation reflected its inaccessibility to students of color, as the college 
became, the words of Manganiello, “inaccessible geographically,” along with already 
being “inaccessible philosophically, academically, intellectually” with its lack of 
culturally-relevant curriculum.15 Thus, the CRP would go beyond offering tutoring and 
other student support services and would provide the means for students of color to 
attend.16 
For some CRP students and tutors, developing “the whole student” also included 
political education and activism. The CRP grew increasingly politicized through the work 
of Aaron Manganiello, Warren Fujitani, Pat Sumi, Tony and Mario Martinez, and other 
leftist radicals who joined the program. Among the organizations and movements from 
which these activists came or would eventually join included the Brown Berets in 
Oakland and San Francisco, Los Siete de La Raza in San Francisco’s Mission District, 
the Free Huey Movement, the movement to Free Angela Davis and all political prisoners, 
and the Third World Liberation Front strike at San Francisco State College. These radical 
activists gravitated toward the CRP because of the program’s resources in aiding students 
of color that radicals thought would be inclined toward activism outside of campus. The 
growing radicalization of the College Readiness Program, however, did not escape the 
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purview of the CSM administration, who soon acted upon their concerns after 
Bortolazzo’s departure in 1968.17 
After filling their vacant presidency with Robert Ewigleben, the CSM Board of 
Trustees defunded the CRP before the 1968-69 academic year, misallocating their 
resources to another part of the budget in spite of the successes of the program. By this 
point the CRP grew so prominent that the program not only attracted students from San 
Mateo and surrounding Peninsula cities, but also from communities as far as San 
Francisco’s Chinatown and East San Jose. The CRP staff had independently raised some 
of their own external funds before this crisis, including a $150,000 federal grant 
contingent upon matching funds, yet the Board rebuffed all efforts to meet the CRP’s 
budget. The CRP also grew increasingly frustrated with Ewigleben. Rhetorically, 
Ewigleben postured himself as a mediator between students and the Board, yet his slow 
response to the CRP’s budget shortfall and CRP student inquiries in general. This conflict 
culminated in the formation of CSM’s own Third World Liberation Front, a series of 
protests against administration, and clashes with non-sympathetic (predominantly white) 
students that ended with local police intervention on campus. This situation alienated 
virtually all CRP students, and most departed the College of San Mateo in early 1969.18 
Disappointed but empowered by their CSM experiences, former CRP students 
took the initiative in building a new institution that would meet their own needs while 
simultaneously addressing those of local communities of color, recruiting Bob Hoover, 
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Jean Wirth, and other former CRP staff to help facilitate this process. The students 
especially drew on Hoover and his wife Mary for their earlier experiences in helping to 
launch the independent Nairobi Day Schools in East Palo Alto for K-12 students. East 
Palo Alto also served as the ideal site to launch the new college, since the former CRP 
students were predominantly Black, and Hoover and other former CRP staff had 
familiarity with the community and its needs. In September 1969, Nairobi College 
opened its doors, and the predominantly-Chicana/o Venceremos College launched in the 
predominantly-Mexican American East Redwood City the following January.19 While the 
accreditation process would take a few years to achieve, Nairobi and Venceremos 
students thought it necessary to begin creating their own infrastructure of self-determined 
education, leading to the Colleges launching despite taking courses at other nearby 
institutions to receive transfer credits. 
Despite their unity at the College of San Mateo, however, and Aaron 
Manganiello’s assurance that “It’s still the same college – just two campuses now,” the 
establishment of Venceremos College away from Nairobi represented more than serving 
two different demographic constituencies.20 Even as the colleges shared course offerings, 
funding, and broader ideas regarding educational self-determination, the separation of 
campuses would manifest divergent ideological orientations and priorities, with Nairobi 
becoming more locally-focused and Venceremos more nationally and globally. 
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Ideological Orientations and Development 
Nairobi and Venceremos did retain a few shared core philosophies. Both 
continued the CRP’s emphasis on developing “the whole student” beyond the classroom 
and placed control of the direction of the college, including hiring and firing faculty, onto 
the students themselves.21  The Colleges also willingly accepted outside sources of 
funding but stated they would not work with donors who would seek to control the 
College in any way. Nairobi and Venceremos also emphasized the need for strong 
connections with their local communities, not just in terms of education and curriculum 
but also the everyday needs they lacked. Inspired by the Black Panther Party’s recent 
shift toward their “survival programs” (Chapter Six), the Colleges dedicated their 
energies in running community outreach programs focused on healthcare, food 
distribution, and other things to which many Peninsularans of color did not readily have 
access. Aside from these commonalities, however, the Colleges diverged from each other 
ideologically.22  
Nairobi drew from a few international sources in planning the college, borrowing 
their name from the capital of Kenya, which had recently gained political independence 
after over eighty years of formal British colonization. They also developed the Nairobi 
College Code with “Seven Principles of Blackness” adopted from Swahili words. The 
principles included Umoja (unity), Ujima (collective work and responsibility), and 
Ujamaa (cooperative economics) and revolved around generating collective visions and 
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efforts toward self-determination for the people of East Palo Alto, who would serve as a 
model for other Black communities in the United States. Throughout their promotional 
materials, Nairobi sprinkled in quotations from other luminaries of the African diaspora, 
such as Marcus Garvey and Patrice Lumumba.23 The rhetoric and imagery of historical 
and contemporary Black revolutionaries provided not only a holistic organizational 
structure but also aimed to develop a consciousness toward issues embattling Black 
people around the world. 
As important as international influences would be symbolically and aesthetically, 
domestic influences proved more important for Nairobi College, especially the influence 
of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. The Hoovers and other East Palo 
Alto former and current SNCC members comprised the majority of the college’s support 
system. SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael also had provided the catalyst for the formation 
of the earlier Nairobi Day Schools. Carmichael regularly visited East Palo Alto during 
and after SNCC’s heyday in the mid-1960s, and during one visit in 1966 attended a 
meeting of East Palo Alto community organizers in their struggle for integration and 
greater control of the local Sequoia High School district. According to Hoover, when 
asked his thoughts on the integration plan, Carmichael replied, “I don’t understand why 
you would be so eager to turn over the minds of your children to the people who’ve 
oppressed you for four hundred years. Why do you think they’re going to give you an 
education that will liberate you?”24 Carmichael’s question resonated with the East Palo 
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Alto organizers, who founded the Nairobi Day Schools in the following days. Nairobi 
College formed an extension of the vision laid out by the Nairobi Day Schools through 
their adoption of SNCC’s ideas regarding Black Power and self-determination through 
community control of its institutions.  
Coupled with Carmichael and SNCC’s influence was an ethos that echoed Black 
scholar and activist W.E.B. Du Bois’ formulation (later revised and repudiated) of the 
“Talented Tenth.” According to Du Bois, Black Americans needed highly- and broadly-
educated leaders in their community who would use their education and accompanying 
skills to improve conditions for the entire race. Nairobi College emulated the “Talented 
Tenth” ideal through their rejection of vocational education for the Black masses, toward 
which the College of San Mateo steered Black students before the establishment of the 
College Readiness Program. They instead favored a curriculum focused on a classical 
liberal arts education; the college’s primary focus was to help create Black leaders that 
would transfer to four-year colleges and universities, gain skills and expertise there, then 
return to East Palo Alto as doctors, lawyers, engineers, businesspeople, and others who 
would help the community’s economic and political development. Although some 
Nairobi students remained activists and community organizers, the college believed, in 
the words of Hoover, “You can’t have all Stokely Carmichaels.”25 Although Nairobi 
would eventually eschew this position and open the Nairobi Vocational Maintenance 
Program under the presidency of Donald Smothers, steering students toward and 
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preparing them for futures in white-collar professions became the primary emphasis of 
Nairobi’s education.26 
In this regard, Venceremos College’s ideological underpinnings did not 
completely depart from Nairobi’s. Aaron Manganiello—one of the early leaders of 
Venceremos—explained a similar concept they called “revolutionary technicians.”27 
Although trained similarly to other doctors, engineers, lawyers, and other professionals, 
revolutionary technicians distinguished themselves in where they applied their work. 
Rather than use their knowledge and skills to advance the will of private capitalists or the 
state, revolutionary technicians would return to the oppressed communities from which 
they came to use their skills toward fomenting revolution within the United States. 
Although Nairobi was oriented around community development and Venceremos around 
revolution, both initially highlighted the importance of educating young leaders to gain 
skills and expertise as seen throughout the rest of society yet with an ethos that would 
serve their respective community. 
Aside from this commonality, Venceremos shared little with Nairobi College’s 
ideologies. Venceremos College—the “ideological arm” of their eponymous 
organization—believed in the imminence of armed revolution in the United States and 
drew their ideological influences primarily from international theorists.28 The 
organization took their name from a rally cry popularized by Che Guevara (Venceremos 
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being Spanish for “we will overcome”) and drew primarily from Marxism-Leninism for 
their political thought. The college’s initial leadership consisted of five current or former 
Oakland Brown Berets, marking a departure from the Berets at large and much of the 
Chicana/o Movement as a whole. It would not be until the mid- to late 1970s when 
Marxism (or at least Marxist analysis) in general would be commonly accepted within the 
Chicana/o Movement. Venceremos, however, reconciled Marxism-Leninism and cultural 
nationalism early on, believing that adherence to both formed resistance against 
imperialism in its capitalist and racist manifestations.29  
Toward the end of 1970, Venceremos underwent an ideological transformation 
after the organization merged with a splinter group from the Bay Area Revolutionary 
Union. The reasons for this split within BARU were contested. According to founding 
BARU member Steve Hamilton, a faction within Venceremos, led by H. Bruce and Jane 
Franklin, became increasingly “adventurist” and foresaw immediate armed revolution 
within the United States via “urban guerrilla warfare” and an “armed propaganda” 
struggle.30 Others contested that the Franklin faction wanted the predominantly-white 
BARU to become fully multiracial, whereas BARU leader Bob Avakian preferred non-
white radicals to join allied BARU organizations like the Black Panther Party and Wei 
Min She. According to Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, an American Indian activist who was 
recruited into the Revolutionary Union, Bob Avakian also “questioned women’s 
liberation,” despite his alleged adherence to Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought 
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(MLMZT) with its emphasis on the importance of .31 The situation within BARU became 
untenable, and the Franklins led a mass exodus out of the organization, merging with and 
transforming the Venceremos organization.  
After the merger, Venceremos officially adopted MLMZT, as evidenced by two 
key ideological shifts. First, Venceremos developed a position on the “National 
Question.” Venceremos aimed to be multiracial—or as they called it, “multinational”—to 
represent the Chicana/o, Black, and white working-class populations of Redwood City 
and to serve as a vanguard organization for what they viewed as the impending 
multinational revolution in the United States, which would spread to fight imperialism 
throughout the world.32  The “National Question” focused on how ethnic, racial, and 
national minorities should relate to the dominant ethnic/racial/national group in a 
communist country.33 While Venceremos hoped to maintain a multinational United States 
after revolution, they also argued that the colonized peoples of the United States—
specifically Black people, Chicanas/os, American Indians, Native Hawaiians, and Puerto 
Ricans—held nationhood status and thus had the right to secede and form their own 
nation-states.34  
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Furthermore, Venceremos firmly advanced the “Woman Question” of MLMZT 
by demonstrating their commitment to women’s liberation, which formed one of their 
core “Principles of Unity.”35 Because male chauvinism and patriarchy impeded full 
proletarian revolution, Venceremos worked to root out all sexism and misogyny within 
their ranks. They further demonstrated their commitment to women’s liberation through 
their selection of Katarina del Valle as their chairperson on what would be their final 
Central Committee and through their operation of serve-the-people programs such as the 
People’s Medical Center, a childcare center, and community education classes on 
prenatal care.36 
 
Implementation of Ideologies 
In putting their theories into practice, Nairobi and Venceremos retained a focus on 
developing “the whole student” beyond the classroom. The Colleges charged no tuition, 
had a primarily-volunteer staff and faculty, and provided books, transportation, and 
employment opportunities for their students. The Colleges’ student body also held the 
power to hire and fire faculty and for the most part controlled the teaching within classes 
alongside faculty. The students also held sway over the curriculum for the Colleges. 
While many classes looked similar to those at other colleges and universities, such as 
mathematics and English composition, the content within those classes tended to differ 
significantly. History classes tended to focus on understanding the history of capitalism 
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and imperialism or that of oppressed peoples in the United States and throughout the 
world, while literature classes often read political tracts instead of common selections 
like the poetry and plays of William Shakespeare. Although classes had assigned 
teachers, students most often took the lead in classes, most of which were no more than a 
dozen people and focused on developing rhetorical and critical thinking skills as much as 
the content of the curriculum. Reflecting a cross-section of their communities, Nairobi 
and Venceremos did not only have “college-aged” students but included community 
members ranging from their early teens who faced frequent disciplinary measures within 
the public school system to working people in their forties and fifties who never finished 
their formal education, and even some formerly- incarcerated people. Both institutions 
also ensured connections between themselves and their broader communities through a 
variety of strategies, including only having one office building for each school and 
holding classes in houses and other places throughout the community. Nairobi and 
Venceremos also administered community programs similar to the Black Panther Party, 
such as health clinics, childcare centers, food co-ops, and rehabilitation facilities for those 
facing drug or alcohol abuse, all staffed mostly by the Colleges’ students as part of their 
“whole student” education. Both institutions also emphasized the need to enjoy 
community building; Venceremos organized baseball games and dances, and Nairobi 
aiming to show its students that “it’s fun to help other people.”37 Community and campus 
for each college would thus work together as one.38 
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Venceremos continually worked to keep the National Question at the forefront of 
its mission by holding Third World people and their struggles at the center of the 
organization, in contrast to many other multiracial leftist organizations of the time. One 
way that Venceremos ensured this was to structure its Central Committee to always have 
approximately two-thirds people of color.39 They further demonstrated their commitment 
to women’s liberation through their selection of Katarina del Valle as the chairperson on 
what would be the final iterations of the Central Committee. Venceremos also showed 
their commitment to the “Woman Question” within their local communities through their 
operation of serve-the-people programs such as the People’s Medical Center, a childcare 
center, and community education classes on prenatal care.40 In their resolutions with the 
“National Question” and the “Woman Question,” Venceremos demonstrated ways they 
connected their goals of global revolution to the act of meeting community needs locally.  
 
Contradictions and Dilemmas 
Despite their best efforts, Nairobi and Venceremos Colleges also experienced 
contradictions and dilemmas throughout their existence stemming from both their 
theoretical foundations and the praxis of their ideologies. Nairobi and Venceremos never 
solved the issue that arose early on in the Colleges’ history regarding the hiring of staff, 
who received regular wages for their work. Although students held some of this hiring 
power early on, they did not fully control the process for hiring and firing staff. As the 
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decade progressed, students would receive less and less control over this vital part of the 
Colleges.41 
Nairobi’s ideological trajectory steered them away from being a fully Third 
World college in either demographics or ideological orientation. Although always 
predominantly Black in enrollment, Nairobi College initially had a small but noticeable 
group of white, Latina/o, and Asian American students, staff, and faculty. Nairobi 
enlisted the help of Black and white Stanford students as well. Yet Nairobi never 
recruited students beyond local Black communities and maintained their limited Third 
World orientation, even after Donald Smothers from the multiracial San Francisco State 
Third World Liberation Front strike succeeded Hoover as Nairobi College President. By 
1973, Nairobi had alienated non-Blacks to the point of being solely Black-populated and 
-operated.42 
Moreover, despite borrowing from Kenyan culture and society, Nairobi did not 
adopt the same anti-imperialist and revolutionary orientation as the Kenyan independence 
movement. Nairobi focused instead on helping Blacks in East Palo Alto gain upward 
social and economic mobility through educational attainment. Part of this focus stemmed 
from the college’s desire to garner the support of the broader East Palo Alto community 
toward incorporation into their own city; the organizers around Nairobi believed that the 
community would not accept a revolutionary platform in the movement toward 
incorporation. But just as pressing was Nairobi’s financial situation. Aside from the 
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federal Office of Education, the college’s funding sources came almost entirely from 
white elite luminaries around the Peninsula, such as David Packard of the Hewlett-
Packard company and Richard Lyman, the president of Stanford University.43 Hoover 
particularly raised funds through the Mid-Peninsula Urban Coalition, of which many of 
the Colleges’ donors were a part. Cyril Bolden, the business manager of Nairobi College 
in the early 1970s, bemoaned their reliance on white money, reminding the College’s 
leadership that, “If they are going to accept white money, then they have got to expect 
white accountability.”44 Despite their pronouncements to the contrary, Nairobi operated 
in a way that balanced their need to appeal to the broadest swath of the greater East Palo 
Alto community while also not appearing threatening to their donor base. 
In contrast, Venceremos was unabashed in its criticism of all they deemed to be 
agents of oppression, including Packard and Lyman. They viewed donors within the local 
technological industries like Packard, formerly in Richard Nixon’s Department of 
Defense, as complicit in the military- industrial complex and U.S. economic and military 
imperialism overseas. Richard Lyman increasingly became a target of Venceremos’ 
rhetorical attacks, since they argued he stifled anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist critiques 
from Stanford student activists and made an example of this after firing H. Bruce 
Franklin for allegedly inciting a riot at an anti-war rally.45  
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More so than Nairobi, however, Venceremos struggled to remain relevant to their 
local community and dealt with numerous internal contradictions. Manganiello, who 
served as chairperson of Venceremos’ Central Committee for most of its existence, 
admitted that their general lack of bilingualism hindered their ability to recruit within 
local Mexican communities, who continued to experience an influx of new migrants 
throughout the 1960s and 70s.46 Similarly to the majority of East Palo Altans, Mexicans 
and Mexican Americans in Redwood City and throughout most of the Peninsula tended 
to disfavor radical politics, particularly armed revolution. 
Like Nairobi College, Venceremos espoused a limited understanding of the 
relations between Third World peoples, in their case specifically regarding indigeneity. 
Venceremos recognized American Indians and Indigenous Hawaiians as indigenous 
colonized peoples with the right to their own nation-states within their vision of a post-
revolution United States.47 Indigenous Alaskans, however—who they called 
“Eskimos”—did not fall under this category; Venceremos instead designated them 
another “oppressed minority group” akin to Chinese and Japanese Americans and other 
racial minorities, thus denying their indigeneity and the right to sovereignty within the 
organization’s theoretical formulations.48 
Venceremos’ limited understanding of the conditions that the Bay Area’s 
American Indian and Asian American communities materialized in their inability to 
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fulfill their Third World revolutionary vanguard visions. The organization originally 
planned developing a network of Third World independent colleges, stretching from 
Nariboi College and Venceremos College upward through the Peninsula, with 
prospective campuses in Daly City, South San Francisco, San Francisco’s Chinatown, the 
Mission District, and all the way to Alcatraz Island. Venceremos eventually tabled these 
plans after a number of blunders; for example, lacking an established community member 
from San Francisco’s Chinatown, Venceremos sent Japanese American Tim Aoki in the 
failed attempt to garner support for a Chinatown Third World college. Venceremos 
periodically provided supplies to the Alcatraz Island occupiers and later voiced solidarity 
with the American Indian Movement’s Siege at Wounded Knee in 1973, even sending 
Central Committee member Bob King to serve as a medic for AIM during the Siege. Yet 
despite their solidarity, Venceremos never maintained formal relations with American 
Indian activist organizations, whether locally or nationally.49 Other issues would arise, 
however, that would bring Venceremos’ demise before their contradictions manifested 
themselves. 
 
Split and Demise 
Their operation of separate campuses notwithstanding, Nairobi and Venceremos 
Colleges initially remained amicable with each other. Disagreements periodically arose 
between the two based on their different ideological orientations and end goals, but the 
                                                 




Colleges, according to Manganiello, “settled them through collective criticism/self-
criticism” that held each party accountable and equal to each other.50 The irreconcilable 
rupture between the two did not emerge until after the late 1970 merger and 
reconstitution of Venceremos. After the merger, Venceremos increasingly focused their 
theory and praxis on how to expedite armed revolution in the United States while Nairobi 
became more involved with its incorporation movement and securing more donors from 
the Peninsula and around the country.51  
The Colleges’ ideological disagreements eventually came to a head. Although 
Nairobi did not formally articulate a position on the “Woman Question,” women served 
in central roles for their vision and leadership throughout the college’s existence, a 
dynamic that reflected the operation of the Nairobi Day Schools. On the “National 
Question,” however, Nairobi departed from Venceremos. Hoover and other leaders at 
Nairobi College disagreed not so much with the validity of the “National Question” but 
with the viability of building a separate Black country within North America, based on 
their current circumstances.52 More immediately viable and necessary, in their view, was 
helping local communities with their immediate needs in whatever form they could. And 
although Nairobi College’s staff kept firearms in their offices for self-defense against 
raiding police officers, they always opposed Venceremos’ pursuit of armed revolution.53 
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As the 1971 fiscal year approached, Nairobi moved to officially sever their 
relationship with Venceremos College, leaving Venceremos without a reliable funding 
source. Nairobi accused Venceremos of not adequately trying to address their 
community’s needs. This criticism was somewhat unfounded, since Venceremos ran 
community programs similar to Nairobi’s. Yet Venceremos did neglect their college and 
spent more time on other college campuses as the 1970s progressed, especially with 
various struggles on Stanford University’s campus. In turn, Venceremos accused Nairobi 
of being too close and uncritical of their white donors and political partners. Manganiello 
even accused Nairobi of “eating steak every night,” embracing the comforts of middle-
class life while neglecting the plight of the working class.54  
Yet in the midst of their criticisms of Nairobi College, Venceremos also tried to 
salvage the relationship. The organization changed the name of its newspaper from 
Venceremos to Pamoja Venceremos, incorporating the Swahili word for “together” 
(pamoja) to symbolize their continuing desire to work with Nairobi College. In an early 
issue of the new Pamoja Venceremos, one of Venceremos’ closest allies, the Black 
Liberation Front (BLF), penned an article urging Nairobi to reconsider its position. The 
BLF operated in communities throughout the Peninsula, including East Palo Alto, and 
some BLF members formerly attended Nairobi College and worked in its accompanying 
community programs. The BLF did not blame Nairobi entirely for their decision; they 
instead emphasized the pressures Nairobi faced within the broader white supremacist 
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capitalist structure and how it caused fissures among different people of color 
organizations. The BLF also implored Nairobi to focus on the dire situation their 
impending funding withdrawal would have on Venceremos students, who did not have 
any other accessible options for higher education. Yet their pleas and criticisms 
ultimately were not enough to persuade Nairobi College from cutting ties with 
Venceremos, and the two official split on July 1, 1971.55 
Venceremos continued their pursuit of revolution after their split with Nairobi 
College. The organization maintained regular protests on Stanford’s campus, in support 
of Franklin, Stanford workers, and other campus dissidents and in opposition to the 
university’s ties to military industrial development. Yet around this time, the small 
internal fissures Venceremos had after subsuming so many different cadre during their 
1970 merger began to expand and crack the organization’s foundation. In mid-summer 
1971, approximately half of Stanford campus’ Venceremos cadre split from the 
organization and reconstituted itself as the Intercommunal Survival Committee (ISC), 
associated with the Black Panther Party. Miriam Cherry, one of the leaders of the ISC, 
laid out the reasoning for the ISC’s departure from Venceremos in an article ran in the 
Stanford Daily, arguing that the latter’s fixation on the Franklin case detracted from the 
community work on which Venceremos needed to focus. In response, Manganiello and 
other Latina/o members of the Central Committee criticized the ISC—a virtually all-
white organization—as “racist sissies” and “oppressors” who left Venceremos because 
they could not follow the leadership of a Third World people-led organization like 
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Venceremos. The organization had also released a position paper earlier that year 
condemning recent shifts in the Panthers’ platform that separated the “political work” of 
the survival programs with the “military work” of forming “guerrilla units” of oppressed 
peoples who would bring about revolution to the country. In Venceremos’ view, 
“political” and “military” work inherently tied together, and the recent shifts in the 
Panthers’ platforms signaled their continual slide toward “reformism” instead of 
revolution.56 
Venceremos also faced an ideological crisis after the People’s Republic of China 
and the United States began to officially normalize diplomatic relations in mid-July 1971.  
The shock of these developments reverberated throughout the MLMZT community 
throughout the Bay Area. Similar to the split of U.S. communists over the issue of the 
Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary in 1957, Venceremos and other organizations 
associated with the New Communist Movement within the Bay Area and across the 
country split over the issue of whether or not to continue supporting China, especially 
after the PRC welcomed President Richard Nixon to visit in 1972. A smaller contingent 
of the New Communist Movement began to reconsider their rejection of Stalinism for 
Maoism, which affected Venceremos’ rank-and-file and leadership. Del Valle recalls the 
Communist League, a Stalinist NCM organization, secretly recruiting some of the 
Venceremos cadre and encouraging them to stir up ideological divisions within 
Venceremos. Moreover, despite Venceremos’ avowedly Maoist orientation, H. Bruce 
Franklin himself revised his conception of Stalin, culminating in his 1972 edited volume 
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The Essential Stalin. While formerly believing Stalin to be an imperialist and tyrannical 
dictator, Franklin now argued that Stalin was instead a misunderstood but brilliant 
military, political, and economic leader whose chief failure was underestimating the 
power of bourgeois forces within the Soviet Union. Franklin bent certain facts to arrive at 
many of his conclusions, such as arguing that the People’s Republic of China carried on 
Stalin’s work while downplaying the differences that Mao and other Chinese Communist 
Party leaders made with the Stalin ideologies from which they drew. These ideological 
uncertainties weighed on internal dynamics in the organization, as Venceremos leaders 
struggled to maintain unity among its ranks.57  
These internal divisions went up to the level of the Central Committee, beyond 
Franklin’s revision of Stalin. Feeling that Manganiello had become too egotistical in his 
role as Chairman, the rest of the Central Committee asked him to step down from his 
position while remaining in an advisory role, with Katarina Davis del Valle installed as 
Chairwoman for the rest of the organization’s history. Manganiello’s leadership at times 
alienated the women on the Central Committee, as his bravado and swagger with which 
he carried himself bordered on an imposing hypermasculinity. In her role as Chairwoman 
of the Central Committee, Davis del Valle focused on creating a more level power 
dynamic among the Central Committee members rather than dominating the decision-
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making process. Yet even with Davis del Valle’s change in leadership, the Central 
Committee fought to maintain a united group for the organization.58 
Venceremos also had numerous conflicts, provoked and unprovoked, with local 
and federal police authorities. These conflicts escalated after the 1972 prison escape of 
and murder of a police officer by Venceremos member Ron Beatty from Chino state 
prison in Southern California, something that the Venceremos Central Committee 
vigorously disavowed.59 Acts of arson and bombings around Stanford campus and 
throughout the Peninsula were often tied to Venceremos or the Black Liberation Front, 
although few arrests occurred. As the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation increased surveillance, so too did Venceremos’ distrust of each 
other grow. The Stanford protests, however, continued to take precedence over 
Venceremos College, which was neglected until it went defunct by the end of 1972.60 In 
early October 1973, Venceremos officially disbanded, with its cadre scattering 
throughout the country and often into other communist organizations or labor union 
activism.61 
Nairobi College operated without the same internal conflicts or state repression 
that plagued Venceremos throughout its short history. Yet being at the whims of federal 
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and private funding left Nairobi in a continually-precarious situation. The beginning of 
the end of Nairobi College began when Robert Hoover left East Palo Alto in 1975 to earn 
his PhD in Education at Claremont Graduate School and spent the subsequent seven 
years doing similar work for predominantly-Black colleges in Chicago and Jacksonville, 
Florida. Although he stepped down as Nairobi College President in 1971, Hoover 
remained the primary fundraiser for the college; yet Hoover’s departure created a void in 
fundraising expertise that no one else could fill. By the end of 1976, Nairobi College’s 
default rate on government NDSL loans had reached 55% (compared to the national 
average of 10.2%); along with regularly submitting late and incomplete applications for 
funding opportunities through the federal Office of Education. In a letter to the college, 
Danny Wilks—the son of Gertrude Wilks who also worked for Congressman Paul 
McCloskey, a supporter of the Nairobi schools—raised concerns from various federal 
program administrators about the staff of Nairobi not having Wirth and especially Hoover 
anymore.62 The college’s stream of funding soon dried up. Nairobi College closed its 
doors in 1979, four years before East Palo Alto incorporated.63 
 
Conclusion 
From their mutual starting point, Nairobi and Venceremos Colleges traversed two 
different trajectories toward gaining self-determination for their communities. Ultimately, 
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although Robert Hoover, Donald Smothers, and other Nairobi leaders framed their split 
with Venceremos as an inability of people of color to sustain alliances, the divisions 
between the Colleges stemmed primarily from ideological differences, their 
implementation, and the various contradictions, limitations, and dilemmas that those 
ideologies and their attendant praxis manifested.  
Nairobi focused on securing East Palo Altans’ and white donors’ support for the 
college, which later translated into support for their movement toward incorporation. Yet 
Nairobi was too narrowly fixated on education and did not seriously orient themselves 
around gaining control of their local political economy, particularly the development of 
their own economic base. Hoover, among others, pegs the relative lack of economic 
organizing as Nairobi’s greatest shortcoming.64 Even Nairobi’s activism outside the 
college and its community programs aimed primarily to give themselves more control 
over their local education system. In short, Nairobi developed an avenue for upward 
social and economic mobility, not a comprehensive strategy for attaining self-
determination. And while this created new opportunities for the residents of East Palo 
Alto, an emphasis on mobility could never bring political and economic liberation for all.  
Although initially rooted in Redwood City, Venceremos spread its efforts to 
communities throughout the Peninsula. But in spreading themselves so far, Venceremos 
neglected their college and eventually their relationship with the majority of Redwood 
City residents. Venceremos also became increasingly insular as they pursued their 
imminent armed revolution within the United States and could not handle the mounting 
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internal instability and external repression they faced. Venceremos ultimately failed to 
keep their local communities connected and central to their global visions of revolution 
and liberation. 
In their local and temporal contexts, however, Nairobi and Venceremos Colleges 
were unprecedented and thus revolutionary in their own ways. The Colleges connected 
their students’ aspirations of higher education with a focus on working toward justice and 
the creation of self-governed communities. Their integration of academic learning with 
community service and organizing demonstrated an ability to connect higher education 
with communities of color in a way that benefitted the latter. They wrestled with the 
seeming contradiction of remaking the state while depending on its financial support, and 
the pragmatic approach of Nairobi College eventually secured greater political power 
through the incorporation of East Palo Alto. Even while falling short of their ultimate 
goals, the Colleges found that through dedicated struggle, they could improve the 
conditions for the oppressed masses around them, both within and outside of educational 
systems. In other words, working toward reforming existing societal structures and 
institutions provided some revolutionary potential in itself.  
The history of Nairobi and Venceremos illustrate that institutions of education—
like the courts, police departments, legislative bodies, and the other institutions that 
comprise the state in the United States—were not neutral entities in the postwar era nor 
since then. Their operation tied into the local, national, and international political 
economies with which they connected. The history of Nairobi and Venceremos also 
illustrates the near-impossibility of completely disengaging with the state, whether in 
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education or otherwise, in the pursuit of self-determination for communities of color. 
Nairobi’s move toward incorporation and eventually electoral takeover of their local 
school boards demonstrated their understanding of this reality, as did Venceremos with 
their handful of campaigns for city council seats and the sheriff’s office. Other 
internationalist radicals understood this reality by the early 1970s as well; rather than try 
to completely separate themselves from the state or bend it to match their visions, 
radicals instead worked to transform their local systems of governance from within via 
electoral politics. This move, however, posed major problems for radicals. For one, many 
other radicals denounced and decried this move, even though many of them would head 
in that direction by early 1980s. More immediately concerning was the fragility of 
alliances among radicals within municipal and county politics, the limited jurisdictional 
scope they had, and the pushback by conservatives, moderates, and many liberals to their 
policies. And similar to the history of Nairobi and Venceremos Colleges, the history of 
local electoral politics discussed in the next chapter demonstrates how ideological 
differences could cause once-solid coalitions to fall apart in a short period of time. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Self-Determination within the System?: The Dilemmas of Internationalist Radicals 
Entering Local Electoral Politics in 1970s Berkeley and Oakland 
 
As the tumult of the 1960s spilled into the 1970s, radical activists in the San 
Francisco Bay Area experienced a growing divergence among their ranks. Although not 
always discrete, three general trajectories emerged from this divergence. Least common 
was the taking up of arms toward fomenting revolution in the United States. Despite 
organizations like the Black Panther Party and Red Guard Party publicly brandishing 
firearms and advocating armed self-defense as part of their political platforms, most 
radical organizations did not see directly confronting the state through open warfare as a 
viable avenue toward dismantling the systems of oppression that structured the United 
States. The second trajectory emphasized labor organizing, with radicals dispersing 
among unions throughout the area. Many radicals believed that working within the 
system, including engagement in electoral politics, would be futile in dismantling the 
racism, economic exploitation, sexism, and other oppressions that structured U.S. society. 
Taking up arms and labor union organizing provided avenues to pursue revolution 
without trying to work within the state. 
The third trajectory, however, involved Bay Area radicals who turned their efforts 
primarily toward electoral politics at the local level. Radical activists viewed this strategy 
as a viable avenue of struggle in their pursuit of self-determination, with the goal of 
gaining control over their communities’ institutions, governance, and political economy. 
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While Nairobi College and Venceremos College and its accompanying organization 
pursued self-determination through creating institutions separate from existing state ones 
(Chapter Five), radicals who engaged with electoral politics viewed separation from the 
state as virtually impossible, thus leading them to try and transform the state toward the 
just and equitable governance of their communities. 
This chapter examines this foray into local electoral politics by Bay Area 
internationalist radicals in the 1970s, focusing on the April Coalition (later Berkeley 
Citizens Action) in Berkeley and the Black Panther Party and the Brown Berets in 
Oakland. By the 1980s, internationalist radicals had largely embraced electoral politics, 
most notably exemplified by their efforts in Jesse Jackson’s national Rainbow Coalition 
presidential campaign.1 During the 1970s, however, internationalist radicals met 
resistance among others on the radical Left for these efforts. Radicals had previously 
created symbolic gestures through electoral politics, such as nominating Eldridge Cleaver 
as the Peace and Freedom Party presidential candidate despite his not being the eligible 
age (Chapter Four). In the 1970s, internationalist radicals entered into electoral politics 
more seriously instead of symbolically, whether a radical activist was a candidate 
her/himself or working in the campaign for an allied Leftist politician. 
Although not counted among the April Coalition candidates like in Oakland 
municipal elections later in the decade, the Panthers played an integral ideological role in 
their shift toward electoral politics, specifically with BPP co-founder Huey P. Newton’s 
                                                 
     1 For more on Jackson’s appropriation of the “Rainbow Coalition” name from Chicago radicals without 
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concept of intercommunalism.2 By the 1970s, Newton argued, the world no longer was 
comprised of nation-states but rather an amalgamation of disparate communities under 
the economic, political, and military control of the U.S. empire and other global capitalist 
elites. Since nation-states could not experience full revolution under U.S. empire, 
oppressed peoples would need to struggle toward self-determination first within their 
communities, before consolidating power as a united front among communities around 
the world and causing this empire to collapse. Electoral politics served as one avenue 
through which radicals could gain control of their local communities.3  
First elected to the Berkeley City Council in 1967, then as Representative for the 
7th Congressional District in 1970, Ron Dellums also became a touchstone figure among 
Bay Area radicals working in electoral politics. Although he did not have formal 
membership or even affiliation with a local radical cadre, Dellums lent his support to 
radicals in struggle, such as Huey Newton during his 1967-1971 trial proceedings, and 
ran on platforms that echoed those of the Panthers, the Peace and Freedom Party, and 
other local radicals; Dellums stressed the need to end racism and economic exploitation 
in all their institutional forms and voiced internationalist solidarity for the Vietnamese 
and other Southeast Asian peoples in “the right of other people to determine their own 
lives.”4 Dellums’ platform was largely left of the Democratic Party establishment of the 
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time, and his anti-imperialist orientation helped him unseat incumbent Jeffery Cohelan in 
June 1970, who shared party membership but consistently voted to escalate the Vietnam 
War.5 This internationalist orientation continued to resonated through the 1970s, even 
after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, with efforts like the anti-apartheid movement 
in support of the South African national liberation movement. Dellums would support the 
April Coalition and Berkeley Citizens Action throughout the 1970s, along with the Black 
Panther Party and later Councilman Joe Coto, whose success stemmed largely from the 
efforts of Brown Berets 
The April Coalition would find most of its success early in the 1970s, while the 
efforts of the Black Panther Party and Brown Berets would largely come to fruition later 
in the decade. Radical activists met stiff resistance within Berkeley and Oakland, from 
conservative politicians but also at times from liberal ones as well. Within the coalitions 
internationalist radicals forged, dissention would arise, leading to the splintering of some 
coalitions. Moreover, in the case of the Black Panther Party and the Brown Berets, 
radicals would go their separate ways before converging again toward the end of the 
decade. The history of internationalist radicals within electoral politics was thus one of 
tenuous alliances that radical activists worked to maintain while they negotiated the 
limitations of the existing government systems and the counter mobilizations of both 
conservative and moderate liberal constituencies. 
 
 
                                                 
     5 “Jeffery Cohelan is NOT a peace candidate” flyer, Ron Dellums folder, Reel 72, Social Protest 
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The April Coalition Mobilizes 
Berkeley electoral politics before the 1970s proved contentious, with strong 
liberal and conservative wings of the city government struggling for control of the city 
council and mayor’s office as the main avenue of reform (or rejection of reform) for the 
city. By the 1960s, liberal activists had gained a stable majority of the city council, 
buoyed by popular politicians such Byron Rumford. Yet, with the escalation of the 
Vietnam War and the continued plight of Berkeley’s racial minorities and working class, 
these communities and the radical activists among them looked to make the Berkeley city 
council and local government as a whole work more in line with the oppressed masses of 
Berkeley residents. 
The multiracial April Coalition—named for the month in which Berkeley’s 
municipal elections were held—was born from the merging of various anti-imperialist, 
anti-racist, and other activist constituencies. The April Coalition predominantly attracted 
Black and white radicals, particularly students from UC Berkeley, along with members of 
the local counterculture and a handful of Asian Americans and Latinas/os. The April 
Coalition included much of the Berkeley Coalition, which had been integral in Dellums’ 
campaigns. The now-Congressman officially lent his endorsement to the April Coalition 
for the city council on which he once served. Moreover, the April Coalition gained a 
significant boost on the campaign trail when sitting councilmember Warren Widener 
agreed to break from Berkeley’s liberal establishment and run for mayor (which was part 
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of the city council) on the slate, demonstrating the ability of the April Coalition to move 
some establishment politicians leftward in their policy agendas.6 
The April Coalition’s platform represented their broad base, incorporating people 
from a large swath of the city’s communities. Included among their mid-January 1971 
platform-drafting workshops were white Berkeleyans, Black Berkeleyans, other racial 
minorities, including recent immigrants, feminists and women liberationists, gays and 
lesbians, elderly citizens, children and youth, disabled peoples, labor unions, university 
students, environmentalists, and religious leaders. Although disparate, these groups found 
much overlap in a variety of issues, such as anti-poverty programs, rent control, land-use 
regulations, more equitable taxation, improvements in education, and internationalist 
solidarity through ending U.S. militarism overseas.7 The bulk of the April Coalition’s 
targeted voting base lived in South and West Berkeley—where racial minorities 
experienced less housing discrimination—and the University of California, Berkeley 
campus. These two constituencies held the keys to success for the April Coalition. For the 
former, the Coalition proposed a more extensive and impactful set of policies to alleviate 
poverty and fight against racial discrimination and segregation; for the latter, the April 
Coalition’s anti-war and anti-imperialist messages resonated with the mood of the 
campus. The passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1970 only encouraged the April 
Coalition’s outreach to UC Berkeley students, as the new amendment lowered the voting 
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age from twenty-one to eighteen and created a previously-untapped part of the 
electorate.8 
The most pressing and controversial plank of their platform, however, centered on 
Police Charter Amendment No. 1 (more commonly known as “community control of 
police”), which provided a plan to restructure the Berkeley Police Department.9 The April 
Coalition identified this as “the primary issue of the April Coalition…because it 
exemplifies the concept of neighborhood government” whereby Berkeley residents would 
have more decentralized and thus more self-determined governance within their 
communities.10 Endorsers of community control included liberal organizations like the 
Berkeley Black Caucus, but support stemmed mostly from local radicals from whom the 
Coalition adopted this issue, including the Black Panther Party (particularly co-founder 
Bobby Seale), the National Committee to Combat Fascism, and the Red Family, who 
drew up a fifty-page pamphlet outlining the case for community control. This pamphlet 
detailed the numerous problems and controversies within the Berkeley Police Department 
throughout the 1960s, such as mounting operating costs, which had ballooned from a 
budget of approximately $1.6 million at the end of 1965 to over $3.6 million in 1971, 
with no evidence of more effective or efficient policing. In addition, community control 
proponents argued that since the police were beholden to the city council yet the city 
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council was largely comprised of economic elites or those tied closely to them, the police 
were held accountable by only a small portion of Berkeley’s residents.11 
More damning than this, however, were the myriad ways that policing had grown 
more militarized and punitive, particularly toward racial minorities, women, gays and 
lesbians, and Berkeley’s youth. The department purchased or received as donations an 
increasing number of weapons from the military, such as grenade launchers, chemical 
mace, and even a helicopter. As was the case throughout the United States, Black and 
other racial minority residents regularly experienced police harassment and brutality, 
particularly those in the working class, and the recent police killings of unarmed thirty-
four-year-old Charles H. Hansen in 1967 and sixteen-year-old Oswald Sanders in 1969 
had particularly disheartened Black Berkeleyans, as none of the officers involved were 
held accountable for these killings. Lack of accountability was also on display with 
Berkeley PD’s handling of rape cases, as the department investigated only around thirty 
percent of all reported cases, placed exceedingly high burdens of proof on the women 
bringing the charges, and proved generally apathetic in their response to this crime. 
Berkeley police officers routinely targeted gay and lesbian residents, with one group of 
officers patrolling Berkeley’s Aquatic Park—a known public place where gay men would 
meet—in order to harass and arrest gay men under the guise of their being prostitutes. In 
one April 1969 incident, plainclothes Berkeley police officers shot and killed unarmed 
Frank Bartley, who attempted to flee the scene after being set up, without any punishment 
from the department. And in addition to their repressive practices against protesters on 
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UC Berkeley’s campus, the police bloated the number of juvenile detainees they 
apprehended throughout the 1960s.12 
These and the other numerous abuses and wasteful expenditures by Berkeley 
police prompted community organizers to pursue the community control of police 
amendment. Rather than having one centralized police department patrolling the whole 
city, the community control amendment would create three police departments for 
different parts of the city: West and South Berkeley would have one police department, 
North Berkeley and the Berkeley Hills would have another department, and the 
University of California campus and surrounding area would have the third. These police 
departments would be under the control of and accountable to a Neighborhood Police 
Council of fifteen elected members, who themselves could be subject to recall by 
residents in their own jurisdictions. Moreover, all Berkeley police officers would need to 
be residents of the city, in contrast to the early 1970s situation where less than thirteen 
percent of Berkeley’s over two-hundred-seventy-person police force lived there. These 
changes, proponents argued, would de-escalate growing tensions and foster more 
familiarity and trust between Berkeley’s communities and its police departments.13 
Yet the community control charter amendment was met with stiff contestation. 
The shrinking conservative political bloc remained invested in the status quo, largely 
seeing no major issues with the Berkeley Police Department. More influentially, a Black 
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and white moderate liberal coalition named “One Berkeley” opposed the amendment on a 
few different grounds, such as the amendment creating a difficult bureaucratic transition 
for the city and increasing the police budget. More politically expedient was the argument 
that community control of police would reify segregation in Berkeley. This argument, 
however, ignored the reality of continual residential and employment discrimination and 
that racial minorities received harsher treatment under the law than white Berkeleyans. 
Moreover, One Berkeley took up the predominant civil rights discourse championing 
“integration” that stemmed from the Jim Crow South’s movements but did not have the 
same applicability in the urban West that the politics of self-determination had. At the 
same time, One Berkeley’s framing of racial inequalities in Berkeley focused on the 
individual, rather than the institutional, mirroring the rhetoric of moderate and 
conservative activists who opposed the Rumford Fair Housing Act and other similar 
government interventions, under the guise of individual rights. In essence, One Berkeley 
advocated a colorblind approach to working toward racial justice that instead downplayed 
how deep-seated racial inequalities were in the city and thus did not address the root 
causes of those issues.14 
By the April 6, 1971 municipal election, the community control of the police 
charter amendment had failed to generate enough support to pass. For the rest of their 
electoral hopes, the April Coalition proved exceedingly successful. Of their four 
candidates for city council—Black Caucus lawyers D’Army Bailey and Ira Simmons, 
white Berkeley Coalition member Ilona “Loni” Hancock, and white UC Berkeley 
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graduate student Rick Brown—Bailey, Simmons, and Hancock gained seats on the 
council, and Warren Widener gained the mayor’s office. As they had planned for, a 
growing number of racial minorities and an overwhelming majority of university students 
turned out to vote for the Coalition.15 But the gains the April Coalition made would prove 
short-lived, as turmoil would overtake the city council and the coalition soon after they 
entered office. 
 
A Turbulent First Cycle and Counter-Mobilization 
Much of the turbulence for the April Coalition members on the city council 
stemmed from a seemingly unlikely source. Although part of the same slate, D’Army 
Bailey held animosities against Loni Hancock. Part of this stemmed from Bailey’s 
uncompromising advocacy of affirmative action policies for racial minorities over 
women in hiring for Berkeley city government jobs, without answering the question of 
how these policies would be equitable toward women of color, then white women. But 
Bailey also had personal antipathies toward white people in general and eventually cut 
off all support for Hancock and any resolutions she introduced to the council. Ira 
Simmons, who had been friends with Bailey years prior to election, was torn between 
Bailey and Hancock but largely sided with Bailey on issues, leaving Hancock isolated 
among the city council members.16 
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The hostilities Bailey directed toward Hancock, however, paled in comparison to 
the hostility the council directed toward the April Coalition. While the Coalition 
candidates did not hold a majority in the council, they held a plurality on the nine-person 
council with Widener and could thus block any conservative or liberal resolutions. 
Moderate liberal councilmembers such as Wilmont Sweeney and Susan Hone quickly 
grew frustrated at the Coalition’s general unwillingness to compromise, particularly with 
Bailey, who at times also insulted and berated other councilmembers. Indeed, by the next 
election cycle in 1973, Bailey’s brashness and generally combative demeanor had 
alienated Berkeleyans across the political spectrum, from conservatives who virulently 
fought against him to members of the Black Panther Party. With this growing antipathy 
against Bailey came the emergence of another coalition, one comprised of unlikely allies 
in moderate liberals and conservatives, despite their public claim of being a progressive 
force.17 
Rallying around a slate they dubbed “the Berkeley Four,” this political group set 
out to undo the power of the April Coalition through two major strategies. First, the 
Berkeley Four set out to draw in moderates from both conservative and liberal 
constituencies, both in terms of the electorate but also establishment politicians. The 
Berkeley Four—whose composition with incumbents Sweeney, Hone, and new 
candidates Henry Ramsey, Jr. (a Black lawyer) and Joe Garrett (a white UC Berkeley 
graduate student) mirrored that of the original April Coalition slate—received 
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endorsements from local Republican politicians Tom McLaren and Wallace Johnson and 
scored a major coup when Warren Widener broke from the April Coalition to endorse the 
Four.18 
Both competing coalitions shared much overlap in terms of the issues they 
broached and critiques of the current state of Berkeley governance, including anti-poverty 
measures, police brutality, and reforms for racial equality. Five out of the seven 
initiatives on the April 1973 ballot passed, with the initiatives being either advocated for 
by the April Coalition or compromised versions of April Coalition positions, such as an 
independent Police Review Commission in lieu of community control of the police. In 
terms of actions to take to rectify these inequalities, however, the Berkeley Four retreated 
to the now-standard individualistic perspective and largely colorblind racial ideologies 
that permeated most of the Berkeley liberal establishment by the mid-1970s. For 
example, Hone and Sweeney declined the enforce the rent control initiative Berkeley 
voters passed in 1972, highlighting their emphasis on promoting class- and race-neutral 
policies that failed to alleviate the increasingly dire circumstances that Berkeley’s lower-
income constituencies—which were largely people of color and students—faced as real 
estate property values rose in the 1970s. The April 1973 election was a resounding 
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victory for the Berkeley Four, who added three out of their four candidates to the city 
council. Of the April Coalition slate that year—Chinese American schoolteacher and 
activists Ying Lee Kelley, sociology professor and Berkeley Black Caucus member 
Margot Dashiell, white graduate student Peter Birdsall, and white economics professor 
Lenny Goldberg—only Lee Kelly gained a seat on the council, leaving the April 
Coalition in a decided minority on the council in light of Widener’s defection and one 
split between Bailey and Simmons on the one hand and Hancock and Lee on the other.19 
Yet even this minority stake on the council would be weakened in the aftermath 
of the April 1973 election, as the moderate liberal-conservative coalition’s second 
strategy began to gain steam. This strategy more directly targeted at the April Coalition’s 
power by launching a recall bid against D’Army Bailey. The official recall petition to the 
state of California, filed in mid-February earlier that year, charged Bailey with 
“obstructionism, filibuster, racism, and vilification” in bringing the city council to a halt 
on passing their city budget while also, they argued, working against the interests of 
Black Berkeleyans.20 In flyers and pamphlets they distributed, the coalition around the 
Berkeley Four framed their recall campaign through Bailey’s obstructionism and often 
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highlighted the existence of an unknown sources of income for him, occasionally 
implying that communists were funding Bailey’s political aspirations.21 
In response, Bailey denied these charges while also emphasizing his continual 
push for affirmative action policies and enlarging city aid for childcare and other services 
for low-income families. The April Coalition and their allies fought vigorously against 
the recall, highlighting the high percentage of conservative white corporate interests 
backing the campaign and arguing that the recall was not about Bailey per se but about 
targeting the April Coalition and radical and progressive politics as a whole. National 
activist leaders such as Julian Bond and Jesse Jackson voiced their solidarity for Bailey. 
Local radicals echoed this sentiment, including the New American Movement and 
Communist Party USA member and recent political prisoner Angela Y. Davis, who 
characterized the recall as “fundamentally racist and anti-democratic” and sheer 
hypocrisy when compared to the lack of a recall for earlier Berkeley City Council 
members who supported the Vietnam War and its escalation or blatantly racially-
exclusionary policies like Proposition M in the 1960s.22 Despite their struggles, however, 
Bailey lost the recall election and was replaced by William Rumford, who shared the last 
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name of his Berkeley political luminary father Byron but leaned right of the elder 
Rumford’s liberal tendencies.23 
Although the original April Coalition dissolved soon after 1973, its core 
constituencies reorganized themselves into other organizations, most notably Berkeley 
Citizens Action, with an eye toward electoral politics throughout the rest of the 1970s. 
Winning Ying Lee Kelley’s seat at the very least ended Loni Hancock’s isolation on the 
city council, and as a sitting councilmember, Lee Kelley proved a viable candidate for the 
1975 mayoral election, although still losing that race by a mere six hundred votes. 
Berkeley Citizens Action counted a handful of successes in electoral politics throughout 
the rest of the 1970s, such as re-electing Hancock in 1975 and electing Gus Newport for 
Mayor in 1979, yet also suffered significant setbacks, such as the loss of Lee Kelley’s 
seat in 1977. Even one of Berkeley Citizens Action’s major victories around rent control, 
passed in 1978 and stemming from the original April Coalition slate, was largely gutted 
by subsequent California state legislation and lack of enforcement. Moreover, changes in 
the structure of elections made by the city council moderate majority of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s fundamentally weakened Berkeley Citizens Action, with election dates 
moved to June—thus hampering student turnout, which was still one of Berkeley Citizens 
Action’s largest constituencies—and city council elections separated by districts instead 
of having city-wide elections. The district system rendered broad city-wide slates 
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irrelevant, and while Berkeley Citizens Action remains alive in the city today, it has long 
been a shadow of its former self.24 
 
The 1973 Elections and the Divergent Mobilizations of Anti-Establishment 
Candidates 
Concurrent with the rise and descent of the April Coalition was the rise of racial 
minorities vying for office within Oakland’s city government. While the April Coalition 
experienced an unlikely counter-mobilization from temporarily-allied liberals and 
conservatives, Oakland’s political Left faced an entrenched conservative force in the 
downtown business establishment (Chapter Two). Whereas the April Coalition found 
most of its success early in the decade, radicals engaging with electoral politics in 
Oakland found its success toward the end of the 1970s. Like with the April Coalition and 
Berkeley Citizens Action, the influence of Ron Dellums and the Black Panther Party 
shaped the trajectory of this history; yet unlike the April Coalition, individuals from 
organizations explicitly intent on bring revolution served as some of the candidates for 
these municipal offices, most notably with Black Panther Party leaders Bobby Seale and 
Elaine Brown. Oakland Panthers had previously run for office in more symbolic gestures, 
most notably on the Peace and Freedom Party’s 1968 slate headline by presidential 
candidate Eldridge Cleaver and featuring Huey P. Newton as the candidate for 
California’s 7th Congressional District (Chapter Four). 
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These efforts in the 1970s, however, marked a shift in the general approach the 
BPP took toward their struggle for self-determination. Whereas the Panthers’ aesthetics 
and rhetoric through the late 1960s focused heavily on the use of armed self-defense (and 
sometimes preemptive violence), during the early 1970s, the Party began de-escalating 
their violent imagery. Part of this rationale stemmed from the continual harassment the 
Panthers faced from the Oakland Police Department at their headquarters, on the streets, 
and while driving throughout the city. A public image that focused less on or absent of 
armed self-defense and violence would draw less attention from the state, and the 
Panthers would have fewer legal battles and expenses as a result The defection (or in the 
view of some Panthers, expulsion) of Eldridge Cleaver from the Black Panther Party 
while in exile in Algeria in early 1971 symbolized this shift, as Cleaver had steered the 
Panthers rhetorically toward armed conflict with the state, most notably with the April 
1968 shootout with Oakland PD. As Cleaver left or was removed from the party, so too 
did many members who agreed with Cleaver’s emphasis on armed struggle.25 
More important than lessening tensions between the BPP and the police was the 
Panthers’ new focus on their community-oriented “survival programs.” The organization 
initiated the survival programs in January 1969 with the free breakfast for children 
program and would soon expand them to include a free shoe program, a community food 
bank, alternative elementary school, and medical clinics, particularly for the testing and 
treatment for sickle-cell anemia, a condition that disproportionately affected African 
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Americans. As Newton argued, the survival programs were not a revolution in and of 
themselves but served “the practical needs of the people” in their current intercommunal 
phase while the Panthers and other revolutionaries around the world worked toward the 
end of U.S. imperialism and all its attendant oppressions.26 Yet although Newton 
provided much of the rhetorical direction for the survival programs, it was the work of 
Bobby Seale, Elaine Brown, and other Panthers who provided most of the organizing 
acumen and leadership for the implementation and expansion of the survival programs, 
particularly with Newton in prison from October 1967 to August 1970. While seemingly 
“reformist” in nature, Seale differentiated the Panthers’ programs as “revolutionary 
community programs” because they were “set forth by revolutionaries, by those who 
want to change the existing system to a better system” and constituted more than just “an 
appeasing handout” set up by the state to placate the oppressed masses.27 Revolution 
would come not from imminent armed resistance but rather through the process of 
community-based organizing and mobilization through the survival programs and other 
avenues toward gaining control of their local community institutions.28 
These newfound efforts toward community-oriented programs fit hand-in-hand 
with an entrance into electoral politics. While local businesses and the Panthers’ 
fundraising efforts supported the survival programs, the Panthers eventually turned to 
local, state, and federal opportunities for financial assistance. In keeping with their 
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emphasis on self-determination politics, the Panthers, particularly Seale, viewed using the 
state toward achieving their ends as part of the revolutionary process. Late in his 1973 
mayoral campaign, Seale articulated this shift in philosophy from the Panthers’ early 
years, arguing that he could transform the system from within and “boot out the corrupt 
politicians who were responsible for that oppression” of the local Black community, if 
elected.29 At the same time, the Panthers’ earlier reputation for violence proved difficult 
for Seale and Elaine Brown to shake during their 1970s electoral campaigns, even with 
their de-escalation in rhetoric and conflicts with the police and although Seale envisio ned 
the Panthers eventually phasing out as an organization but whose work would be usurped 
and expanded by the Black community. After failed campaigns in 1973 and 1975, the 
Black Panther Party saw a breakthrough in this strategy when judge Lionel Wilson—the 
candidate they endorsed, even though he was not a Party member—won the 1977 
mayoral race for Oakland.  
Yet Wilson’s victory came at the expense of Joe Coto, a member of the GI Forum 
and a sitting City Councilmember whose campaigns also owed a debt to radical activists, 
in this case former Brown Berets. In contrast to the April Coalition and reflecting 
Oakland’s demographics, Latinas/os played a more prominent role in these political 
mobilizations, especially Mexican Americans and including radicals like the Berets. By 
the 1973 municipal election, the Berets nationally officially had disbanded, and the 
Oakland chapter split into two factions. A small but stringent group of Berets formed 
themselves into El Partido Revolutionario Chicano (Chicano Revolutionary Party, later 
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Raza Revolutionary Party), a militant organization focused on armed revolution whose 
central thrust was highlighted with their adopted logo: “Dare to Struggle, Dare to Win, 
Shoot to Kill.”30 More commonly, Berets still active in local organizing worked within 
the Northern California chapter of El Partido de La Raza Unida (The United Race Party; 
more commonly referred to as La Raza Unida Party or RUP). Founded in southern Texas 
in early 1970, RUP formed out of a resolution penned by José Angel Gutierrez that he 
proposed at the late December 1969 national conference for the Mexican American 
Youth Organization. Arguing that “Democrats and the Republicans are all alike…neither 
party has ever delivered for the Chicano,” Gutierrez urged and successfully persuaded a 
majority of the delegates at the conference to adopt this resolution for a new political 
party and spent much of the next few years organizing and recruiting across Texas, then 
across the rest of the U.S. Southwest. La Raza Unida’s influence spread so rapidly that 
within a few years, longtime Mexican American activist Bert Corona declared in a 
widely-circulated pamphlet that “Only through the establishment of our own strong 
national La Raza Unida Party can we Chicanos put an end to tokenism and dependency” 
with the Democratic and Republican Parties and toward self-determination for Chicana/o 
communities throughout the country.31 
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Within Oakland’s electoral politics, former Berets now in La Raza Unida Party 
would prove instrumental to Coto’s successful 1973 bid for Oakland’s District 6 city 
council seat. Although he was not himself a radical activist or politician, Coto had shown 
solidarity with a number of Beret struggles and with other Chicana/o organizations at 
large. As historians Juan C. Herrera and Robert Self note, Mexican American intra-ethnic 
umbrella associations like the Mexican American Unity Council and broader Latina/o 
ones like the Spanish Speaking Unity Council had begun consolidating disparate political 
actors like the Mexican American Political Association and the Community Service 
Organization into a more unified and cogent political force in the 1960s. While much of 
this coalescence crystalized around directing War on Poverty programs toward Mexican 
American neighborhoods and organizations, the growing legibility of the Mexican 
American community as a political force in Oakland lent itself to campaigning as well.32 
The 1973 municipal election cycle did not constitute the first leftist foray into 
electoral politics in the endeavor to break up the downtown business hegemony. It did, 
however, present the most formidable challenge to this hegemonic governance heretofore 
in the city’s history. Although Black Panther Party candidates did not comprise the 
entirety of anti-establishment candidates for the 1973 elections, Chairman Bobby Seale 
and Minister of Information Elaine Brown’s announcement of their candidacy for mayor 
and 6th District city council seat, respectively, at the May 13, 1972 Black Community 
Survival Conference in Oakland garnered the most media attention of the candidates 
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challenging downtown. Dedicated to their incarcerated Chief of Staff, David Hilliard, the 
Panthers organized this conference to exhibit gains made through and future plans for 
their survival programs and included the distribution of bags of groceries, shoes, and 
Sickle Cell Anemia tests for the approximately 4,000 Black attendees. In line with the 
survival programs’ mantra to “serve the people,” Seale and Brown articulated the 
platform of the “Community Survival Ticket” that would focus on grassroots 
mobilization— by June 1972, the Black Panther Party and its volunteers had already 
registered over 11,000 voters, primarily during BPP-sponsored events in Alameda 
County but also in Contra Costa County to the north and San Francisco County to the 
west—to help improve the “slum conditions” that poor and working-class people lived in 
and alleviate the many problems these communities faced, including skyrocketing 
unemployment, poor and limited housing, underdeveloped public transportation 
infrastructure, uneven quality of education, and living “under the threat of a misguided 
and brutal police force.”33 Similarly to the April Coalition, the BPP also advocated 
community control of the police and instituting rent control throughout Oakland. The 
Party envisioned winning the Oakland’s mayor office and seats on the city council as an 
avenue toward what Seale described as “increasing the [survival programs] on a massive, 
quantitative scale,” especially in between election cycles.34 Moreover, by the time of his 
run-off election the next year against incumbent Mayor John Reading, Seale himself 
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envisioned the Black Panther Party eventually phasing itself out as more and more of the 
Black community in Oakland mobilized and organized toward their collective self-
determination. By the end of summer 1972, Seale and Brown had positioned themselves 
as grassroots champions poised to take on Oakland’s downtown business establishment.35 
An integral part to the Panthers’ campaigns for the 1973 elections was their 
outreach to Oakland’s Latina/o communities, which had risen to 7.6 percent of the city’s 
total population by 1970. The Panthers had voiced solidarity with the struggles Latina/o 
activists engaged with locally since the BPP’s inception, especially with issues related to 
the state like police brutality and the criminal justice system (Chapter Four). Integral for 
the Panthers toward this endeavor was their alliance with Cesar Chavez and the United 
Farm Workers (UFW). Initiated in 1968 with the Panthers publishing an article in their 
The Black Panther newspaper supporting the UFW’s international grape boycott, the BPP 
and UFW had collaborated coordinated a number of solidarity actions in the Bay Area 
and throughout the U.S., including picketing at Safeway stores for the grape boycott and 
canvassing across the area in the campaign to defeat the anti-labor California ballot 
initiative Proposition 22. With the help of UFW workers in the Bay Area, the Panthers’ 
1973 campaigns became a bilingual endeavor, as the BPP printed flyers in Spanish and 
English and advocated for Oakland to provide election literature and ballots in Spanish 
while also offering Spanish language classes through its Oakland Community School. 
Chavez announced the UFW’s official endorsement of the Panthers on March 29, 1973, 
particularly for Seale’s mayoral campaign, stating that the UFW supported his “approach 
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to gaining political power for his people and all poor people in the city of Oakland” for 
the upcoming April 17th election. Gaining the endorsement of the most nationally-
renowned Latina/o activist bolstered the Panthers’ visibility within and efforts to reach 
out to Oakland’s Latina/o communities for their electoral campaigns.36  
Conspicuously absent from Seale and Brown’s campaign organizers, however, 
were large numbers of the Panthers’ most visible longtime Oakland allies, the Brown 
Berets. Before they founded the Black Panther Party, Huey Newton and Bobby Seale had 
met Jorge Gonzales and other future Berets while attending Merritt College. The Berets 
also marched with the Panthers at rallies for Huey P. Newton and other BPP members on 
trial (Chapter Four). Yet the Berets, who by early 1973 had disbanded, did not lend large 
numbers of support toward Seale and Brown. Rather, former Berets who had shifted their 
efforts toward La Raza Unida Party predominantly worked on the campaign for Joe Coto, 
a member of the Mexican American G.I. Forum and public school administrator running 
for the same District #6 city council seat for which Elaine Brown was also vying. 
According to former Beret Alex Gonzalez, Coto’s work to reach out to Mexican 
American Oaklanders and a sense of ethnic solidarity led to Oakland La Raza Unida 
Party supporting Coto, despite their previous history with the Panthers. Moreover, despite 
the similarities between the Community Survival Ticket’s platform and Coto’s—
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particularly their emphasis on Oakland’s skyrocketing unemployment rate—Coto joined 
a slate of Democratic Party candidates headlined by councilman John Sutter for the 
Mayor’s office and endorsed by the East Bay Teamsters Political Club, whose union was 
fighting against the UFW for which of the two could organize farmworkers. Coto’s 
personal politics aligned more with the Democratic Party ticket, and the Coto campaign 
wagered that a more moderate liberal slate stood more of a chance to gain election than a 
slate featuring the Panthers. Although Brown would change her candidacy to the District 
#2, then #3 seat, former Brown Berets’ support of Coto and his slate demonstrated the 
divergence that had occurred between them and the Black Panther Party by the April 
1973 election cycle.37  
The April 17th Nominating Municipal Election chipped away the first cracks in 
the foundation of the downtown business establishment’s hold on Oakland’s city 
governance. As incumbent and a heavy favorite, John Reading received 55,434 votes out 
of 110,983 cast, dwarfing the vote counts of his opponents. Seale received less than forty 
percent of Reading’s total, coming in at 21,329 votes, with Otho Green—another Black 
candidate who ran with the Democratic Party and garnered more moderate liberal votes 
than Seale did—and Coto slate ally John Sutter the only other candidates receiving a 
significant number of votes at 17,469 and 15,354 respectively. Because he failed to win 
the requisite majority to gain election, however, Reading would square off with Seale, as 
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runner-up, on May 15th in a run-off during the General Municipal Election. Despite this 
temporary step toward entering Oakland’s halls of power and receiving twice as many 
votes during the General Municipal Election (43,710), Seale lost in a decidedly one-sided 
election, garnering approximately 36% of the votes, giving Reading a third term as 
Mayor of Oakland. Seale’s loss, coupled with Brown’s loss in the District #2 city council 
seat to downtown-backed Joshua Rose in the April election, meant that no radical activist 
would gain office in Oakland in 1973, with many speculating that many voters could not 
bring themselves to vote for a Black Panther because of the BPP’s earlier history.38 
Yet the success of other anti-establishment candidates would signal a turning of 
the tide within Oakland’s city governance. Joe Coto’s strategies in defeating 
establishment-backed Paul Brom during the General Municipal Election demonstrated his 
and his campaigns’ commitment to multiracial organizing toward breaking up the 
hegemony of Oakland’s downtown business establishment. As Coto explained to a 
private foundation researcher after the election, he and Carter Gilmore, a Black East 
Oaklander who was President of the Alameda Branch of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), both ran for the District #6 city council seat 
to prevent Brom from gaining a majority of the votes. Then, according to their pre-
election plans, whichever of the two was not part of the May run-off election would 
channel his support to the other in a unified effort toward gaining the council seat. 
Indeed, although Coto only gained approximately thirty-three percent of votes compared 
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to Brom’s forty-five percent during the Nominating Municipal Election, he usurped 
virtually all of Gilmore’s electorate on May 15th, garnering 62,740 votes (54.63%) to 
Brom’s 52,095 (45.36%). Coto attributed his victory not only to his and Gilmore’s 
planning but also to the Black community support that Gilmore brought, along with allied 
middle- and working-class Filipinas/os, Japanese Americans, white Oaklanders, 
organized labor locals associated with the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), and Chicana/o activists, who helped him gain 
approximately 10,000 Mexican American votes. While the 1973 elections marked a 
divergence between former Brown Berets and the Panthers, former Berets still found 
themselves within multiracial organizing circles while engaged with electoral politics.39 
 
The 1975 Elections and a Growing Leftward Electorate 
Even with Seale and Brown’s inability to gain elected office in 1973, the Black 
Panther Party found success in organizing a political base for their future campaigns. The 
BPP would experience external and internal turmoil over the subsequent year. A joint-
OPD/San Francisco Police Department raid on the Panthers’ Oakland campaign offices in 
mid-April 1974 hearkened back to the BPP’s early history and their multiple run-ins with 
the police and disrupted their political organizing temporarily. Soon after this, Huey 
Newton expelled Seale from the Party, causing discord among its leadership and rank-
and-file, particularly since most viewed Seale’s expulsion as unjustified and largely as 
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the result of, in the words of Brown, “a cocaine-boosted rage” by Newton, who himself 
fled to Cuba shortly thereafter. 40 
Despite these internal fractures, Brown managed to hold the BPP together as the 
new Chairperson of the Party. Brown expanded the efforts of the Panther-led New 
Oakland Democratic Committee, which she and Seale had formed during the 1973 
campaigns, to bolster political involvement among Oakland’s Black communities. Brown 
also made inroads with mainstream Black leaders in other sectors of Oakland, including 
some Democratic Party organizations and the Urban League, and even pledged some 
Panthers’ support. Brown drew upon this new support during her 1975 District #3 City 
Council campaign. Among those organizing alongside Brown and the Panthers were 
leaders within Ron Dellums’ congressional campaigns, Black businesspeople rooted in 
West Oakland, and Ortho Green, the second runner-up in the 1973 mayoral election. 
Although Brown again met defeat against a downtown business establishment-backed 
candidate, Raymond Eng, she drew over forty-one percent of the votes cast, improving 
upon her 1973 showing by almost nine percent. Brown’s improvement, coupled with 
Coto ally John Sutter’s election in the at-large councilmember race, demonstrated that 
both liberal and radical opposition was mounting against Oakland’s downtown business 
establishment for control of the city’s governance.41 
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The mid-1970s also saw the converging of certain policy issues for liberal and 
radical contingents in the city, most notably with economic issues. One of Seale’s central 
planks in his 1973 mayoral campaign platform was greater community control by and 
higher employment of racial minorities for the Port of Oakland, noting how the Port by 
the 1970s had become arguably the most important pillar of Oakland’s economy while 
Black Oaklanders and other racial minorities were drastically underrepresented 
throughout the Port. At an early May 1975 city council meeting, Joe Coto formally 
proposed to the city council that they make the Port’s hiring practices the utmost priority, 
with a heavy focus on increased anti-discrimination hiring measures and greater racial 
diversity for the Port, particularly racial minorities who were also Oakland residents. 
Coto argued that making Port jobs more accessible and fair for racial minority 
Oaklanders would reduce unemployment and improve the city as a whole, since the Port 
was connected to many of the city’s institutions and other industries. Although phrased 
differently, Coto’s proposal contained similar core elements to Seale’s.42 
Radicals also influenced some of the affairs within Oakland’s city council as the 
decade progressed, most notably with their efforts in solidarity with the anti-apartheid 
movement in South Africa. As part of the international struggle against the white 
supremacist policies of the minority Afrikaner population in South Africa against the 
Black majority, the anti-apartheid movement partially involved a boycott, divestment, 
and sanction campaign where international governments, corporations, private citizens, 
and other entities would withdraw investments within South African corporations. 
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Similar to the April Coalition in Berkeley, radicals in Oakland worked to convince the 
city council to divest the city’s pension funds from South Africa. At one city council 
meeting in late March 1977, radicals representing the Socialist Workers Party and the 
Black Panther Party, along with a handful of liberal Black community activists, made 
their case to the city, focusing on the ways that Oakland’s investments in South Africa 
contributed to the oppression of Black South Africans, particularly as workers. In a 
motion made by John Sutter and seconded by Joe Coto, the council brought the resolution 
to request the city’s municipal employees, including the police and fire departments, to a 
vote, with Sutter and Coto casting the lone supportive votes in a 5-to-2 defeat. On May 
31st, however, Sutter made another motion to vote on this issue, which passed with a 4-to-
2 vote, even with Coto, ironically, being absent from that meeting. This demonstrated 
that although the convergence of radical and liberal allies often brought policy 
suggestions closer to the liberal side, sometimes these alliances could foster a leftward 
shift in policy.43 
 
The 1977 Mayoral Race, an Electoral Split, and Re-convergence of Allies 
The momentum the Black Panther Party had gained through Seale and Brown’s 
1973 campaigns and Brown’s 1975 campaign continued to swell heading into the 1977 
election cycle. Brown herself would not run for election a third time; however, she was 
instrumental in organizing grassroots support for Lionel Wilson, the candidate who 
                                                 
     43 “Socialist Workers Campaign ’77, An Open Letter to All Oakland Candidates,” Oakland Elections 
1977 folder, Oakland History Room, Oakland Public Library; Ann E. Fields, “Oakland Council Won’t 
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gained the Panthers’ endorsement. A leader on the Oakland Economic Development 
Council and a judge for the Alameda County Superior Court since 1960—the first Black 
person in the county’s history— Wilson embarked on his campaign in early January 1977 
as a newcomer to electoral politics but a veteran of local affairs. Similar to Seale and 
Brown’s 1973 platform, Wilson centered his platform on economic issues, particularly 
the unemployment crisis afflicting the city, with estimates as high as thirty percent 
unemployment for Oakland’s communities of color and a rate of forty percent for Black 
youth. At his announcement for his campaign, Wilson declared his would provide 
“leadership that will listen and respond to the concerns of all sectors of our city – 
minority groups, women, working class citizens, industry and business, you and senior 
citizens.”44 Wilson had previous connections with the Black Panther Party when he 
appointed Brown to the OEDC the previous year and gained endorsements from various 
Panther sympathizers, including Congressman Ron Dellums, and mainstream 
organizations and politicians, including the United Democrats. With a base including the 
Panthers’ grassroots mobilization support and the mainstream Black community leaders 
and organizations, Wilson was primed to mount a campaign that would finally break 
through the downtown business establishment’s decades-long hold on the mayor’s 
office.45 
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In line with his endorsements of Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown in their earlier 
municipal campaigns, Cesar Chavez officially backed Wilson for the mayor’s office. At a 
late March 1977 press conference, Chavez and Wilson highlighted their points of 
commonality and mutual admiration. Chavez pointed to Wilson’s commitment to solving 
Oakland’s unemployment crisis as an issue behind which organized labor should stand, 
with Wilson adding that “Attitudes which would ignore the rights of laborers in the fields 
are the same attitudes which would tolerate high unemployment in Oakland.”46 Similarly 
to the Panthers’ 1973 electoral campaigns, Chavez pledged the help of UFW staff and 
volunteers in the Bay Area toward Wilson’s campaign, including outreach to Mexican 
American communities. Although never a Black Panther himself, Lionel Wilson 
demonstrated the ability to rally the campaign infrastructure the Panthers had created 
earlier in the decade. 
Just a few weeks after Wilson announced his candidacy, Joe Coto announced he 
would forgo re-election as a councilmember. Instead, he decided to run for mayor, with 
Carter Gilmore seeking election to take Coto’s city council seat. Some pundits had 
speculated that Coto might run for the mayor’s office as early as the summer after his 
successful 1973 city council bid, and rumors swirled midway through his city council 
term that Mayor John Reading might endorse Coto to run as his successor after his 
retirement from office in 1977, though Reading quickly disavowed these rumors. Despite 
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this, Coto’s entry into the mayoral race still surprised many within Oakland’s different 
political circles. Former Brown Berets working within La Raza Unida Party mobilized 
heavily for Coto’s campaign, with Coto emphasizing the need for a bilingual campaign 
and eventually garnering the support of El Mundo, the most esteemed Spanish-language 
newspaper in the East Bay. Yet Coto’s candidacy also concerned those rallied around 
Wilson and the Left in Oakland in general. Although other left-leaning racial minorities 
would run against them, Wilson and Coto represented two of the most prominent faces on 
the Left in Oakland. Since Coto and Wilson were both racial minorities with similar jobs-
oriented platforms and the support of multiracial, anti-establishment mobilizations, those 
on the Left worried that they would split the Left vote in an inverse of the Coto-Gilmore 
plan in 1973, leaving an easier path for David Tucker, the candidate representing the 
downtown business establishment, toward the Mayor’s Office.47 
The 1977 Nominating Municipal Election pitted Wilson, Coto, and Tucker, 
among other candidates, against each other. Other racial minorities would be counted 
among the candidates, including African American Laney College professor Victor 
James, Jr., and Mexican American businessman Hector Reyna, with the latter threatening 
to potentially split Oakland’s Latina/o vote. Yet when the final votes were tallied, only 
Wilson, Tucker, and Coto received more than ten percent of the votes, garnering 31,297 
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(44.22%), 25,727 (36.35%), and 9,806 (13.86%) respectively. Similarly to 1973, the 1977 
mayoral election would require a run-off election between a downtown establishment 
candidate and a Black Panther Party-endorsed candidate. As the May 17th election 
approached, Wilson picked up perhaps the most significant endorsement imaginable: Joe 
Coto’s. On April 28th, Coto formally announced his and his campaign’s official 
endorsement for Wilson and their organizing strength toward his election on May 17 th. 
Similar to his prior efforts with Carter Gilmore, Coto worked to elect Wilson, since he 
and Wilson shared more in common with their platforms and policies than he did with 
Tucker. Not all of Coto’s campaign leaders joined Coto in this endeavor; members of the 
business establishment like Laurence Bolling, Sally Sprague, and C.J. Patterson threw 
their support behind Tucker, with whom they aligned much more closely in terms of 
policy than they had with Coto. Yet the majority of Coto’s campaign supporters 
redirected their support toward Wilson, who won the General Municipal Election with 
42,961 votes (53.69%) to Tucker’s 37,060 (46.31%), making him the first Black mayor in 
Oakland’s history. With the election of Wilson to the mayor’s office and Gilmore and 
fellow Democrat Mary Moore joining seated councilmember John Sutter and left-leaning 
re-elected Republican George Vukasin, the Left secured a majority on the city council, 
also for the first time in Oakland’s history.48 
Four weeks after defeating David Tucker in the run-off election, Lionel Wilson 
named the members of his “transition team,” ahead of his July 1st inauguration for the 
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Mayor’s office. Although Wilson stated the transition team was “not a representative 
body” and was tasked first to form a Mayor’s Advisory Committee that would represent 
interests of all parts of Oakland, its twenty members represented many of Oakland’s 
racial groups, community institutions, and interest groups, including clergy, college 
educators, women’s organizations, organized labor, businessmen, and attorneys. Standing 
or former political officials or recent candidates constituted a plurality on the transition 
team, including Black Panther Party Chairperson Elaine Brown, outgoing City 
Councilman Joe Coto and his successor Carter Gilmore, and former Mayoral candidate 
and current City Councilman John Sutter. The presence of these members of their 
respective 1973 slates, along with Coto’s endorsement of Wilson following April’s 
Municipal Nominating Election, demonstrated the sizeable overlap between the platforms 
and political views of BPP-backed candidate and those endorsed by the majority of 
former Brown Berets working within La Raza Unida Party. Thus, although they traversed 
separate paths within Oakland’s electoral politics, the Panthers and Berets re-converged 
within this largely non-radical political formation after the 1977 election cycle.49 
 
Conclusion 
Radical activists in Berkeley and Oakland built formidable oppositions toward 
their respective local political establishments during the 1970s, with the April Coalition 
finding immediate success in 1971 and Black Panther- and Brown Beret-affiliated 
politicians finding growing success until their 1977 crescendo. Yet, even in the early 
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aftermath of their successes, radicals in Berkeley and Oakland faced mounting challenges 
to their gains. While the early decade seemed to beckon a new era in Berkeley politics, 
internationalist radicals had suffered a staggering run of defeats by the end of the 1970s. 
Their broad-based aspirations and visions toward a more democratic and self-determined 
governance were stifled from the moment they took a trace of power, with continual 
resistance by conservatives and most liberals. D’Army Bailey’s unrelenting conflicts with 
Loni Hancock and the Berkeley City Council, coupled with his alienation of much of the 
rest of his constituency, demonstrated how interpersonal tensions could derail a common 
struggle. In addition, Warren Widener’s defection from the liberal establishment to the 
April Coalition then back again highlighted the tenuous nature of political alliances 
during this era, especially between liberal and radical politicians, who, although shared 
similar concerns over social, economic, and political issues, often disagreed with their 
root causes and prescriptions to fix these issues. Ultimately, while Berkeley radicals 
gained some victories in the 1970s, ideological divisions between and within different 
electorates and structural impediments within political channels limited and overturned 
much of what they had fought for. 
The leftward shift in Oakland politics also would soon encounter its own 
resistance. Similarly to Berkeley, Oakland city council elections began operating at the 
district level, rather than city-wide, beginning in the early 1980s. Whereas this change 
undercut Berkeley radicals’ ability to mobilize city-wide campaign slates, district 
elections hampered the electoral power of Oakland’s racial minorities, who by 1980 
constituted over sixty percent of Oakland’s citizenry, with Black communities 
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constituting a plurality at approximately forty-seven percent and Latinas/os nearly ten 
percent. Ironically, liberal and leftist activists pushed for this change in the attempt to 
gain more leverage in the electoral process. Yet, even as housing barriers gradually broke 
down within Oakland’s historically exclusionary neighborhoods, the status quo of spatial 
segregation left some of Oakland’s districts predominantly white and affluent. Although 
racial minorities overwhelmingly leaned leftward, whether liberal or radical, white (and 
especially white conservative) Oaklanders retained political power disproportionate to 
their population size through the district system. And Oakland’s poverty rate remaining 
stagnant between 1980 and 1990 suggested that even with racial minorities in Oakland’s 
city governance, widespread progress would not come easily.50 
The arena of electoral politics rendered multiracial coalitions prone to divisions. 
The nature of elections focused on vesting power within a handful of individuals, with 
divergences between politicians causing more immediate splits than when disagreements 
arose among organizations in coalitions. Self-proclaimed radicals found gaining office 
difficult, particularly if they continued to carry the stigma of violent imagery and rhetoric 
of their previous incarnations. Moreover, radicals running for office often tempered or 
repackaged their platform, struggling to articulate their ideologies and principles in a way 
that made them understandable and appealing in a mainstream political context. While 
self-determination remained the central goal, working through electoral politics would 
bring slow and incremental changes, often wrought with constraints within the political 
process and with convincing a majority of those within city governance or the local 
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citizenry the desirability of their policy proposals. At the same time, organizations like 
the Black Panther Party and the Brown Berets found success in registering voters and 
mobilizing toward candidates they backed. While unable to steer policies to the exact 
alignment of their political philosophies, radical activists could still affect local elections 
and left reverberations that would be felt long after the end of this era. Ultimately, 
however, whether pursuing self-determination by trying to evade the state’s grasp or 
working to use the state’s systems and resources to their advantage, radical activists 
remained encumbered by obstacles difficult to overcome. And while alliances and 
coalitions helped with this endeavor, these connections only went so far in radicals’ work 
to eradicate oppression from society. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion: The Decline and Legacy of Internationalist Radicalism in the San Francisco 
Bay Area 
 
1968 has long signified both the end of “the Sixties” and the zenith of radicalism 
in the history of United States. Arguments for this periodization often hinge on 
interpretations advanced by Todd Gitlin, Maurice Isserman, Michael Kazin, and similar 
scholars who argue for the growth and increasing unity of the US Left until 1968, when 
the proliferation of people of color and women’s organizations allegedly fractured this 
unity. Some historians have located the apex of radical protest in 1968 by relating US 
radicalism to related global events, pointing to government repression in the West like 
Charles de Gaulle’s crushing the Paris Commune. Others like Jeremi Suri argue that the 
rise of détente between the United States, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of 
China, and others involved in the Cold War after 1968 served not so much to lay a path 
toward peace among these countries but rather as a way for their governments to focus 
more on quelling dissent within their respective populaces. Yet as this dissertation has 
shown—in line with recent scholarship—the United States experienced an insurgence of 
radical activism during and after 1968, particularly among those who identified as Third 
World peoples and other radicals who worked in solidarity with them.1 
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For a number of radicals during the 1960s and 70s, the end of these decades 
signaled not a “declension” in radicalism, but rather a transformation. The League of 
Revolutionary Struggle (LRS) perhaps signified transformation more than any 
organization. The LRS formed in 1978 from a merger between the predominantly-
Chicana/o August Twenty-Ninth Movement and I Wor Kuen, originally a Chinese 
American organization that absorbed the San Francisco-based Red Guard Party earlier in 
the 1970s and eventually other Asian Americans among their ranks. By late 1979, the 
LRS incorporated the Amiri Baraka-led Revolutionary Communist League into its 
organization, marking the first time a Marxist organization had Black, Chicana/o, and 
Asian American members among its ranks with equal representation and power within 
the organization. Despite their adherence to Marxism-Leninism, the League of 
Revolutionary Struggle also engaged with issues they might have earlier deemed 
“reformist,” including electoral politics. Joining the Union of Democratic Filipinos and 
other radical organizations, the LRS organized nationally for Jesse Jackson’s 1984 and 
1988 Rainbow Coalition campaigns, the name for which Jackson appropriated from the 
late 1960s and early 1970s Rainbow Coalition organized by the Illinois Chapter of the 
Black Panther Party and other Chicago-based radical organizations. Other organizations 
who underwent transformations included the Third World Women’s Alliance, who 
became the Alliance Against Women’s Oppression in 1980. The AAWO expanded its 
visions of liberation to include anti-homophobia and anti-heteronormativity as 
oppressions against which women should struggle and incorporated white women into 
their organization for the first time. Whether campaigning vigorously for an unabashed 
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capitalist like Jackson or broadening their goals toward the dismantling of other forms of 
structural oppression, some prominent radical organizations of the 1970s remained 
invigorated with their activism into the 1980s.2 
At the same time, radical politics permeated the mainstream of US society during 
the 1960s and 70s in a manner unlike the decades prior or since, begging the question of 
why this fall from prominence occurred. One reason for the diversity within the League 
of Revolutionary Struggle was the reality that as its previous organizations continued to 
shed members, they needed to merge with other organizations to sustain themselves. 
Other merger organizations similar to the LRS like the Communist Party (Marxist-
Leninist) and the Democratic Workers Party met their demise by the early 1980s, as did 
virtually all the organizations I have examined in this study.3 A multitude of factors 
contributed to the general falling out of favor of radical politics and activism within 
mainstream society by the early 1980s, from shifts in the political economy of the United 
States to numerous issues within the Left itself. 
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The advent of deindustrialization within the United States marked one of these 
factors. As stated toward the beginning of Chapter Six, one of the trajectories along 
which internationalist radicals followed during the 1970s was labor union organizing. 
Although labor organizations such as the League of Revolutionary Black Workers existed 
before the 1970s, radical organizations previously involved with labor unions in marginal 
or non-existent ways invested more of their energies and resources into this endeavor. 
Organized labor made significant gains during the 1970s, albeit not to the heights of 
political and economic power organized labor reached from the mid-1930s to the mid-
1940s before the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 (Chapter Three). Yet this 
decade also saw the beginnings of corporations involved with manufacturing closing 
many sites of production in the United States and the movement of production overseas, 
to Mexico and other countries in Latin America and spreading to Africa and Asia as the 
decade progressed. The hemorrhaging of production jobs weakened organized labor, 
leaving its constituents in a state of continual economic precariousness in the decades 
thereafter.4 
The rise of mass incarceration also contributed to the decline of radical activism 
in the 1970s. Urban, working-class communities of color—who comprised the primary 
bases for radical organizations in the Bay Area—felt the brunt of punitive policing and 
unequal treatment under the law before this decade, disproportionately comprising the 
prison population within the United States. Beginning with the presidency of Richard 
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Nixon, however, the federal government’s “war on drugs” amplified police attention to 
these communities while subjecting those convicted of drug-related offenses to more 
severe sentencing. Quelling dissent underpinned the changes Nixon’s administration 
brought, as former Nixon domestic-policy adviser John Erlichman laid out in a 1994 
interview:  
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two 
enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We 
knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting 
the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then 
criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their 
leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on 
the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.5 
 
Historian Heather Ann Thompson notes that mass incarceration magnified the problems 
within the urban crisis and growing unemployment caused by deindustrialization. 
Moreover, federal and state legislation barred citizens with criminal records from voting, 
meaning that the “war on drugs” that targeted racial minorities became a tool to 
disenfranchise these groups in the aftermath of progress gained from federal civil rights 
legislation in the mid-1960s. Thus, even though the crime rate in California peaked in 
1980, California’s prison population boomed to over 160,000 after the 1970s, with the 
majority of those incarcerated coming from the urban, working-class communities of 
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color from which internationalists in the 1960s and 70s garnered the bulk of their 
membership and support.6 
Growing economic precariousness among the white working class and mass 
incarceration contributed to the overall rightward political shift the United States 
experienced in the 1970s. Conservatives had mobilized since the mid-1960s against what 
they perceived as the threat to their political power (and its attendant economic, cultural, 
and social influence) from left-leaning racial minorities, women, LGBTQ-identified 
people, and other marginalized groups in society who had made social progress in the 
1960s and early 1970s. This conservative influence also permeated the Bay Area. As 
historian Robert Self explains, the dominant political discourse in Oakland and its East 
Bay suburbs shifted from a focus on the benefits of public services and assistance to the 
costs thereof. As mentioned toward the end of Chapter Six, East Bay white suburbanites 
mobilized at the forefront of the campaign for California Proposition 13 in early June 
1978. With its passage, Prop. 13 limited state and local regulations on property taxes. 
Since property taxes in Alameda County were collected on the county level, white 
suburbanites in the East Bay in the aftermath of Prop. 13’s passage continued to reap the 
benefits from the postwar suburban boom they and their parents’ generation had 
fashioned (Chapter Two) while continuing to decimate the tax base that would allocate 
public benefits for communities near its urban cores. Later that month, the Supreme 
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Court of the United States put forth their decision for Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke (1978). Despite opposition from both liberal and radical legal 
scholars and activists like the Third World Women’s Alliance, the Court ruled as 
unconstitutional the guaranteed minimum number of admissions slots the School of 
Medicine at UC Davis set aside for racial minority applicants. Conservative victories 
such as Prop. 13 and the Bakke decision highlighted the conservative counterinsurgency 
that stemmed the tide of liberal and radical activism of the prior two decades.7 
Internationalist radicals in the Bay Area also experienced more immediate threats 
to their organizations’ survival. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) continued to monitor and at times disrupt 
activist organizations. Activists often sensed when COINTELPRO surveillance occurred, 
such as the heyday of the Black Panther Party in the early 1970s or with the explicitly-
militant Symbionese Liberation Army that engaged in open armed conflict and guerrilla 
warfare tactics with police officers. Yet organizations could also experience infiltration 
from the most unlikely of sources, as recent discoveries from FBI records attained by 
journalist Seth Rosenfeld attest. Rosenfeld discovered that Black Panther Party and Asian 
American Political Alliance member Richard Aoki had served as a paid informant for the 
FBI during much of the 1960s and 70s. Rosenfeld first released one set of these FBI 
records to the public in August 2012, partially to promote his forthcoming book 
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Subversives. Heavily redacted to the point of indecipherability and containing numerous 
errors in identifying Aoki, these records still left questionable the allegation of Aoki as 
informant. This uncertainty changed, however, when Rosenfeld released a second set of 
FBI records in June 2015. Although the specifics of the nature of Aoki’s informant 
work—merely as a surveillance agent or also as a saboteur and provocateur—remain 
unclear from Rosenfeld’s released records, the allegation that Aoki worked for the FBI 
turned virtually indisputable. Thus, although radicals’ suspicion of each other at times 
could seem paranoid, the Aoki revelations demonstrate just how pervasive 
COINTELPRO surveillance could be.8 
In addition, activists themselves exacerbated divisions within their networks. 
After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, internationalist radicals found themselves 
without a prominent unifying cause that also made inroads with mainstream society. 
Some organizations at times supported regressive political positions or policies, such as 
the Revolutionary Communist Party’s homophobic party line or their reaction against 
Black students’ attempts to secure equitable public education opportunities during the 
Boston “busing” crisis. Internal ideological conflicts continued to produce splits within 
organizations, as did more mundane conflicts, as when the Black Panther Party central 
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leadership in Oakland ordered (usually without success) its chapters across the country to 
prioritize selling the Panthers’ newspaper over the local problems that rooted those 
chapters’ activism. Interpersonal relationships within these organizations also caused 
members to leave, ranging from substance abuse issues such as Huey Newton’s cocaine 
addiction to the continual marginalization of women in organizations like the Black 
Panther Party and Los Siete de La Raza. Elaine Brown and Donna Amador, respectively, 
left these organizations during the 1970s because of certain gender-related issues, such as 
continual male chauvinism within the BPP for the former or the unwillingness for the 
organization’s leadership to understand her need to take maternity leave from organizing. 
Although occurring within the broader contexts of changes within the local and national 
political economy and external surveillance and pressures, discord and unequal treatment 
within organizations also played a key role in the decline of this era of radicalism in Bay 
Area history.9 
Certain themes have permeated throughout this study. Most centrally, I have 
endeavored to demonstrate the importance that internationalist radicals placed on 
building and maintaining alliances with likeminded activists. I argued that highlighting 
these “genealogies of alliance” through their formation, dissolution, and reconstitution 
                                                 
     9 Revolutionary Communist Party, “On the Position on Homosexuality in the New Draft Programme,” 
RCP, USA, accessed April 5, 2016, <http://revcom.us/margorp/homosexuality.htm>; Elbaum, Revolution 
in the Air, 81. On the ways that the term “busing” obfuscated the core issue of this episode in US history 
(i.e. ending discrimination in education), see Matthew Delmont, Why Busing Failed: Race, Media, and the 
National Resistance to School Desegregation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
2016); Letter from James Parhms to Huey Newton, Sept. 22, 1972, Series 2, Box 13, Folder 6, Dr. Huey P. 
Newton Foundation Records, M864, Department of Special Collections, Stan ford University, Palo Alto, 
CA; Elaine Brown, A Taste of Power: A Black Woman’s Story (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992 ), 438-
440, 443-450; Jason Ferreira, “All Power to the People: A Comparative History of Third World Radicalism 
in San Francisco, 1968-1974,” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2003), 382-383. 
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across different mobilizations and issues illustrates their significance within this history. 
Although not my initial intent, I discuss the tensions and also points of unity between 
“liberal” and “radical” activists, emphasizing the dilemmas that radical activists faced in 
supporting more liberal types of reforms and noting that most divisions found within this 
study existed not because of racial divisions but because of ideological and strategic ones. 
Finally, I endeavored to broaden the framework surrounding each of the central issues 
within the two anti-imperialism and two self-determination chapters, ranging from how 
anti-imperialism politics within the Vietnam War moved beyond the mainstream antiwar 
movement of the mid-1960s to discussing electoral politics and community control as an 
avenue toward gaining self-determination for local communities of color and other 
marginalized populaces. 
The feasibility of alliances and how they manifested varied among issues and 
mobilizations. Internationalist radicals often found anti-imperialist alliances easier to 
create and maintain than alliances toward self-determination. While differing in critique 
and rationale for opposing common enemies still allowed room for anti-imperialist 
alliances, divergent visions of what constituted self-determination and how oppressed 
peoples might achieve this limited and at times precluded alliances of these sorts. Put 
another way, uniting against common enemies proved more sustainable and less 
discordant than rebuilding communities and their institutions toward the liberation of the 
people therein. The subjects of this study demonstrate that alliances by and in themselves 
will not create social change and dismantle systems of inequality and oppression. Yet 
informal and formal coalitions and solidarity remain necessary for social and political 
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activists in the present. Historical movements provide organizers with lessons with which 
they can navigate contemporary issues toward successful outcomes. In recent years, 
movements and organizations like Black Lives Matter, (formerly) the DREAMers, APIs 
4 Black Lives Matter, the Standing Rock Sioux and their anti-Dakota Access Pipeline 
protests, and Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) in solidarity with the Palestinian 
people have all given and answered calls for solidarity among each other. And while 
movements can gain progress on their own, alliances among movements still provide the 
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